
Although public-health-based violence-prevention trials have been successful in a variety of high-risk settings, no study has addressed the prevention of genocide, a form of population-based catastrophic violence. In addition, little is known about women who participate in genocide, including women's motivations for active participation in hands-on battery, assault, or murder. In order to explain why women assaulted or murdered targeted victims during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, we interviewed ten Rwandan female genocide perpetrators living in prisons and communities in six Rwandan provinces in 2005. Respondents’ narratives reveal two distinct pictures of life in Rwanda, separated by an abrupt transition: Life prior to 6 April 1994 and Life during the 1994 genocide (6 April-15 July 1994). In addition, respondents described four experiential pressures that shaped their choices to participate in the 1994 genocide: (1) a disaster mentality; (2) fear of the new social order; (3) confusion or ambivalence about events on the ground; and (4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles. The unique combination of these factors that motivated each female genocide participant in Rwanda in 1994 would shift and evolve with new situations. These findings may have implications for understanding and preventing catastrophic violence in other high-risk jurisdictions.

- Mostly 1994, explanation of violence committed by women
- Grounded theory, data gathered in interviews with 10 women convicted of participating in the genocide


The authors combine detailed event data about the timing and location of localized crop failure and armed conflict with Rwandan nationally representative household survey data (collected in 1992 prior to the 1994 genocide) to examine the impact of these shocks on the health status of young children who were exposed to them. They come to the conclusion that children born during the civil war in the conflict region, girls as well as boys, from poor as well as nonpoor households, are negatively affected by the war exposure. Conversely, girls born during a crop failure in the affected regions are particularly vulnerable, and the impact is even worse for girls in poor households. They find no evidence of a negative impact of crop failure exposure on the health status of boys or children in nonpoor households.

- econometric analysis

The author explores political reconciliation efforts and the role of truth telling in healing deeply divided societies. He further assesses two ways to serve justice in Rwanda – retributive legal accountability as pursued by the ICTR or Rwandan courts and the restorative justice approach of the *gacaca* courts. Finally, he examines the role of churches in facilitating political reconciliation. The author concludes that the *gacaca* courts’ restorative justice approach is an adequate answer to the challenge of serving justice to the victims. However, he argues that it is not sufficient and that churches are crucial in reforming the societies’ values in order to reach reconciliation. (JG)

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice, truth and reconciliation efforts, role of church
- Qualitative analysis


An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda-1994. The theory considers ‘macro’ conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and ‘micro’ conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority’s choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.

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This paper studies the Rwandan case to address some of the challenges and pitfalls in defining pro-poor strategies. The paper first looks at the danger of a purely growth-led development focus (as in Rwanda’s first PRSP), and evaluates the extent to which the agricultural sector has been a pro-poor growth engine. It then studies Rwanda’s current rural policies, which aim to modernise and ‘professionalise’ the rural sector. There is a high risk that these rural policy measures will be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. This paper stresses that the real challenge to transform the rural sector into a true pro-poor growth engine will be to value and incorporate the capacity and potential of small-scale ‘non-professional’ peasants into the core strategies for rural development. The
lessons drawn from the Rwandan case should inspire policy makers and international donors worldwide to shift their focus away from a purely output-led logic towards distribution-oriented rural development policies. In other words, the challenge is to reconcile efficiency in creating economic growth with equity, and perhaps, to put equity first.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, economic development
- Case-Study, analysis of economic indicators


This article analyses the Rwandan elite’s visions and ambitions for a wide-ranging re-engineering of rural society. The post-1994 political elite has few links to rural society and the peasant way of life, and sees little room for small-scale peasant agriculture in Rwanda’s economic future. The article shows how current Rwandan policy makers aim to realize three social engineering ambitions: first, to transform the agricultural sector into a professionalized motor for economic growth, centred on competitive and commercial farm units; second, to artificially upgrade rural life by inserting ‘modern’ techniques and strategies into local realities, while hiding true poverty and inequality; and, finally, to transform Rwanda into a target-driven society from the highest to the lowest level. The article points to the (potential) dangers, flaws, and shortcomings of this rural re-engineering mission, and illustrates how the state as the engineer ‘hovers’ above the local without consulting those affected. It concludes that contemporary polices are unlikely to be conducive to poverty reduction.

- Pre- and (mostly) post-genocide Rwanda, the regime’s strategy to reform the rural society
- Qualitative study based on interviews with 26 high- and low-ranking government officials and secondary data


This article focuses on the Rwandan peasantry to confirm how "views from below" can contribute to a better understanding of the "pro-poor" growth challenge. Based on micro-level evidence gathered in 2007, it examines local peasants’ perceptions of the characteristics and degree of poverty for different socioeconomic categories (i.e., peasant groups). It looks at the various opportunities and constraints that influence the potential of these categories or groups for social mobility and their capacity to participate in growth strategies. Further, it considers how local peasants perceive specific policy measures in the Rwandan government’s "pro-poor" rural strategies. Their insights could inspire Rwandan policymakers and supporting donors to redirect their efforts toward distribution-oriented growth strategies.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, rural development strategies
- Qualitative study based on interview data

The paper applies a quantitative methodology to study poverty and livelihood profiles on the basis of a large set of variables. It takes the context of post-conflict rural Rwanda for a case study. By means of exploratory tools (i.e. principal component and cluster analysis), it combines variables that capture natural, physical, human, financial and social resources together with environmental factors to identify household groups with varying livelihoods. The paper further explores how these clusters differ with regards the incidence of poverty, livelihood strategies and their respective crop preferences. The paper concludes that Rwandan rural policies should adopt distinct and appropriate interventions for impoverished peasant groups, each having their own particular livelihood profiles.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, analysis of livelihood profiles
- Quantitative methodology, (cluster analysis)


This paper considers the progress made in the implementation of Rwanda’s Vision 2020 programme since its launch in 2000. At the halfway point, the overall picture is quite encouraging. Rwanda’s economy is thriving and reported growth figures have been impressive. The country is on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals in the fields of education and health care. Its political leaders have been praised for their quality of technocratic governance and their proactive approach to creating an attractive business climate. However, some indicators remain problematic. This paper argues that the current strategy – one of maximum growth at any cost – is counterproductive to the objective of achieving the greatest possible poverty reduction. Strong economic growth, concentrated in the hands of a small elite, results in a highly skewed developmental path with limited trickle-down potential. A possible alternative lies in an exploration of a broad-based inclusive growth model founded on existing strengths and the notion of capacity building among rural small-scale farmers. Striving for a more inclusive concept of growth would appear to be crucial not only for successful poverty reduction, but also with a view to promoting long-term stability and peace in Rwanda.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, economic development strategies of the government, economic inequality
- Case study, analysis of economic indicators


Three transitional justice processes, namely the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the National Genocide Trials (NGTs) and Gacaca courts, have been instituted to deal with the issues of justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. All three processes are examples of the liberal-prosecution model, i.e. they seek to punish the
perpetrators of the genocide. In their operation, the three processes have exhibited due process deficiencies which have impacted on the perception of "justice." As a result, both the perpetrators and victim-survivors of the genocide feel that they are victims and not recipients of justice. This paper argues that the resulting deficiencies are due to the three processes being rooted in different prosecutorial traditions and philosophies. Whereas the ICTR is rooted in adversarial tradition, the National Genocide Trials are rooted in the inquisitorial tradition, and the Gacaca process is an example of popular justice. In view of the procedural deficiencies in the three processes therefore, the paper advocates for a restorative type of justice in post-genocide Rwanda.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice process
- Comparative analysis of the philosophical and prosecutorial underpinnings of the three different transitional justice approaches in Rwanda


Since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, scholars and policy think-tanks have produced an impressive number of macro-level studies and theories to explain the seemingly inexplicable: how and why did this happen? Yet these studies, most often based on ethnic and/or global level analyses, tend to simplify complex social relations at the local level which likewise contributed to the genocide. This article examines 'micro-level' testimonial evidence collected in human rights reports to shed light on one particularly under-theorised realm and approach, that of gender and the politics of the body. I suggest that the 1994 genocide was an extreme attempt not only to purge the 'Hutu nation' of the Tutsi, but also to actively engender a vision of the 'Hutu nation' in the minds of an otherwise diverse and fragmented local populace. Women's bodies, gender and sexuality became highly contested terrains for scripting this vision of an imagined nation.

- Pre-genocide Rwanda and 1994, explanation of violence
- Qualitative study


Civil war (1990–1994) and genocide (1994) left the Rwandan government with the daunting task of re-establishing internal security. The policing model they have pursued, reflecting their regime ideology, is a hybrid model. It combines a modern professional and disciplined police force with the informal social control mechanisms of popular justice. The article, based on two months fieldwork in 2006, demonstrates that the model has provided an effective, popular and universally accessible policing that is not resource intensive. Yet its success has to be tempered by reflection that civil liberties have been compromised by an intrusive surveillance at local level, and by repressive responses to anything perceived as opposition to the ruling party at national level. Rwanda's special circumstances make listing durable
substantive lessons with widespread applicability unwise. But, there is a case for re-
examining the potential of using informal security structures with varying degrees of
connection to the state in the overall national internal security strategy.

- Article not available online through umich!


The authors aim is to assess the influence of economic policies on identities, and the
resulting conflicts. They illustrate these possible identity disturbances induced by policies
using the example of the Rwandan genocide. The authors argue that identity adjustments
due to economic policies have potentially devastating effects and that in the case of
Rwanda, the economic policies imposed by the international organizations have contributed
to the crisis and eventually the genocide. (JG)

- 1994, explanation of the genocide
- Case study?


*The author gives an account of his first visit to Rwanda, the Commonwealth’s newest
member, and describes the process leading up to Rwanda’s admission. Commitment to and
expectations of the Commonwealth are high in Rwanda and the Commonwealth has a
position there of considerable leverage and influence.*

- Post-genocide Rwanda
- Descriptive report – the journal is probably not peer-reviewed! > exclude…?


This article analyses how political space, defined here as the ability of actors other than the
government to critically engage in debate on government policy and practice, is being
constituted in post-genocide Rwanda. Using evidence from interviews with civil society
activists and examples from the Rwandan Government's post-genocide policies, it explores
the kind of political space which results from an interplay of potentially competing influences.
These include the promotion of a liberal approach to democracy, favoured by many of
Rwanda's donors, and a more tightly-managed and limited transition which is both preferred
by and beneficial for the RPF Government. The article shows that although space could be
seen in some areas as opening, this trend is hampered by government actions, including
legislative and shadow methods, by donor reluctance to pressure the ruling RPF and by fear
within civil society of tackling politically sensitive issues. In conclusion, the author suggests
that this fear is reinforced by government policies which narrow perceptions of political
space, exacerbated by perceived abandonment of civil society by donors, and that in combination these factors pose a long-term challenge to more openly contested politics in Rwanda.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, government policies to manage political dissent
- Qualitative study, based on interview data


Beswick argues that the strict identity management of the government in post-genocide Rwanda has led to the further exclusion of the indigenous Batwa people, limiting their ability to effectively advocate for their rights. The author draws its conclusions on interviews with civil society activists, government representatives and bi- and multilateral donors. (JG)

- Post-genocide Rwanda, identity management of the government
- Qualitative study


This article explores the relationship between the UK and Rwanda, using the lens of the UK Department for International Development's integrated approach to state building and peace building in fragile and conflict-affected states. It identifies a number of priorities for UK aid under such a framework, but shows that in the case of Rwanda these have not been foregrounded in the bilateral aid relationship. The article suggests a number of reasons for this, arguing that, by refusing to acknowledge or address Rwanda's deviations from what was considered a positive development trajectory, the UK is becoming internationally isolated in its support for the RPF regime. It concludes that, while this bilateral relationship may support achievement of stability and relative security in Rwanda, promoting such a narrow form of state building is detrimental to more holistic peace building, both nationally and regionally.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, relationship UK-Rwanda, influence of the UK support for the regime on national and regional peace-building
- Qualitative case-study


This article specifies a simple mechanism - a *behavioral* norm defined in *ethnic* terms - to understand the dynamics of mass participation by reluctant Hutu in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The mechanism, which has not been analyzed systematically in the scholarly literature, is specified using an agent-based model of *within*-group interaction that captures the role of intra-Hutu coercion in precipitating genocidal violence, yet is general enough to be applied to other group conflicts and contexts. The model highlights the role of individual
heterogeneity, within-group punishment, behavioral adaptation, group networks, and ethnic entrepreneurs, and generates a set of results on norm formation and change, a number of which are not intuitive. These findings suggest that (1) norms are not equally likely to form in groups with similar aggregate preference; (2) a violence-promoting norm can emerge in a group dominated by moderates, and violence is not the inevitable outcome in a group dominated by extremists; (3) strong punishments are a prerequisite for the emergence of norms that promote interethnic violence or cooperation; (4) interaction patterns matter - for example, the segregation of an ethnic group clearly inhibits norm formation; and (5) an ethnic entrepreneur can effectively amplify norm formation within a group in the absence of strong punishment.

- 1994, explanation of mass participation by reluctant Hutu in violence

- agent-based model


This article specifies a novel theoretical framework to explore how rival ethnic groups learn from threats to ethnic kin in a neighboring country and from threats made by nominal rivals at home. We argue that a combination of external and internal threats causes violence domestically. Violence causes casualties, increases interethnic animosity, and generates refugee flows. These outcomes, in turn, contribute to renewed violence, reinforce or undermine disparities in power, and shape patterns of ethnic domination. Among the range of outcomes generated by our framework are those that bear a strong resemblance to the trajectory of ethnic domination in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad. [Supplemental materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher’s online edition of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics for the following free supplemental resource: an appendix of the framework’s formal aspects and technical details.]

- Pre-genocide until post genocide Rwanda, ethnic domination/minority rule in Burundi and Rwanda 1959 – 2003
- Qualitative


This paper argues that Rwanda’s decision to abolish the death penalty should be viewed in a wider context rather than as a mere result of top-down pressure from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Part I traces the creation of the ICTR and the breakdown of negotiations as a result of the exclusion of the death penalty from the ICTR’s jurisdiction. It then outlines Rwanda’s efforts to prosecute the hundreds of thousands of individuals accused of committing genocide-related crimes and notes the limited and steadily
decreasing role the death penalty actually played within Rwanda. Part II discusses Rwanda’s legislation abolishing the death penalty and argues that both international pressure and local historical and political forces influenced the decision. Part III situates Rwanda’s story within a growing paradox of excluding the death penalty from international criminal tribunals for the most serious crimes while national jurisdictions maintain it. It concludes that as in Rwanda, any perceived or potential impact of international criminal law in national jurisdictions must be measured in light of local circumstances.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, abolition of death penalty

- qualitative study


Academic debate on Rwanda has significant thematic gaps, and does not usually make use of a theoretically informed comparative framework. This article addresses one thematic gap – the distinctive approach of the RPF-led regime to political involvement in the private sector of the economy. It does so using the framework of a cross-national study which aims to distinguish between more and less developmental forms of neopatrimonial politics. The article analyses the RPF’s private business operations centred on the holding company known successively as Tri-Star Investments and Crystal Ventures Ltd. These operations are shown to involve the kind of centralized generation and management of economic rents that has distinguished the more developmental regimes of Asia and Africa. The operations of the military investment company Horizon and of the public–private consortium Rwanda Investment Group may be seen in a similar light. With some qualifications, we conclude that Rwanda should be seen as a developmental patrimonial state.

- Post-Genocide Rwanda, RPF’s approach to political involvement in the private sector
- Qualitative study


This article presents unique material from in-depth interviews with 16 women in Rwanda who have testified in the gacaca, the village tribunals initiated to enhance reconciliation after the 1994 genocide. The aim of the interviews was to learn more about how testifying in such a public event as the gacaca affects psychological health. Do the women find the experience healing or retraumatizing? Are there other effects involved? There has been an assumption that testifying in truth and reconciliation commissions is a healing experience for survivors, and healing has been a central concept in the general reconciliation literature and in political rhetoric around truth commissions. However, the findings of the present study are alarming. Traumatization, ill-health, isolation, and insecurity dominate the lives of these testifying women. They are threatened and harassed before, during, and after giving testimony in the gacaca. The article provides a picture of the reconciliation process that we seldom see.
Truth telling has come to play a pivotal role in postconflict reconciliation processes around the world. A common claim is that truth telling is healing and will lead to reconciliation. The present study applies recent psychological research to this issue by examining whether witnessing in the gacaca, the Rwandan village tribunals for truth and reconciliation after the 1994 genocide, was beneficial for psychological health. The results from the multistage, stratified cluster random survey of 1,200 Rwandans demonstrate that gacaca witnesses suffer from higher levels of depression and PTSD than do nonwitnesses, also when controlling for important predictors of psychological ill health. Furthermore, longer exposure to truth telling has not lowered the levels of psychological ill health, nor has the prevalence of depression and PTSD decreased over time. This study strongly challenges the claim that truth telling is healing and presents a novel understanding of the complexity of truth-telling processes in postconflict peace building.


This article explores and analyzes the role of women who exercised agency as perpetrators during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Genocide narratives traditionally cast women as victims, and many women did suffer horrific abuses and become victims of torture in Rwanda. However, this gender-based characterization of women is inaccurate and incomplete. After presenting a multidisciplinary body of literature relevant to female agency during genocide, this article explores three core questions related to female agency during the Rwandan genocide. It discusses how women were mobilized before and during the genocide, the specific actions of women who exercised agency and finally what happened to these women in the aftermath of the genocide. This article is based upon research that was gathered by the author and includes interviews of female perpetrators as well as victims and witnesses of direct violence committed by women. The article asserts that women played an active role in the Rwandan genocide but are often excluded from the dominant narrative. This article also addresses the implications of ignoring female perpetrators of genocide. It suggests that such an oversight may have a detrimental impact on the long-term peace and stability in post-genocide Rwanda.
More than a decade after the genocide, Rwanda’s local communities remain severely affected by the experience of the violence and horror. This is reflected in the way people remember their past, as well as in what they choose to forget. During fieldwork in Nyamata and Gikongoro it became apparent that even though the memory of the genocide as such, its pain and suffering, was essential for all interviewees, a clearer picture of the causes of the genocide had disappeared into oblivion. In this article I argue that this forgetting of pregenocide social cleavages reflects less a mental failure than a conscious coping mechanism. What I shall refer to as chosen amnesia, the deliberate eclipsing of particular memories, allows people to avoid antagonism and enables a degree of community cohesion necessary for the intimacy of rural life in Rwanda. While this is presently essential for local coexistence, it prevents the emergence of a critical challenge to the social cleavages that allowed the genocide to occur in the first place and impedes the social transformation necessary to render ethnicity-based violence impossible.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, dealing with the past (on an individual level)
- Qualitative study based on in-depth interviews and group discussions

The paper investigates the strategy of the Rwandan government in pursuing its stated objective of national unity and reconciliation after the 1994 genocide. In order to unmake the divisions of the past it promotes a notion of collective identity, which is no longer based on ethnic but on civic identity of all as citizens. The strategy is centred on an interpretation of Rwanda’s history according to which ethnicity did not exist prior to the arrival of the colonialists. But does narrating the nation as founded on ethnic harmony lead to unity in Rwanda? I argue that due to the top–down nature of the government’s history discourse, its censorship of alternative accounts as well as the deep scars of the genocide division and resentment persists. At present, ethnic belonging is still very important for most Rwandans restricting their willingness to consider different interpretations of the past. The paper draws on the teaching of history as an example of illustrating means by which the Rwandan government narrates its past. It analyses the debates about and practises of history teaching in schools as well as in education camps called ingandos through which released genocide prisoners, but also a considerably large portion of the society in general, have to pass. By way of conclusion it argues that the Rwandan government introduces narrative closure on
alternative interpretations of the past which stands in the way of reconciliation and a
genuinely grown national unity in the future.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, the government’s strategy of national unity and reconciliation,
history narrative
- Qualitative case study


Across Africa, many countries have taken initiatives to increase the participation and
representation of women in governance. Yet it is unclear what meaning these initiatives have
in authoritarian, single-party states like Rwanda. Since seizing power in 1994, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front has taken many steps to increase the participation of women in politics such
as creating a Ministry of Gender, organizing women's councils at all levels of government,
and instituting an electoral system with reserved seats for women in the national parliament.
This article explores the dramatic increase in women's participation in public life and
representation in governance and the increasing authoritarianism of the Rwandan state
under the guise of 'democratization'. The increased political participation of women in
Rwanda represents a paradox in the short term: as their participation has increased,
women's ability to influence policy making has decreased. In the long term, however,
increased female representation in government could prepare the path for their meaningful
participation in a genuine democracy because of a transformation in political subjectivity.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, gender balance in governance
- Qualitative case study


Based on long-term fieldwork in urban and rural Rwanda between 1997 and 2002 as well as
on recent focus groups and interviews conducted in May and June 2007, this article explores
local perceptions of the Gacaca process and asks whether Gacaca is fulfilling its primary
goals to "end impunity," promote reconciliation, and establish, in the words of Paul Kagame,
the "real truth of what happened during the Genocide." The findings indicate that how well
Gacaca is functioning varies a great deal from community to community. The most important
variable appears to be the character of the inyangamugayo ("persons of integrity") who serve
as both judge and jury in the Gacaca system. Regardless of how well Gacaca is operating,
in communities where research was conducted, the process has increased conflict in local
communities (or at least brought it to the surface) and intensified ethnic cleavages in the
short term. Since the Gacaca process began its pilot phase in 2001, community-based
organizations that had reestablished or built new cross-ethnic relationships have faced
extreme difficulties as other people (both Tutsi and Hutu) within the community have tried
to destroy solidarity across ethnic lines. Increasing ethnic cleavages in the short term would not
necessarily be a negative outcome if the long-term prospects for building a peaceful society
were good. Unfortunately, given local perceptions of widespread injustice in the Gacaca process, the latter is not the case.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, assessment of the gacaca process
- Qualitative, based on interviews


Building on previous studies of women's formal, descriptive, and substantive representation in Rwanda, this article examines women's symbolic representation, defined as the broader social and cultural impact of the greater representation of women in the Rwandan political system. It explores the cultural meanings of gender quotas by analyzing popular perceptions of women, of women's roles in politics and society more broadly, and of changing cultural practices vis-à-vis gender. Data were gathered over 24 months of ethnographic research conducted between 1997 and 2009 and by ongoing documentary research. The study finds that although Rwandan women have made few legislative gains, they have reaped other benefits, including increased respect from family and community members, enhanced capacity to speak and be heard in public forums, greater autonomy in decision making in the family, and increased access to education. Yet there have also been some unexpected negative consequences, such as increased friction with male siblings, male withdrawal from politics, increased marital discord, and a perception that marriage as an institution has been disrupted by the so-called upheaval of gender roles. Most significantly, increased formal representation of women has not led to increased democratic legitimacy for the government.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, female empowerment
- Ethnographic study


This article presents a synopsis of detailed research and analysis of British foreign policy in the Great Lakes region of Africa from 1990 and throughout the period of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The study evidences that the rebel guerrilla force of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was supported militarily and ideologically by the United Kingdom prior to its 1990 attack on Rwanda from Uganda; throughout the ensuing civil war in Rwanda between the RPF and the forces of the Government of Rwanda; and during the genocide and massacres of many thousands. The study confirms that the British government had a wealth of knowledge regarding insecurity and violence in Rwanda, and took a positive decision not to act to prevent or stop it, thereby omitting to fulfil its obligations in terms of the UN Convention on Genocide and International Law. It is suggested herein that the decision-making of the British government during the period 1990-94 advanced the interrelated goals of maintaining power status and ensuring economic interests in key areas of Africa, inferring a substantial degree of complicity in genocide by omission.

The article discusses the role of the Anglican Church in the post-genocide Rwanda. It states that Anglican church leaders were raised and educated in exile in Uganda and were attracted to Anglicanism because the exile community mistrusted the pro-Hutu Catholic Church before 1994. Reconciliation and unity as the call of Christianity were promoted by the Anglican Church in Rwanda. It notes that Rwandans perceive the Anglican leaders as outsiders for their use of English in church functions and discourses about the new Rwanda. The Anglican Mission in the Americas (AMIA) initiative was developed by the Anglican Church. Events related to the contribution of Emmanuel Kolini, bishop of the Kigali Diocese, are presented.


This paper applies an alternative model to analyze criminal behaviour by countries based on real option models. Criminal options incorporate a richer framework than traditional cost-benefit models and allow examining the optimal timing of a crime as criminals have the possibility but not the obligation to commit a crime in the near future. From the model, we show how criminal states can actively manage their criminal options. More importantly, we show how the international community can optimally intervene pro-actively, by reducing the incentives for criminal states to execute their criminal options. These novel insights are then applied to two episodes of criminal behaviour by Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): the massive killing of Hutu refugees by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) in late 1996-early 1997 and the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources from August 1998 onwards. This article describes and assesses these activities from this real option perspective.

The author tries to explain why there is disagreement in the human rights community about the gacaca courts in Rwanda. The author briefly outlines the proceedings of the gacaca trials and the charges brought against it by human rights NGOs such as AI and HRW. She provides several possible explanations for the division between these NGOs and others such as Avocats sans Frontières which are supportive of the gacaca process.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice
- Qualitative study


This article focuses on the gendered dimensions of the genocide in Rwanda. It seeks to explain why Tutsi women married to Hutu men appeared to have better chances of survival than Tutsi women married to Tutsi men or even Hutu women married to Tutsi men. Based on data from a field site in southwest Rwanda, the findings and insights offered here draw on the gendered, racial, and operational dynamics of the genocide as it unfolded between April and July 1994.

- 1994, gendered dimension of the genocide, interethnic marriages
- Qualitative study based on field work (mostly in-depth interviews and transcripts of trials at a gacaca tribunal)


The past cannot be changed, but we can learn from it. The purpose of this article is to explore some of the lessons that can be learnt from the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The first of these is that the génocidaires should not be dehumanised. This is simply to engage in the very process that made genocide possible in the first place. Rather, they should be given a voice. As the work of authors such as Hatzfield, McDoom, Mironko and Straus demonstrates, perpetrators’ stories can offer an important ‘insider’ perspective into events and add richness and texture to top-down elitist accounts of the genocide. The second lesson is that while it may be comforting to believe that genocide is only carried out by monsters and psychopaths – by people ‘not like us’ – the reality is that it is ordinary people who, under certain circumstances, commit genocide. Hence, it should not be seen as a crime that can only occur in ‘faraway’ places. The final lesson, which pertains to how we deal with the perpetrators of genocide and mass crimes, is that retributive justice is not a panacea in either post-genocide Rwanda or in post-conflict societies more generally. Perpetrators should be held accountable for their crimes, but criminal trials have limitations, particularly in facilitating reconciliation. Rather than relying exclusively on retributive justice, therefore,
post-conflict societies should wherever possible seek to combine criminal trials with restorative justice mechanisms.

- 1994 and post-genocide Rwanda, explanation of violence, transitional justice, lessons learnt
- Largely a literature review?


> no electronic access!


On August 9, 2010, Rwanda held its second Presidential elections since the genocide in 1994. As specified by the Rwandan constitution, the elections took place seven years after the 2003 Presidential elections when the at that time interim President Paul Kagame (Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF) was elected by an overwhelming majority of 95.5 percent (Meierhenrich, 2006). It was clear from the outset of the 2010 elections that Paul Kagame would be re-elected for another seven years term. This note describes the election campaign and outcome, and reflects on the democratic character of the elections. It uses information from different sources: reports from official Rwandan institutions and human rights groups, articles in international media and academic journals, and reflections of politicians, scholars, and ordinary citizens collected during a research visit.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, brief discussion of 2010 elections
- Qualitative study, different sources


After decades of cycling violence between Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda and Burundi, violence peaked in 1994 with a genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda, during which the Hutu majority slaughtered 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus, leaving the country with 120,000 accused genocidaires awaiting trial. Rwanda's gacaca courts were established as a response to the backlog of untried genocide cases. These courts disturbingly distinguish between genocide and war crimes committed during the same era, trying only those accused of genocide. This article argues that the gacaca process will contribute to the insecurity of all Rwandan citizens in the future, since it pursues inequitable justice, accentuates the ethnic divide and will be interpreted as revenge.

- historical analysis of pre-genocide Rwanda, followed by an assessment of the gacaca process
- historical/qualitative analysis

“This essay is an attempt to interrelate the three principal genocides of this century in order to encourage emerging efforts to shift attention from case studies to comparative studies of genocide.”

- 1994, explanation of genocide
- Comparative case study


The Rwandan Constitution of 2003, the National Land Policy of 2004 and the Organic Land Law of 2005 all contain clear provisions which add up to a mandate for gender equality in land rights and set out a context in which all land shall be registered and rights gained under different means of access to land shall be considered equal. The Rwandan Succession Law of 1999 had already established the principle of equal inheritance rights to land for men and women. Articles from these four core documents together comprise the new body of land policy and law in Rwanda which is currently in the process of being implemented. This paper argues that an iterative approach to planning for the implementation of land tenure reform in Rwanda over a long period of research and consultations, including field consultations and subsequent “trial interventions”, and involving both government and civil society, has enabled the issue of how to secure women's land rights to be more fully considered within the overall land tenure reform process. This comes in a country with particular and unique post-Genocide circumstances that enabled women to gain their new land inheritance rights on paper early on. Evidence gathered by the authors suggests that these paper rights are already beginning to affect social relations and land inheritance patterns in practice. Moreover, women's land rights retain a prominence on the political agenda in Rwanda, positing an “enabling” environment for some crucial articles in the secondary legislation required for implementation to be drafted.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, gender equality in land rights
- Qualitative study


Un hiatus sépare la montée de la peur, du racisme et de la violence, du passage à l'acte massif que furent le génocide des Rwandais tutsi et les massacres qui l'ont accompagné. L'événement déclenchant que fut l'attaque de l'avion présidentiel ne rend pas compte, a lui seul, de l'ébranlement des milices et de la mobilisation populaire. Au-delà de toute explication, il restera toujours une part inexpliquée de ce basculement. Le présent article replonge le lecteur dans les circonstances internationales particulières et les slogans du
début des années 1990 qui formaient l'arrière-plan des négociations internationales et de la marche locale vers le multipartisme. Il le fait en adoptant les vues qui imprénaient encore le quotidien de très nombreux Rwandais ruraux sans oublier ce fond commun de l'humain qui nous rend possible, au moins intuitivement et au-delà des mots, de saisir ce glissement d'un quotidien de paix apparente à un quotidien de violence extrême. Derrière le miroir fragile de la réalité se déploie un monde si semblable au nôtre mais où plus rien ne bride les fantasmes. Quels ressorts les mobilisateurs ont-ils pu toucher pour provoquer ce saut à travers le miroir? A dix ans du génocide, cet article se veut commémoratif et plaide pour une justice qui soit aussi une justice sociale dans un des pays les plus pauvres du monde.

- Article is in English
- Mostly pre-genocide Rwanda and 1994, conditions that led to the genocide or facilitated it
- Historical/anthropological analysis


Book review of Marie Beatrice Umutesi’s autobiographic book “Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire” (Umutesi is a Hutu refugee and claims that the killings of refugees in the DRC by Rwandan troops/rebels constitutes another genocide), see also the review by Solongo... exclude?


Comparing pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, this article argues that clear continuities exist between the regimes of Juvénal Habyarimana and Paul Kagame. Both have projected a remarkably similar image of ‘benevolent leadership’. Presenting themselves as harbingers of an ‘improved’ or ‘new’ Rwanda, both leaderships have claimed to be best able and willing to guide Rwanda along the right path to peace, security, ethnic unity and development. ‘Benevolent leadership’ in both periods has also served as a tool to try and shape regime relationships with international and domestic audiences. Internationally, each government has worked to promote Rwanda and its authorities as a good development partner. Domestically, these projections have served to establish norms of order and obedience. We argue that projections of ‘benevolent leadership’ have been a tool designed to win over the international community and discipline the Rwandan population.

- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, comparison of the Habyarimana and Kagame regimes
- Qualitative comparative study


This article is about the simultaneous subversion and perpetuation of political borders ‘from below’. Using the state boundary between the cities of Goma in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Gisenyi in Rwanda as a case study, this article shows how people make sense of their border-related social world. By analyzing everyday narratives and practices of people who live on both sides of the border, this article reveals popular geopolitics at work and demonstrates the inchoate character surrounding the idea of ‘the border’. Border talk is examined in key narratives and narrative clusters to emphasize the primacy of certain thematic plots and to reveal which aspects of the border people prioritize and how they attribute meaning to the idea of the border. Views of the border ranging from a desired barrier against the demonized ‘other,’ and as a means of exclusion, to its conception as an institution that may be in need of reform but is essential to economic survival, make clear that approaching the border through narratives means allowing for its historicity and relationality. Border narratives and practices reveal some neglected aspects of violent conflict in the study region and provide insights into state–society relations, an understanding of the state’s legitimacy, and an understanding of the effects of the border as a social construction that influences everyday life.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, border studies, micro narratives of state borders
- Narrative analysis, based on interviews, participant observation and mobile data gathering


Legal practitioners at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are exercised by the question of whether their endeavour should seek to intentionally create an "historical record." Their views are framed by a supposed distinction between Truth Commissions and Trials and by the assumption that the practice and method of law and historiography are distinct. Such distinctions are, however, unsustainable given that both trials and Truth Commissions require coercive, enticed remembering and that both the lawyer and historian vicariously re-enact the past in the search for meaning. Similarly, the methodology of the oral historian is not distinct from that employed in a trial. And yet, the apparent celebration of orality at the ICTR is matched by a desire to instantaneously convert mutable speech into immutable text. While the ultimate mutable text, the judgement, declares a legal finality, it intentionally directs the reader to the process of fact discovery preserved in a globally accessible, digital database. While there remains a tension between the digital archive and its physical shadow, an historical record awaits consumption. The question, however, remains who will the consumers be and to what purpose will this record be put? (Rather an introduction)

"Rather, the concern here [in the paper, JG] is the ICTR as a historio-preservation technology. In reviewing reflective assessment by legal practitioners regarding the place an "historical record" should, or should not, occupy in the operation of the Tribunal, one detects a strong belief that enacting law and writing history are discrete endeavours. But can this distinction be maintained both within the trial process and in terms of the archival residue?"
- Post-genocide Rwanda, exploration of the question of the "historical record" at the ICTR through orality, performance, the tacticity of documents and the virtuality of digitization
- Anthropological qualitative study, based on observations in the court and interviews with judges/prosecutors/defense counselors


The author tries to explain why individuals or communities in Rwanda committed to genocide. He argues that the reasons for participating in the killings are manifold and cannot always be explained with obedience to state authority. According to the author it is misleading to interpret the Rwandan genocide simply as a state-sponsored genocide. Local extremists who subdued the local government also played an important role in the genocide. The author draws on testimonies from perpetrators and survivors in his analysis of individual and community choices in the genocide. The author concludes that research about the genocide has so far placed too much emphasis on the involvement of the military and the authorities while the important role of local extremists from the interahamwe networks has been underestimated.

- 1994, explanation of violence
- Qualitative study, based on testimonies of perpetrators and survivors


“In this article, I intend to conceptualize two postconflict reconstruction projects supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as efforts in social capital development in postconflict situations. I specifically focus on the UNDP's support for the creation of focus groups within the Mozambican government and for the Rwandan government's reorganization of its policing system as reform measures in the countries' state systems. I argue that by creating a focus group in Mozambique, which provides an avenue for collective decisionmaking that involves previously fighting factions, and by streamlining the police service in Rwanda, which makes it easier to predict and monitor the operations of the country's police force, the UNDP is not only assisting these countries to transform uncertainties into risk in postconflict situations, it is also redesigning the institutional environments, hence rebuilding trust among the citizens and between them and the state."

- Post-genocide Rwanda, postconflict reconstruction
- Qualitative comparative case study (Rwanda and Mozambique)


The author argues that in order to help the genocidal message to be accepted, the génocidaires had to convince people that genocide is not only normal but also a legitimate strategy under certain circumstances. To this purpose they had to transform the moral
landscape and bring people to reassess actions, such as killings, that used to be outlawed and perceive them as legitimate. According to the author, the developments that lead to the genocide in Rwanda were not unavoidable. The establishment of a genocidal norm in Rwanda was a multi-staged process in which the génocidaires successfully spread their message and thus enabled the following mass killings. (JG)

- Pre-genocide Rwanda and 1994, explanation of the process that lead to the normalization of the genocidal message, also: brief description of how RPF actions facilitated this development
- Qualitative study


How do ordinary people come to commit genocide against their neighbors? Ethnicity-based approaches cannot explain the different pathways that lead to mass violence or the different forms that participation takes over time and place. In Rwanda, different processes and mechanisms led some to join in the carnage while others resisted. Utilizing Mark Granovetter’s concept of "social embeddedness," this article argues that social ties and immediate social context better explain the processes through which ordinary people came to commit mass murder in Rwanda. Leaders used family ties to target male relatives for recruitment into the killing groups, which were responsible for carrying out the genocide. Ties among members of the killing groups helped to initiate reluctant or hesitant members into committing violence with the group. Finally, ties of friendship attenuated murderous actions, leading killers to help save Tutsi in specific contexts. Which ties became salient depended on the context. In the presence of the killing group or authority(ies), low-level participants (a group I call “Joiners”) tended to go along with the violence. Alone, Joiners often made different choices. The findings in this article are based on data collected during nine months of fieldwork in two rural communities and two central prisons in Rwanda.

- Explanation of violence 1994, social ties and social context as explanation of why someone participated in violence
- Sociological analysis based on narrative data


- Post-genocide Rwanda, accountability for the crimes, transitional justice
- Essay by the exiled former prosecutor general.. exclude?


This paper evaluates the pertinence of interventions sponsored by aid agencies that seek to meet the security needs of women in post-reconstruction Rwanda. Personal security, economic security, and socio-political security are used as the main methodological
reference marks and indicators. The information and data used in the paper were gathered during several visits to Rwanda in 2001 and 2002. The study reveals that efforts have brought about positive impacts on the lives of women.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, reconstruction,
- Qualitative study


This article investigates three recent human rights memoirs that chronicle the Rwandan genocide of 1994: Emergency Sex (and other desperate measures): True Stories from a War Zone, Shake Hands with the Devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda, and The Zanzibar Chest: a memoir of love and war. I use these memoirs to explore the complexities of bearing witness to ethnic violence and war as an autobiographical subject shaped by the memory of historical atrocity — as a besieged self in traumatic occupations of the UN protector (Roméo Dallaire), lawyer (Kenneth Cain), and war correspondent (Aidan Hartley). Finally, I suggest that the authors of these memoirs are secondary witnesses, claimants to ethical truths and writers of atrocity testimony that complicate the burgeoning life-telling compulsion of what is and who can claim to be a genocide victim.

- 1994 and bearing witness of the violence
- Qualitative analysis of the autobiography of three secondary witnesses?


Land reform and post-genocide justice and reconciliation are arguably the two most pressing challenges facing Rwanda. Both will only be delivered by collaboration between government, civil society, and international donors. This article explores the realignment of these actors within post-genocide and post-conflict policy-making processes. Rwanda is a hard case for NGOs and civil society, in that both the internal freedoms of democracy and the external support structures that often assist resistance to authoritarian rule are lacking. Further complicating matters, the interplay between the moral legitimacy of the Rwandan government and its material dependence on donors shapes the opportunities and constraints of all policy actors. The article proceeds by profiling the policy context and relevant policy actors; mapping the land reform and gacaca policy processes, and the contribution of two civil society actors, LANDNET and Penal Reform International (PRI), to these processes; and concludes by evaluating the determinants of civil society effectiveness. The core argument is that spaces for civil society engagement in policy processes are ad hoc and personalized, rather than based on institutional relationships between society and the state.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, role of the civil society in policy making
- Qualitative study

An increasingly large literature on patronage has developed within political science in recent years. Yet this body of scholarship has thus far failed to explain variation in patronage allocation across countries. An original theory based on the logic of institutional choice, whereby political leaders allocate patronage in accordance with the varying political threats they face, explains this variation. Two variables—geography and visibility—capture this variation and thus explain patronage allocation. The theory is tested and validated through a comparative analysis of Rwanda and Uganda, whose current regimes are remarkably similar in origin and structure. The analysis extends to previous regimes in both countries.

- Pre- and (mostly) post-genocide Rwanda, explanation of variation in patronage
- Comparative case study, most similar approach (Kagame regime in Rwanda and the Museveni regime in Uganda)


Analyses of the nature and policies of the Rwandan government since 1994 vary widely. On the one hand, the country is regarded as having made remarkable progress from a developmental perspective; on the other, concerns abound over the attitude of the government with respect to democratisation, human rights and regional stability. Donor agencies active in Rwanda engage with these governmental aspects in different ways, with some taking a more favourable view vis-à-vis such issues than others. This article examines the aid policies of Belgium and the United Kingdom in Rwanda between 1994 and 2005 – two donors with very contrasting historical experiences in the country. These examples demonstrate how the policies donor agencies pursue can be traced to their historical relationships with the recipient country, their domestic political contexts, and their approaches to aid. The article warns against a simplistic divide into “new” and “old” donors, a divide often used in the literature on Rwanda, as this masks more complex factors. The positions of individual donor agencies are constantly shifting, which raises broader questions regarding the current trend towards greater harmonisation in donor strategies with regard to developing countries.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, aid policies of Belgium and the U.K. in Rwanda
- Qualitative comparative case study


The author compares the U.S. response to the crisis in Darfur to that of the Rwandan genocide ten years earlier. He concludes that prevailing domestic and international political realities during the debate over the Darfur crisis allowed U.S. administration officials to use the rhetoric of genocide as a substitute for taking more forceful action to stop the killings.
- 1994, US response to Rwanda (and Darfur)
- Qualitative comparative case analysis


“This paper examines the German response to Rwanda’s genocide, (...) Like the United States, Great Britain, France (up to mid-June 1994) and other powers, Germany chose the role of bystander, observing and condemning the genocide, but failing to act.”

“The paper begins with the presentation of a theoretical framework that specifies hypotheses concerning the likelihood of humanitarian intervention in response to gross human rights violations. The next section sketches the Federal Republic’s foreign policy framework, with a special focus on its role in Rwanda during the 1990s. This is followed by an analysis of public “Rwanda discourse” in the German political agenda.”

“The findings from these analyses confirm the conclusions of previous research on the important role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) and media framing in shaping expectations for humanitarian intervention. They also demonstrate the existence of a consensus in the foreign policy elite regarding Rwanda. Two constraints inherent in the German foreign policy paradigm at the time tilted decisions against humanitarian intervention: the so-called constitutional problem and the growing pressure to halt the Bosnian crisis.”

- Mostly 1994, German response to the genocide
- Qualitative analysis


When the journal *Ethnicities* was launched in 2001, the first issue included an article by this author, which examined the politics of ‘race’ and identity as central ingredients in the Rwanda genocide of 1994. This current article considers how political identities have been reconstructed since the genocide, especially from above. History, law and politics are examined, as central instruments in government efforts to construct a new Rwandan society and ensure that genocide will ‘never again’ be possible. Evidence suggests that inequalities in income and land distribution have grown rapidly since 1994. At the same time, the poor and marginalized often find it difficult to openly express their views, including their political identities outside of officially circumscribed spaces and categories. Debates continue around numbers of victims and perpetrators, and new inter-elite conflicts have emerged along language lines. The article shows how race categories have been replaced with new terms, which arise from a particular reading of the genocide. A new foundation myth for Rwanda, a form of diasporic victim nationalism, is also briefly explored. Re-labelling Rwandans from above, the state continues to exercise tight control over the public expression of political identities. Open political debate is very difficult; the government frequently feels it is being attacked, and accuses critics of divisionism or harbouring a genocide mentality. If more inclusive forms of Rwandan-ness are to emerge in future, state controls will need to be relaxed, so that more complex forms of political identities can finally emerge.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, the reconstruction of political identities by the new regime
- Qualitative study


The participation of women in the 1994 Rwandan genocide should be considered in the context of gender relations in pre-genocide Rwandan society. Many 'ordinary' women were involved in the genocide but, overall, committed significantly fewer acts of overt violence than men. Owing to the indirect nature of women's crimes, combined with male 'chivalry', women may be under-represented among those pursued for genocide-related crimes, despite the broad conception of complicity in Rwanda's Gacaca Law. Women in leadership positions played a particularly important role in the genocide, and gendered imagery, including of the 'evil woman' or 'monster', is often at play in their encounters with the law.

- 1994, participation of women in the violence
- Qualitative study, primarily based on interviews with female detainees


At the time of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the BBC's late-night political discussion program *Newsnight* was one of the few media political spheres within which representatives of the British government, opposition parties, the United Nations, and international non-governmental organizations could comment on British foreign policy. Since 1994 the British media have been charged with failing to report genocide; yet a focus on print media has created a void in understanding how BBC's *Newsnight* covered events. The present article analyzes Newsnight reporting between 6 April 1994 and 30 September 1994 and reveals that the BBC framed the genocide in a specific way until 31 July 1994. A comparative reading between the discourse of presenters, guests, and the news reports filed by journalists reveals that, despite a stack of media evidence that genocide was taking place, no representatives of the British government or opposition parties were interviewed on the role of the UK as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and signatory of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide from April to the end of July. Rather, a focus on the stateless "international community" and the failings of UN bureaucracy, the timing of debates, and the presenters' refusal to use the word "genocide" when guests and journalists did reveal that Newsnight failed to hold British politicians to account.

- 1994, failed coverage of the Rwandan genocide by BBC's *Newsnight*
- Qualitative study based on the analysis of Newsnight programs between April and September 1994

As with most British media coverage in 1994, the BBC did not report genocide in Rwanda, preferring instead to depict political violence as tribal civil war and ‘primitive’ ethnic conflict. Yet when the international community declared that genocide had taken place, the BBC was quick to change its tack, moving away from reporting ethnic conflict towards memorialising genocide. Referring to the BBC’s website, political discussion programmes and documentary films, the article considers how over time an institutional narrative on the 1994 genocide has developed. The author argues that the BBC has been required to reconcile the problem of depicting genocide—conventionally seen as modern, ‘Western’ political violence—in Africa. The ways in which the BBC has remembered Rwanda’s genocide also conceal from view British foreign policy decision-making between April and July 1994. The author then considers how, since Rwanda joined the Commonwealth in November 2009, the BBC’s reporting has shifted again—this time towards framing news in the context of democracy and freedom of speech.

- BCC’s coverage of the genocide after 1994, development of an institutional narrative of the genocide, reporting on Rwanda after the country joined the Commonwealth
- Qualitative analysis of the BCC webpage, political programs and documentaries


- Post-genocide Rwanda, Introduction to special issue of Peace Review


The author outlines the land and agricultural reforms in Rwanda and identifies them as a potential source of social conflict in the Rwanda. He further argues that the government’s (often coercive) implementation of agricultural policies violates basic human rights of Rwanda’s citizens and increases the risk of food insecurity. JG

- Post-genocide Rwanda, agricultural and land reforms
- Qualitative analysis


The memory of the 1994 genocide overshadows the present in Rwanda. The landscape is marked with burial and memorial sites, and April has become a month of mourning with national genocide commemorations held annually. The genocide memorials have been sanctioned and promoted by the state, but they are also the product of initiatives by genocide survivors. This article argues that survivors have made substantial and distinctive contributions to memorialization in Rwanda. It explores a survivor politics of memory and its relationship to trauma and grief.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, memory politics, contribution of survivors
The modernised tradition of the Gacaca courts has become the key mechanism for dealing with the past in Rwanda. The process needs to establish accountability for all acts of genocide and to foster reconciliation. Nevertheless, popular narratives and survey results reveal that a widespread ‘crisis’ accompanied the initial stages of the Gacaca process. We argue that a problematic quest for the truth is short-circuiting reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. Truth-telling is the cornerstone of the transitional justice framework due to the design of the Gacaca tribunals. On the basis of twenty months of fieldwork in Rwandan villages, we locate tensions at different levels. The Gacaca system is a distinctively modern phenomenon despite its traditional appearance. The state-sanctioned speaking of the truth according to a prosecutorial logic runs counter to the core values of the customary institution and established societal practices. This friction is further enhanced by the underlying Judeo-Christian model of truth-telling introduced with the Gacaca system in a socio-political environment mediated by a culture of deceit and dominated by a war victor. In such a socio-cultural context, communication serves the interests of the power holders (national and local), and not necessarily the interest of truth-telling and justice.

- Post-Genocide Rwanda, truth and reconciliation process
- Qualitative study (also using descriptive statistics) based on a survey, focus group discussions, interviews and informal encounters.


This article analyses over 400 life trajectories of ordinary peasants in order to complement top-down studies of the Rwandan political transition. Changes and differences according to the ethnicity of the respondents shed light on the Hutu–Tutsi bi-polarity which underlies the transition and reveal a reversal in perceived ethnic dominance accompanying the decisive moment in the political transition: the overthrow of the Hutu-dominated regime by the Tutsi-led RPF. This suggests that the experience of the nature of governance and the (perceived) proximity to power lies at the heart of ethnic awareness. The nature of governance at the periphery of society is explored, and the article demonstrates that the instrumental stance on ethnic identity adopted by the post-genocide regime is not only erroneous but counter-productive. Adjusting the socio-political environment in which identities thrive is more important than a direct focus on identity constructs when developing policies to prevent ethnically structured violence.

- Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda
- Qualitative (ethnographic) research method (analysis of 400 life trajectories of peasants), quantitative elements added
Do we really understand life after genocide? A reflection on the construction of knowledge in and on Rwanda reveals that it is rife with contradictory assertions and images, and that there is a discrepancy between image and reality. This article attempts to map the center(s) of knowledge construction in postgenocide Rwanda, the place not only where policy is made, but also where knowledge is actively construed, managed, and controlled. It argues that an overall cultivation of the aesthetics of progress and a culturally specific communication code have contributed to an active interference in the scientific construction of knowledge. It stresses the need for scholars and observers to reveal the social and historical context for the knowledge being generated. It also urges them to physically and mentally move away from the center of society: to adopt a bottom-up perspective that captures the voices of ordinary people.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, knowledge construction in and on Rwanda
- A reflection based on personal experience while undertaking fieldwork in Rwanda

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The insurgency in North West Rwanda is a good example of a small scale conflict that provides a first step into the more complex world of regional instability in central Africa. Following the genocide of 1994, genocidaires and ex-military personnel fled to what was then Zaire and established a network of anti-Tutsi bases. Linking up with local groups in Eastern Zaire, these insurgents, usually known as ‘infiltrators’ have carried out a low-intensity but consistent insurgency campaign in Rwanda. The constant barrage of propaganda aimed at the local population, a technique pioneered during the 1994 genocide, has led to a general, manufactured support for the insurgency. In particular, those people returning from Zaire have been fed a constant diet of anti-Tutsi and Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) propaganda, making it easier to act against these groups. Even within the local government and other official bodies, there are widespread Hutu sympathies that have led to additional aid reaching the insurgents. The particular strain of ethnic violence has led to an insurgency in which civilian villages are as likely to be attacked as RPA military installations. More surprising, given the nature of the insurgency, Hutus themselves have been targets. Initially, moderate Hutus were singled out as examples, but increasingly indiscriminate killings have been aiming to force all Hutus to take sides. The insurgents have deliberately polarised large parts of Rwanda and this has profound implications for conflict resolution. In particular, supplementing the military campaign with political social campaigns, at least partly to combat the mythology of grievance among the Hutus, and tackling the conflict as part of a supra-national conflict that goes beyond ‘national’ borders.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, insurgency in North West Rwanda by Hutu extremists (ex-FAR/Interahamwe), partly justifies RPA counter-insurgency actions

This analytical article asks the question: to what degree did the media contribute to the Rwandan genocide and what might have been done about it? In examining the historical development of mass media in Rwanda, this paper argues that while hate media clearly contributed to the dynamics that led to genocide, its role should not be overstated. While it is commonly believed that hate media was a major cause of the genocide, instead it was a part of a larger social process. The use of violent discourse was at least as important as, for example, the availability of weapons in carrying out the genocide. Put another way, violent discourse was necessary but not sufficient by itself to cause the genocide of 1994. In arguing this thesis, Rwandan history is examined to demonstrate the processes of communication in the formation of destructive attitudes and behaviour. Next, analysis of the methods and content of propaganda campaigns is discussed. Finally, an overview of the requirements and organizations for third parties to conduct international communication interventions is presented in the last section.

- 1994 (and before), the influence of mass media on the genocide
- Qualitative study


This paper analyzes the poverty impact of the violent events that affected Rwanda in the 1990s. The main objective of the paper is to identify systematically potential mechanisms linking violent conflict with changes in poverty across provinces and households in Rwanda before and after a decade of violence. In accordance with emerging literature on the long-term economic effects of violent conflict, we find empirical evidence for economic convergence between richer and poorer Rwandan provinces and households following the conflict shocks. Using a small but unique panel of households surveyed before and after the conflict period, we find that households whose house was destroyed or who lost land ran a higher risk of falling into poverty. We do not find much evidence for an economic effect of violent deaths at the household level due to substitution effects of labor within the household. Non-violent deaths however seem to increase income per adult equivalent for the survivors. Results are shown to be robust to sample selection and IV models.

- Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda, poverty impact of the violent conflicts
- Empirical analysis based on household panel data from before and after 1994


Most academic work on the genocide in Rwanda uses either a methodologically social scientific or historical approach to explain the genocide's root causes. These causal stories
most often focus on ethnicity and, in doing so, understate how structured economic-material relations made the conditions for genocide possible. Turning to Louis Althusser's concept of structural causality, I form an alternative method for narrating the genocide which treats the genocide as the result of highly complex and over-determined social relations. The paper then re-examines the structural causality of the genocide, focusing on how the coffee economy intersected with the economic, cultural, state, and ideological registers at which the genocide was produced. Representing the genocide in terms of structural causality addresses how over-determined exploitative relationships—between Hutu, Tutsi, coloniser, colonised, rich, poor, farmer, évolué, northerner, southerner, coffee producer, coffee consumer, etc—produced the genocide.

- 1994, explanation of the genocide’s causes
- Qualitative study using the concept of structural causality


“This article attempts to encourage thinking about peacebuilding beyond the conventional bounds of inquiry. In particular, it aims to stimulate debate with regard to the subtle and complex relationship between education, ethnic conflict, and peacebuilding. The central argument is that schools and curricula are an important site of the construction, mobilization, and politicization of ethnic divisiveness, and that this has important and largely overlooked implications for post-conflict peacebuilding and the prevention of conflict.”

“This article will begin with a preliminary review of the literature to unpack the key themes and hypotheses of contributions dealing with formal education, conflict, and peacebuilding. Next, it will apply the findings from this overview to a case study of Rwanda exploring how education helped construct the ethnic identities that played a role in the 1959 revolution and in the 1994 genocide. It will also investigate significant developments in education policy since 1994 and their prospects for peacebuilding. Reflecting upon both the theoretical propositions and the Rwandan example, the final portion of the article will lay out an agenda for research highlighting important questions and challenges that must be addressed to better understand the prospects for peacebuilding education.”

- Pre- and Post-genocide Rwanda, peacebuilding education
- Qualitative case study


While interest in conducting fieldwork in conflict and postconflict societies continues to grow, literature addressing the specific challenges and dilemmas of this kind of research remains scarce. Based on four months of fieldwork and approximately seventy interviews, this article explores the complexities of conducting research in postgenocide Rwanda. I argue that what at first may appear to be data problems can also be important data points; problems such as
historical memory, selective telling, and skewed participant demographics illuminate political structures, group relations, and societal cleavages. This article then illustrates this argument by examining how these challenges/opportunities help explain the difficulties involved in teaching history in postgenocide schools. These reflections on research in Rwanda suggest valuable lessons for fieldwork and data analysis in a number of settings by providing examples of pitfalls, dilemmas, and often unseen opportunities that are likely to present themselves in other divided societies.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, difficulties of conducting research in post-genocide Rwanda
- Qualitative study based on fieldwork experience of the author


Intrastate wars and genocides result in devastating losses and leave deep and lasting scars on those who survive. Making space for civilians to share their experiences of violence and to have them publicly acknowledged—especially by their own governments—can be important parts of (re)knitting the social fabric. This article focuses on the experiences of ordinary Rwandans during and after their country's civil war and genocide. It is centered on excerpts from a series of field interviews and highlights Rwandans' memories in their own words. This article contrasts this cross-section of civilian narratives with the official memories of violence that the national government disseminates through memorials and schools. The central argument is that, in order to legitimate its rule, the Rwandan government selectively highlights some memories of violence, and represses others, and that this is likely to hinder sustainable peace.

- 1994 and post-genocide Rwanda, comparison of civilian narratives of the genocide with the official narrative of the regime
- Qualitative study


What sort of person chooses to remain in a place like Rwanda when an easy exit is offered, when leaving seems the only safe or sane option, and when one is not directly connected to the would-be victims? And how does this person come to develop a circle of care that is expansive enough to include those who are radically Other? In what follows, I consider these questions through a detailed examination of the recent example of Paul Rusesabagina, the Hutu hotel manager in Kigali, Rwanda, who sheltered more than a thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu refugees during the hundred-day genocide. I argue that Rusesabagina was primarily motivated by an awareness of his own mortality, his personal history, a desire to distance himself from the negative behavior of Hutu like himself, and a strong identification with the Tutsi refugees under his protection.

- 1994, the case of Paul Rusesabagina
- Qualitative study,

The majority of scholarly research on Rwanda currently focuses on determining the causes of and participation in the genocide. In this paper, we explore a variety of questions that have come to the forefront in post-genocide Rwanda. In particular, we are concerned with the prospects for peace and justice in the aftermath of the gross abuses of human rights that occurred and, to that end, we consider the potential uses and limits of restorative justice initiatives in the process of healing and reconciliation in Rwanda. We argue that restorative justice initiatives have moved the country closer toward reconciliation than retributive measures, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. That said, we also suggest that the Rwandan government, despite claims that it seeks to achieve reconciliation, has not shown a serious commitment to healing the wounds that persist between either individual Rwandans or the groups that they comprise. In the end, then, we make a case for the importance of pairing a comprehensive search for justice in Rwanda with a commitment to truth-telling and accountability by the victims and perpetrators of the genocide, as well as by current government officials.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice, reconciliation
- Qualitative study


In 1997 Rwanda introduced a resettlement policy for refugees displaced during previous conflicts. I exploit geographic variation in the speed of implementation of this policy to investigate the impact of conflict-induced displacement and the resettlement policy on household agricultural output and on skill spillover mechanisms between returnees and stayers. I find that returns to on-farm labor are higher for returnees relative to stayers, although the evidence suggests that the policy contributed little additional effect to this differential. More speculatively, these differentials suggest that, upon return from conflict-induced exile, returnees are more motivated to increase their economic performance.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, influence conflict induced displacement and a resettlement policy on household agricultural output
- Quantitative analysis using household survey data collected after 1994


Beginning with Maurice Halbwachs ’s theory of collective memory and the great body of sociological, historical, and political-science literature on war and aggression that postdates Halbwachs, the author attempts to identify the elements of aggressor-victim memory through
a detailed analysis of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In participant and third-party narratives of the genocide, it is possible to observe a commemorative quality in the campaign of mass murder. The author suggests that the persistence of post-traumatic culture and the failure of dialogue can lead people to kill in remembrance of earlier aggression: in such cases, "acting out" substitutes for "working through," with horrifying consequences.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, collective trauma
- Historical analysis


The Rwanda civil war that in 1994 degenerated into a slaughter of the country's Tutsi, amounting to genocide, was possibly the world's most devastating bloodbath of the 1990s. In 1994, the newly formed Czech Republic took up its place as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; Karel Kovanda was the Czech Ambassador at the time. Drawing on internal documents of the Czech Foreign Service and on his own private notes, as well as on a wealth of published information, Kovanda details in this personal memoir the step-by-step evolution of the Rwandan tragedy as he and his delegation perceived it, and the Czech reaction to it. He repeatedly highlights the information gap: on the one hand, insufficient and biased information provided by the UN Secretariat; on the other hand, the detailed, accurate, and timely information his delegation received from NGOs. Kovanda estimates that during the first weeks, the Security Council gave perhaps 80% of its attention to the civil war between Rwandan government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and 20% to how to handle the difficult position of UNAMIR, the peacekeeping operation then on the ground in Rwanda. Only after weeks of delay did the Security Council even start to come to grips with the ongoing genocide—a term that Ambassador Kovanda was the first to employ publicly in an official UN meeting. While focusing on Rwanda proper, Kovanda also explains and describes the sometimes little-known mechanisms that play a role in the day-to-day workings of the Security Council: the role of the UN Secretariat, informal consultations, groupings of Security Council members, and so on.

- 1994, role of the UN and the Czech Republic as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in particular
- Personal memoir


This article examines the dilemmas of post-genocide Rwanda, where society finds itself caught between justice and reconciliation. One of the major challenges for Rwandans today is to engender reconciliation in a deeply wounded nation and do justice to both victims and perpetrators. It is difficult to affirm the victims, punish the perpetrators and at the same time bring about reconciliation between them. Yet there are unequivocal claims, especially from the victims, that there can be no justice without reparation and there can be no reconciliation without justice. To bring about justice and reconciliation, the Gacaca process was put in
place, but it has turned out to be a source of fear for the perpetrators, who are desperate to bury the evidence by intimidating the survivors, and for the survivors, who are now living in fear of their lives. Consequently, the rising insecurity of survivors has become a matter of national concern, and the challenges to the Gacaca process are threatening to hamper its progress. But this apparently is the only viable justice system for communities to carry out trials at community level, for it was there that the crime of genocide was committed in a mass-killing frenzy. Truth telling and confessions by perpetrators, and forgiveness by victims have been identified as crucial steps towards reconciliation, but the dilemma lies in the inherent contradictions in the application of these concepts: truth, confession and forgiveness.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice and truth and reconciliation efforts
- Qualitative study


“In most cases of mass killing since World War II—unlike the Holocaust—the victim group has triggered its own demise by violently challenging the authority of the state (Fein, 1990; Harff and Gurr, 1988; Kuperman, 2002). The Holocaust paradigm is so dominant, however, that the field of genocide studies has focused almost exclusively on explaining the actions of the perpetrators of genocide, leaving aside the actions, strategy, and potential responsibility of victim groups and third parties. To start rectifying this bias, it is useful to reexamine the early 1990s role of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels, who with the support of the international community threatened Rwanda’s Hutu regime to such an extent that it retaliated with genocide. This exploration is not intended to excuse or justify the genocide in any way, but merely to understand more fully its causes. Until scholars and policymakers appreciate how genocide may stem from the strategic interaction of ethnic groups and the international community, there will be less chance of preventing such tragedies.”

- Pre-genocide Rwanda and 1994, influence of the RPF’s invasion on the strategy of the Hutu regime
- Qualitative study, mainly based on interviews with former senior Tutsi rebels as well as one Hutu army officer of the Rwandan army during the genocide.


Although there are obvious merits to the consociational argument, including the need to recognize the claims of minorities through power-sharing arrangements, translating theory into practice has generally failed in much of Africa. The reasons for this are many and are by no means reducible to single-factor explanations. Looking at the recent experiments in power sharing in former Belgian Africa, this article offers a comparative assessment of the radically different trajectories followed by Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in their efforts to regulate conflict through consociational formulas. Although Rwanda stands as a textbook example of failed power sharing, and the DRC as a
less than successful experiment, Burundi, which comes nearest to institutionalizing the Lijphart model, offers grounds for cautious optimism about the merits of a consociational polity. On the strength of the evidence from Burundi, one might conceivably argue that the key to success lies in the extent to which the technicalities of power sharing tend to approximate the conditions spelled out by Lijphart, notably group autonomy, proportionality, and the minority veto. Closer scrutiny of the cases at hand suggests a somewhat different conclusion. Perhaps even more importantly than the mechanics of power sharing, the socio-political context is what spells the difference between success and failure.

- 1994, mostly post-genocide Rwanda, comparative case study about consociationalism in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC
- Qualitative


The author addresses the radio station RTLM’s role before and during the genocide in Rwanda, in particular its influence on listeners. The enquiry is based on interviews and transcripts of RTLM broadcasts. The author finds that the role of RTLM can be illustrated by means of three aspects: ideology, performance, and everyday life. He concludes that the radio station was a medium through which Rwandans experienced and executed the genocide.

- 1994 (and pre-genocide Rwanda), impact of the radio station RTLM on the listeners during the genocide
- Qualitative study based on interviews and document analysis


Scholars and policy-makers now recognise the security risks posed by refugee militarisation, including the spread of civil war and regional destabilisation. These analysts pay little attention to the militarised exiles once they return home. Instead, repatriation is uncritically accepted as the most desirable solution to refugee crises and as a prerequisite for post-conflict peace-building. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of the refugees desire a peaceful and stable return home. For the minority of militarised exiles, however, return may facilitate a continuance of their programme of political violence. This article examines whether and how previously militarised refugees engage in political violence upon return. It does this by tracing five decades of forced migration in Rwanda, paying particular attention to the Tutsi exiles in Uganda and their eventual militarised return. In the Rwandan case, leaders relied on the mechanism of socialisation, defined as transformative learning and the development of new worldviews, to achieve their goals. Such socialisation operated in exile to form the Tutsi exile army and later functioned as a tool for the coercive imposition of political control in Rwanda.
- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, 1959 – 2010, political violence by previously militarized refugees upon their return (Hutus and Tutsis)
- Case study, mechanism-based approach


The author reviews literature about Rwanda which he thinks is important to understand the genocide and points to possible directions for future research.

"While I make no attempt to catalogue the numerous publications on the 1994 genocide, much less the vast array of scholarship on general Rwandan history, politics, society, and economy, I do attempt to suggest the works, both on the genocide and on Rwanda more broadly, that I believe are most useful as background for anyone setting out to conduct research on Rwanda. It is my contention that the genocide cannot be understood in isolation but must be studied in historical, cultural, and regional context. To understand the genocide, why it happened and how, one must have a thorough understanding of Rwanda’s historical background and the social, economic, and political developments that took place in the decades prior to the violence. It is also important to understand the lasting effects of the genocide, as it continues to reverberate not only in Rwanda but in ongoing violence in Burundi and Congo. The research most needed now is not overly ambitious comprehensive analyses of the genocide that rehash the same secondary sources but sectoral, thematic, and local-level research that tests theories of genocide and adds new data, creating building blocks upon which a more complex and complete understanding of Rwanda’s terrible tragedy can be constructed."

- Literature review


The article examines the issues involved in the gacaca court system developed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994. It explains that the gacaca has prosecuted individuals responsible for crimes against humanity but was used by the government to assert its authority. However, the concern on whether the implementation of gacaca is effective in promoting reconciliation and building peace is noted. The author thinks that gacaca’s focus on genocide crimes undermined its ability to provide accountability and promote rule of law.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice (the gacaca court system)
- Qualitative study


The human, social and economic costs of Rwanda’s genocide have been staggering. The losses in life cannot be reversed and the psychological impact of the violence will take a long
time to heal. The country has made remarkable progress over the last 10 years to get back to where it would have been without the conflict—for example, in terms of trends for basic education and health indicators such as primary enrollment and child mortality. Yet GDP per capita remains much lower than what it would have been without the genocide. The paper proposes a methodology for the estimation and correction of extreme values or outliers and estimates that per capita GDP today would probably be between 25 and 30% higher if the conflict had not taken place.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, economic impact of the civil war
- Econometric analysis (economic time series analysis)


In "Why Men Participate: A Review of Perpetrator Research on the Rwandan Genocide," Cyanne E. Loyle provides a thought-provoking analysis of the existing state of the genocide perpetrator literature. Relying on fieldwork conducted in Rwanda over the past several years, her research contributes to the development of a unified theory of participation in genocide (that is, who participates and why) that can be examined and applied across case.

"Herein, I provide a review of the genocide perpetrator and participation literature across field and synthesize the main hypotheses. I then go on to apply and test those predictions on participation in the context of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Through a more detailed description and evaluation of the Rwanda context I challenge some of the existing assumption of genocide participation and the applicability of this research across case. I conclude by proposing some avenues for future research in participation for both political science and genocide studies."

- 1994, explanation of violence
- Largely a literature review


Purpose – Like other developing countries, Rwandan rural credit market is repressed, shallow, segmented, inefficient and dual structured where both formal and informal financial systems operate side by side. While the later has been playing a predominant role, cooperative societies have emerged as an apt method of increasing the delivery of formal rural credit and savings facilities on sustainable and non-exploitative terms albeit of financial imprudence stemming from poor credit repayment records. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine the factors contributing to credit repayment behaviour among the members of savings and credit cooperative societies in rural Rwanda.

Design/methodology/approach – Both exploratory and descriptive designs are used for primary data collection on variables contributing to the repayment behaviour in savings and cooperative societies. Thereafter, a binary logistic regression empirical model is employed to
estimate the contribution of each variable to credit repayment rate.

**Findings** – The results from the tested empirical model show that age, gender and size of the household, purpose for credit, interest rate charges and number of official visits to the credit societies, have a strong effect on loan repayment performance (statistically significant at p<0.05) whereas size of credit disbursed, credit processing and disbursing time, borrowers’ market place and income transfer from relatives and friends are more or less statistically significant at p<0.20 level. The remaining factors have logical and explainable sings but are not statistically significant.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, repayment behavior
- Logistic regression models


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In the 1980s, two nations in Africa stood out for their development and stability in a continent beset with famine, war and strife. Both Rwanda and Botswana earned the moniker ‘the Switzerland of Africa’ as they successfully pursued economic growth and development. But things went drastically wrong for Rwanda. In 1994, extremist elements led the most intense genocide of the twentieth century, resulting in the deaths of close to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu in just a ninety-day period. The country was devastated and, seventeen years later, is still recovering. By contrast, Botswana has been able to maintain its strong economic growth and reputation as an oasis of stability. It has gone from one of the poorest countries in the world at its independence in 1966 to a solid middle-income nation. The presence of ethnic divisions and inequalities has not derailed Botswana’s progress, which has occurred despite the presence of a number of the risk factors typically associated with nations fraught with ethnic strife. While Botswana has appeared on Genocide Watch’s list of nations at risk of mass atrocities in the past, it was ranked relatively low on the scale, and has not experienced any major interethnic violence. The risk factors present in Botswana appear to have been offset by the nation’s multiple strengths. This article seeks to compare risk and resilience in Rwanda and Botswana. While there has been extensive analysis of what ‘went wrong’ in Rwanda, there is much less information available about what ‘goes right’ in countries like Botswana. The case studies of these two nations suggest that understanding the pathways that lead to genocide and mass atrocities not only requires a
consideration of risk, but a more complex analysis of the interaction between risk factors and mitigating factors that can have a protective function.

- Pre-genocide Rwanda, comparison of the risk factors and mitigating factors for genocide in Rwanda and Botswana
- Qualitative comparative case-study


Post-conflict stability remains an elusive goal for many African countries. The political and socioeconomic preconditions of African civil wars have often persisted after the end of open hostilities and have frustrated regional and international efforts at peace building. The growing role of non-state armed groups in post-conflict governments raises further questions on the important role of guerilla groups in either exacerbating or ameliorating the ‘structural’ preconditions of protracted African wars. The cases of Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda offer important insights on the complex interplay between armed groups and governments that underlie these conflicts. All three countries have been marked by devastating civil wars and the subsequent formation of post-conflict governments led by respective insurgent groups, but only Rwanda and Uganda have made any effort to mitigate the conditions that ultimately led to intra-state violence and state collapse. While the conflict dynamic may heavily condition an insurgent group, these factors alone do not play a determining role in the success or failure of peace building efforts. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

- Pre and post-genocide Rwanda, comparison of post-conflict stability in Liberia Uganda and Rwanda
- qualitative


How do security threats mobilize social groups against each other? The strength of such threats lies in the power of group emotions, notably the primary emotion of fear. Fear works by activating psychological processes at the group level that polarize attitudes between different groups. An analysis of survey data, radio broadcasts, and interviews from Rwanda’s civil war and genocide of 1990-94 reveals four psychosocial mechanisms at work in group polarization: boundary activation, outgroup derogation, outgroup homogenization, and ingroup cohesion. Additionally, scholarly debates on the role of emotions, material opportunities, and rationality in ethnic conflicts represent a false theoretical choice. Both emotions and material opportunities matter, and rationality and emotion are not incompatible. Two simple refinements to extant theoretical and empirical approaches are needed. First, scholars ought to distinguish between attitudes and violence in ethnic conflicts; emotions matter for the polarization of attitudes, but material and structural
opportunities mediate their expression as violence. Second, scholars should pay greater attention to the extensive research in social psychology that shows that both emotion and reason interact in individual judgment and decisionmaking.

> rewrite abstract?

- Pre-genocide Rwanda (1990-1994), 1994, explanation of violence, the influence of fear on intergroup polarization
- Quantitative analysis; sources: survey data, in-depth interviews and transcripts of radio broadcasts


In episodes of intergroup violence, which group members participate and which do not? Although such violence is frequently framed as occurring between distinct ethnic, racial or sectarian groups, it is easily overlooked that it is usually only a subset of the group’s members who in fact participate in the violence. In predicting participation, extant research has privileged an atomistic approach and identified individual attributes indicative of a predisposition to violence. I suggest instead that a situational approach should complement the atomistic paradigm and present evidence that an individual’s micro-spatial environment is an important predictor of differential participation in intergroup violence. Using GIS data on 3,426 residents from one community, I map the household locations of participants, non-participants, and victims of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. I find that participants are likely to live either in the same neighbourhood or in the same household as other participants. Specifically, as the number of violent to nonviolent individuals in an individual’s neighbourhood or household increases, the likelihood of this individual's participation also increases. In explaining these neighbourhood and household effects, I suggest social influence is the mechanism at work. As micro-spatial distance decreases, micro-social interaction increases. Neighbours and household members exert influence for and against participation. Participation then may be as much the product of social interaction as of individual agency. What neighbours and family members think, say and do may influence participation in collective action such as intergroup violence. The conceptualization of neighbourhoods and households as micro-spheres of influences suggests the importance of social structure as a determinant of participation.

> shorten abstract?

- 1994, explanation of violence, the impact of social influence on participation in the genocide
- Quantitative analysis, using GIS data on residents from one community


- Post-genocide Rwanda, brief research note on the 2003 parliamentary elections

The United Nations Security Council is central to the application of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This article examines the role of the Council in the circumstances of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and questions the secrecy of its decision making. It outlines the similarities between response to genocide in Rwanda and the mass human rights abuses in Darfur, Sudan. It questions the failure of the western press to provide adequate and timely information about both these tragedies.

- 1994 (and preceding events), role of the UNSC (compared with the response to the Darfur crisis) and Western media coverage of these conflicts.
- Qualitative study


- 1994 and preceding developments, role of UK government, explanation of inaction
- Qualitative


Since the conclusion of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front has sought to promote unity and reconciliation through a national programme that is guided by three key structures: strict legislation, education and justice. This contribution will evaluate this programme from a sociological perspective. This evaluation will include an in-depth discussion of how reconciliation is promoted at the expense of the freedom of expression, media and democratic participation. This contribution seeks to demonstrate that reconciliation may be more effectively promoted through the official acknowledgement of human rights abuses and violations on both sides of the conflict, constructive dialogue about the events leading up to and during the genocide as well as increased political participation in Rwanda.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, evaluation of the national reconciliation program of the Kagame regime from a social constructionist perspective
- Qualitative, sociological study


This article recounts a clash between an establishment international nongovernmental organization (NGO), Amnesty International, and the government of Rwanda over the meaning of international human rights norms in a postconflict society. It offers a critical perspective on the main stream human rights community's due process critique of Rwanda's gacaca - a system of over ten thousand local judicial bodies modeled on a precolonial communal dispute resolution the Rwandan government introduced to process the over one hundred twenty thousand suspects crowding its prisons following the 1994 genocide. This
moment of norm contestation offers a lens to broader problems facing the human rights regime. It argues that Amnesty International's legalistic approach to the gacaca prevents it from appreciating its unique postcolonial hybrid form, and that other approaches, such as the one adopted by Penal Reform International, are perhaps better models for human rights praxis in the developing world.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice
- Qualitative study


“\textit{The RPF-dominated government has employed ingando, or solidarity camps, both to plant the seeds of reconciliation, and to disseminate pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination. The government encourages or requires Rwandan citizens from diverse walks of life—students, politicians, church leaders, prostitutes, ex-soldiers, ex-combatants, genocidaires, gacaca judges, and others—to attend ingando for periods ranging from days to several months, to study government programs, Rwandan history, and unity and reconciliation. This Note, based primarily on interviews with ingando participants, government officials, journalists, and genocide survivors conducted in Rwanda in January 2004, evaluates the merits and limits of ingando as a means of fostering reconciliation in the complicated social landscape of post-genocide Rwanda. Focusing on ingando for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, students, and released genocidaires, this Note argues that much of the ingando project is focused on the dissemination of pro-RPF ideology, a dangerous undertaking in a country in which political indoctrination and government-controlled information were essential in sparking and sustaining the genocide. Furthermore, a successful reconciliation program must take place in a society that values human rights; therefore, we cannot evaluate ingando in isolation from human rights developments in Rwanda. This Note argues that ingando will fail as a reconciliation mechanism so long as the Rwandan government continues to attack public spheres of independent thought and criticism.}"

- Post-genocide Rwanda, evaluation of the ingando solidarity camps of the RPF regime
- Qualitative study


“\textit{On the basis of interviews with avoués, or confessed genocide perpetrators, I argue that while state actions in Rwanda in 1994 may have speeded the process of genocide, people themselves, thinking and acting in mobs, assumed a degree of initiative in the violence, and killed with methods that far exceeded state mandates. It is one thing to understand how and why a state might organize such violence but it is another thing altogether to attempt to understand what these apparently ordinary people were thinking and feeling when they committed these atrocities and how they subsequently came to understand their actions and indeed themselves. The analysis of these interviews underscores the importance of factors}
such as state structure and organization that made possible the speed and the magnitude of the genocide. In addition, this article attempts to explore the state of mind of the perpetrators, both during the genocide and up to six years later in jail. It examines their statements about civil rights, legitimate defense, and protection of their independence and freedom. This article questions whether the perpetrators, the Rwandan government and genocide scholars understand the concept of genocide in similar ways.”

- 1994, explanation of violence
- Qualitative study based on interviews with confessed genocide perpetrators


“The Organic Law provides that certain serious offences that previously attracted the death penalty are now punishable by life imprisonment with special provisions and others which also previously attracted the death penalty, but less serious than those in the first category, are punishable by life imprisonment.”

“In this note, it is argued that insofar as it provides for life imprisonment with special provisions the Organic Law violates Rwanda's international human rights obligations, as well as its own national law. An analysis of the issue of life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence is also undertaken and it is argued that it violates the right to a fair trial.”

- Post-genocide Rwanda
- Qualitative study


In two studies that were conducted in Rwanda, we have examined the conceptualizations held by people who have experienced genocide with regard to reconciliation sentiment and quantitatively assessed the relationship between reconciliation sentiment and mental health. It was found that the participants have articulated conceptualizations regarding the nature of reconciliation sentiment. These conceptualizations are consistent with the way the genocide victims personally experienced reconciliation. More importantly, one type of reconciliation sentiment (the one corresponding to a renewed capacity to live together, hear each other, work together, and to forge compromises on a daily basis) was associated with mental health.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, relationship between reconciliation sentiments and mental health
- Quantitative study

The study assessed the relationships between mental health (loss, anxiety and depression), reconciliation sentiment (intra personal and interpersonal reconciliation sentiment), and dispositional forgiveness (lasting resentment, sensitivity to circumstances and unconditional forgiveness) among Rwandese survivors of the 1994 genocide. A sample of 72 females and 29 males living in the southern province of Rwanda, primary victims of the genocide (widows or children of killed people), was presented with questionnaires measuring these constructs. As hypothesized, (a) a strong, positive association was found between interpersonal reconciliation sentiment (trust and cooperation) and unconditional forgiveness, and (b) no significant associations were found between interpersonal reconciliation sentiment and the other two factors of the forgivingness construct: lasting resentment and sensitivity to circumstances. This pattern of associations was consistent with the view that, owing to the current situation in Rwanda where very few perpetrators have directly apologized, the only way for the victims to achieve a state of forgiveness is through unconditionally forgiving the people who harmed them.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, relationship reconciliation sentiments and mental health
- Quantitative study


~ essay by former Rwandan Minister about lessons learned


The PRSP process has been given a prominent place in government business in Rwanda. Poverty increased dramatically in the years leading up to and following the 1994 genocide, so reducing poverty is seen as critical to establishing the credentials of the government. This article argues that a degree of optimism is justified regarding the prospects for the institutionalisation of the PRSP approach in Rwanda. However, realizing this promise will require further progress towards peace, stability, reconciliation, decentralisation and democratic governance. External financing agencies should consider altering the way they interact with government agencies. And continued improvements will be needed in budgetary control, forecasting and prioritisation, involving closer linkage of the PRSP and MTEF processes.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, PRSP process
- Qualitative study


This study analyzes factors that contribute to the livelihood of smallholder farmers living in the vicinity of the Cyabayaga and Rugeramigozi wetlands. Three tools were used: 1) focus group discussion 2) formal surveys and 3) Monitoring for Quality Improvement (MONQI).
Farming systems in wetlands and on hillsides differ. Level of education, resource availability, land ownership and location have an important impact on the location and type of farming systems practiced by households. The dependency of households on wetlands varies between sites. Field size, status of soil fertility and input use are also key factors determining the level of contribution that wetland agriculture makes to farmers' livelihood. In Cyabayaga, the per household per year contribution of wetland cultivation to gross margin (GM) was 74% ($1901) compared to 24% ($844) in Rugeramigozi. The rice in Cyabayaga was the largest contributor to household income providing on average $1045 per household per season. Vegetables cultivated in the dry season in Rugeramigozi have high potential as cash crops. Poor maintenance of drainage and irrigation channels as well as inappropriate cropping systems in wetlands can undermine sustainability and have repercussions for the livelihoods of farmers dependent on agricultural wetlands.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, evaluation of wetlands contributing to the livelihood of peasants
- Quantitative study


The author discusses the impact of advocacy work by national and international women's rights NGOs on the prosecution of gender related war crimes. She argues that the case of the ICTR casts doubt on the assumption that TAN's are crucial in influencing the international court's decision on if and how to address sexual violence and that the work of NGOs becomes mainly important after the court decides to prosecute. JG

- Post-genocide Rwanda, impact by TAN's on the ICTR's approach to prosecute sexual war crimes
- Qualitative study


Widespread and systematic rape pervaded both the genocides in Bosnia–Herzegovina in 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994. In response to these conflicts, the Yugoslav Tribunal (ICTY) and the Rwandan Tribunal (ICTR) were created and charged with meting justice for crimes committed, including rape. Nevertheless, the two tribunals differ in their relative success in administering justice for crimes of rape. Addressing rape has been a consistent element of the ICTY prosecution strategy, which resulted in gender-sensitive investigative procedures, higher frequencies of rape indictments, and more successful prosecutions. In contrast, rape has not been a central focus of the ICTR prosecution strategy, which resulted in a sporadic approach to gender-sensitive investigative procedures, inconsistent rape indictments, and few successful prosecutions. What accounts for this disparity in rape prosecutions between the Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals? Building off the existing literature that discusses factors such as legal instruments and resource capacity of the tribunal, this article argues that transnational advocacy helped generate the necessary political will to adopt and
implement legal norms regarding crimes of sexual violence at the ICTY and the ICTR. Following the importance of transnational advocacy as agents of norm change, this paper also explores the antecedent conditions of advocacy mobilization that conditioned different levels of mobilization vis-à-vis the ICTY and the ICTR, including media attention and framing, connections and interest match with local groups, and geopolitical context.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice, (prosecution of sexual violence) by the ICTR compared with the ICTY
- Comparative case study


This article discusses the public justifications brought forward for three waves of bans on political parties in Rwanda after the regime change of 1994. While the standard narrative of protecting democracy from its enemies (‘militant democracy’) was not invoked, two alternative narratives carried the burden of justification. The first is that of banning strongly particularistic parties, i.e. parties that discriminate or incite hatred and violence along ethnic or similar lines. The second is that of banning the former ruling party, responsible for mass atrocities, and its successor organizations. While both justification narratives have strong initial plausibility against Rwanda’s history of ethnic conflict and genocide, and mirror analogous justifications for banning parties elsewhere, a detailed discussion of the evidence suggests that Rwanda’s bans mainly served the purpose of repressing political opposition. The justifications brought forward in the later waves of bans remain unconvincing and cannot claim political legitimacy.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, analysis of government justifications of bans on political parties
- Qualitative study


Within a relatively short span of time, and culminating with the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2004, the 1994 Rwanda genocide has become a key global injustice memory. At the core of this process is a double-sided conception of injustice: on the one hand, the genocide itself clearly constitutes a major injustice; on the other hand, injustice claims have been expanded to encompass actors outside of Rwanda who observed the horrors without instigating sufficient action to halt, or at least mitigate the effects of, the unfolding genocide. It is the fact that moral and political responsibility for the genocide has been so powerfully expanded to third parties in a spectatorship position that most vividly testifies to the global character of the Rwanda injustice memory. The article identifies and analyzes four areas in which the transformation of the Rwanda genocide from national event to global injustice memory has occurred: institutionalization, expressions of regret, analogical bridging, and cultural products. The article argues that the transformation of non-Western
events into global injustice memories has so far been insufficiently explored within International Relations and global political sociology.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transformation of the genocide to a global injustice memory
- Qualitative study


Never before was a process of doing justice driven so strongly from the outside as in post-genocide Rwanda. Not only did the 1994 genocide lead to the founding of the International Tribunal, but it also induced intensive donor involvement in domestic attempts to ‘break the cycle of hatred’— from the work done by the national courts and the Unity Commission to the gacaca. In this sense, Rwanda became the forerunner of a much wider trend, towards a judicialization of international relations, for instance through an emphasis on international criminal law. However, the past decade of donor involvement in Rwanda in general, and the case of the gacaca in particular, show us how this specific — technocratic, de-contextualized — emphasis on justice might seem innocuous at first glance, but carries dangers within it, particularly if it takes place in an increasingly autocratic and oppressive political environment like that of contemporary Rwanda.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, donor involvement in the justice process
- Qualitative study


Deference and dissent strike a delicate balance in any polity. Insufficient deference to authority may incapacitate government, whereas too much may allow leaders to orchestrate mass violence. Although cross-national and cross-temporal variation in deference to authority and willingness to express dissent has long been studied in political science, rarely have scholars studied programs designed to change these aspects of political culture. This study, situated in post-genocide Rwanda, reports a qualitative and quantitative assessment of one such attempt, a radio program aimed at discouraging blind obedience and reliance on direction from authorities and promoting independent thought and collective action in problem solving. Over the course of one year, this radio program or a comparable program dealing with HIV was randomly presented to pairs of communities, including communities of genocide survivors, Twa people, and imprisoned génocidaires. Changes in individual attitudes, perceived community norms, and deliberative behaviors were assessed using closed-ended interviews, focus group discussions, role-play exercises, and unobtrusive measures of collective decision making. Although the radio program had little effect on many kinds of beliefs and attitudes, it had a substantial impact on listeners' willingness to express dissent and the ways they resolved communal problems.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, influence of a program on the willingness to express dissent
Experimental intervention using mass media


No electronic access through umich.


"My essay explores testimonial statements made by children and young adults between the ages of ten and twenty-five, from both urban and rural environments. These statements were selected from over forty focus group discussions I led in Rwanda during fieldwork for my doctoral degree on two two-month trips from 2006 to 2008. My doctorate examines the daily lives of Rwandan children and young adults post-genocide, and evaluates the impact of different nongovernmental organization (NGO) programs aimed at improving their circumstances. NGO programs were involved with them when they were deemed vulnerable: many were orphaned (either because of the genocide or as a result of HIV/AIDS); some had parents in prison; and others yet lived in extreme poverty. While my essay focuses on the narratives of survivors, it also includes reference to other children sharing some similar problems in their daily struggle for survival."

- Post-genocide Rwanda
- Short qualitative essay


For human rights advocates, the notion of “victor's justice” has become increasingly distasteful in the decades since Nuremberg. At first glance, the victor's justice problem that plagued the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals appears to have been transcended by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) given their mandate to prosecute all serious violations of international humanitarian law. But the tribunals' lack of police powers give states wide latitude to withhold the vital assistance the tribunals need to investigate atrocities and bring suspects to trial. The aim of this article is to evaluate the tribunals' approach to the victor's justice question and assess the extent to which they have held the victorious protagonists in the Balkan and Rwandan conflicts accountable for atrocities committed during wartime. The article imparts two main lessons about the difficulties that international tribunals confront when attempting to prosecute war crimes suspects from the winning side of an armed conflict. First, tactics by states targeted by a tribunal can significantly limit a tribunal's ability to realize justice in a fair and even-handed manner. Second, tactics by powerful international actors in relation to a targeted state can significantly constrain or expand the space in which a targeted state can act to undermine a tribunal. In certain situations, the tribunals may increase the prospects of
state cooperation by crafting effective strategies to subject the state's behavior to international scrutiny and condemnation.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice, the challenge of holding the victors accountable for atrocities
- Qualitative comparative case study


No electronic access through umich.


The author compares the international community’s reaction to the crises in Rwanda and Darfur. Against the predominant presumption in literature, the author argues that the avoidance of the word genocide with respect to the atrocities committed in Darfur should not be regarded as a sign of political unwillingness, but as the successful application of “humanitarian realism”, which refers to a balance between rhetoric and actual deeds. JG (Focus of the article more on Darfur.)

- 1994 ~ , inaction of the international community
- Qualitative comparison between Rwanda and Darfur


Land reform and gender equality are important development issues in post-Genocide Rwanda. Beginning in 1999, the government of Rwanda passed and implemented reforms which granted women rights to own and use land on an equal status with men. However, as is expected with widespread social reform, obstacles continue to inhibit widespread gender equality in practice. In Rwanda, major social obstacles manifest in the form of (1) resistance to allowing daughters to inherit land from their parents, (2) adherence to assumptions of female inferiority, and (3) the persistence of informal marriages, in which wives remain unprotected by the new laws. Interested actors have documented these obstacles and proposed legal and policy solutions to overcome them. This article seeks to identify the causes underlying these obstacles to gender equality. Through this analysis, I find that land scarcity, vestiges of discriminatory legal systems, and gendered power structures are significant underlying causes of these social obstacles. I argue that many of the currently proposed solutions are inadequate because they do not address these underlying causes, as is necessary to better secure women's land rights. The question currently before Rwanda - how to ensure gender equality in the face of continuing social obstacles - has importance
outside Rwanda's borders. The underlying causes discussed in this Article are not unique to Rwanda. Understanding the ways in which these factors inhibit gender equality, and finding solutions to overcome them, are lessons learned not just for Rwanda, but also for the international development community.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, attempt to identify obstacles that inhibit gender equality in land rights
- Qualitative study, sources: laws, published field studies, own field research (interviews)


A decade ago, Rwanda embarked on a major land reform programme. The government envisaged a new land law, supported by a land policy, and claimed that the new tenure system would contribute to enhancing food production, social equity and the prevention of conflict. The Land Law was finally passed in the summer of 2005. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has taken on significant responsibility for monitoring the reform programme. This article provides a contextualized reading of the new Law. It argues that its emphasis on the obligation to consolidate fragmented family plots and register them will exacerbate social tension, but that some of the potential for social strife may be reduced because the state will allow flexibility in how the Land Law is implemented.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, effects of the land law reform
- Qualitative study


The author compares the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the crimes against humanity and possible genocide in Darfur (since 2003). He finds one main common point: the basic incapacity to turn the Responsibility to Protect from a virtuous doctrine into a practical reality. On the basis of his wide experience as a scholar of African politics, the author gives his answer to the question why. His conclusion is that in both cases there was either no 'peace' to keep for the 'peacekeepers', or several of the actors had no intention of respecting the peace agreement. He then sums up seven commonly held illusions about peacekeeping: a) Parties stop fighting because they recognize the inanity of conflict; b) "Give war a chance" is wrong c) A bad peace is better than a good war; d) A peacekeeping military force on the ground changes the reality; e) A pro-forma stabilization of peace is enough to start a peacekeeping operation; f) 'Conflict' is an operational concept; and g) We deal with the present, the past belongs to historians. He concludes that in many ways the failed peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Darfur are exemplary, not because of what peacekeeping advocates hope are technical mistakes, but because the basic concepts of why the operations were undertaken at all. He argues there are no quick-fix solutions,
because the basic concepts are wrong, or at the very least wrongly applied, and that if we cannot do something properly, we should not do it at all.

- 1994, comparative analysis of the failed peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Darfur
- Qualitative analysis


Based on seven months of fieldwork research, the present article explores the nature and ‘reach’ of the state in post-genocide Rwanda, and its effects on decentralisation, participation and assertion of voice at the local level. Rwanda as a case of a ‘strong’ African state is explored through a number of lenses: the vertical structure (administrative and information apparatuses of the state); the lateral structure (multiple responsibilities, *imihigo*, indirect control); the spectrum of state-led ‘local’ activities; and, last but not least, the ‘counterweights’ to the state. The article suggests an increasing penetration of state in terms of surveillance as well as exactions (couched in terms of *umusanzu* or contribution) and control over voice at local level. Decentralisation amounts to mere ‘dispatching of control’, making central power more, not less, effective.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, nature and reach of political control by the RPF regime
- Qualitative study, field work (observations, immersions, interviews)


The author provides in this very brief paper an overview of the Rwanda-Congo relations since 1996, analyzes the developments that turned these two enemies 2009 very quickly into allies that jointly undertook military operations on Congolese territory and discusses the implications for the region. JG

- Post-genocide Rwanda, relations between Rwanda and Congo
- Qualitative analysis


Seventeen and a half years ago, Rwandan society was convulsed in a paroxysm of genocide. An extremist Hutu government, its military and militia, as well as village gangs, tried to hold on to power and avenge the death of their president by killing over eight hundred thousand Tutsi and Hutu opponents in about one hundred days. The 18 years since those brutal events in Rwanda give some insights into the dilemmas and prospects of transitional justice in this most extreme example of man's inhumanity to fellow man. Offering a brief review of the horrific event, Rawson finds that, after the genocide, both the
international community and the new Rwandan government adopted transitional justice strategies that concentrated on punishing offenders.

- 1994 and post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice
- Qualitative analysis


In institutionalizing gacaca, the Rwandan government has launched one of the most ambitious transitional justice projects the world has ever seen. But gacaca is controversial, and its contribution to postconflict reconciliation is unclear. Through public opinion surveys, trial observations, and interviews, this study provides a window into how gacaca has shaped interethnic relations in one Rwandan community. Although gacaca has brought more people to trial than the ICTR, transnational trials, and the ordinary Rwandan courts combined, gacaca exposes—and perhaps deepens—conflict, resentment, and ethnic disunity. Lies, half-truths, and silence have limited gacaca's contribution to truth, justice, and reconciliation.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice, effect of the gacaca process on interethnic relations
- Qualitative study, based on public opinion surveys, trial observations and interviews


The author argues that continuity can be found between the pre-genocide and the post-genocide regime in Rwanda. Analyzing different trends during the first ten years of post-genocide Rwanda, such as ethnic discrimination, the oppression of opposition movements and the government's repressive information management, Reyntjens claims that the new RPF regime is guilty of massive human rights violations and that it built a new authoritarian rule. According to the author, the newly developed structural violence in the country is ignored by the international community, and could lead to another break-out of violence in the future.

- 1994, mostly the first 10 years of governance in post-genocide Rwanda, comparison to pre-genocide Rwanda
- Case study


When the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in July 1994, winning the civil war and ending the genocide, this was seen by many as the succession of a bloody dictatorship by a decent government. Despite the early drift into authoritarianism, concentration of power and human rights abuse, Rwanda continued to be seen as a country in transition towards democracy. However, political transitions do not automatically lead from dictatorship to
democracy, and Rwanda is but one of the illustrations of the weaknesses of the transition paradigm. Rather than liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, the RPF has brought oppression, exclusion and dictatorship. People’s widespread and deep-rooted feelings of frustration, anger and despair are a fertile breeding ground for structural violence, and they are likely to again lead to acute violence.

- Mostly post-genocide Rwanda, development of the new RPF regime to an authoritarian regime
- Qualitative case study


Post-genocide Rwanda has become a ‘donor darling’, despite being a dictatorship with a dismal human rights record and a source of regional instability. In order to understand international tolerance, this article studies the regime’s practices. It analyses the ways in which it dealt with external and internal critical voices, the instruments and strategies it devised to silence them, and its information management. It looks into the way the international community fell prey to the RPF’s spin by allowing itself to be manipulated, focusing on Rwanda’s decent technocratic governance while ignoring its deeply flawed political governance. This tolerance has allowed the development of a considerable degree of structural violence, thus exposing Rwanda to the risk of renewed violence.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, analysis of the RPF regime’s practices
- qualitative case study


“This article outlines the history leading up to the last election. It then analyzes the run-up to the presidential poll and the election itself. Finally, it addresses the significance of elections in post-genocide Rwanda and considers the role that the international community should play in support of the country’s democracy and growth. This article argues that Rwanda is not even a moderately functioning democracy, that politics of exclusion result in widespread structural violence, and that the international community should act now to deter any future violence.”

- Qualitative study


The author argues that the emergence of irregular forces is not just a sign of weak states, but also an instrument of states to repress oppositional groups. In particular he claims that when donor-induced democratization in Africa coincided with strong domestic political threats, states sponsored militias to implement their coercive strategies. The author
compares the privatization of repression in Rwanda and Kenya to supply evidence for his theoretical framework. JG

- Pre-genocide Rwanda and 1994, interaction of donor induced democratization, oppositional threats to the regime and the privatization of state violence (comparison between Rwanda and Kenya)

- Qualitative comparative case analysis


In 1994, the Rwandan civil war and genocide produced thousands of orphans. Alongside the war, the growing HIV/AIDS crisis in Rwanda has produced a current population of about 300,000 orphans — many of whom are compelled to head households. These orphans urgently require land use rights, but many find that their rights to their deceased parents’ customary land holdings are denied or restricted by their guardians and others. Despite the legal protections for children that are guaranteed within Rwanda's laws, the reality is that many guardians do not respect orphans’ land rights and few orphans have sufficient access to administrative and legal forums to assert and defend these rights. In contrast to most accounts in the literature that discuss more generally the issue of African orphans’ land rights in the context of adults’ land rights, this article focuses on specific cases in which Rwandan orphans independently pursued their land rights. Ultimately, the article concludes that in Rwanda — and elsewhere in Africa — government officials should re-examine their ideas about guardianship and grant orphans urgent attention as individuals and as a special interest group.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, land rights of orphans
- General discussion of the land rights and qualitative analysis of 100 land dispute cases of orphans


For the past two decades, a growing number of researchers have focused attention on the problem of environmental scarcity, particularly land scarcity, which they believe can contribute to violence and conflict in some countries. Their work follows in a tradition of linking land matters to war. More specifically, some researchers have argued that land scarcity may be linked to genocidal violence in some countries, including Rwanda, where land scarcity, along with population pressure, environmental degradation, economic decline, and perceived social disparities, contributed to the ethnic-political conflict that culminated in the genocide of 1994. The field research upon which this article is based explored four connections between land and genocide in Rwanda, as suggested by the literature, by interviewing, first, prisoners accused of genocide (mostly Hutu) about their experiences with wartime and post-war land-grabbing and, second, prison officials (mostly Tutsi) about their fact-finding techniques for assessing prisoners’ accounts of post-war land-grabbing. Instead
of arguing that land scarcity in Rwanda is linked to or contributed to the genocide, this article argues, on the basis of the interview findings and an analysis of the fact-finding efforts, that the genocide influenced land-grabbing during the war and continues to influence interpretations of and responses to land-grabbing after the war.

- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, connections between land matters and genocide
- Qualitative field study based on interviews


Part of a special issue on war, crisis, and transition. The writers analyze the role played by international finance institutions in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. They review the criminological literature focusing on issues of state criminality and "crimes of globalization" before briefly describing the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and international human rights. With the application of an integrated theory of organizational crime, they explain the conditions fostering Rwanda's genocide, including the roles of international finance lenders. They demonstrate how, because their policies and development demands altered Rwanda's social, economic, and political structures, such institutions bear some culpability for the disaster. In conclusion, they assert that international financial policies for postcolonial states should be dictated by concerns for human rights and the social, cultural, and economic needs of a state and its citizens rather than the exigencies of "free trade," capital mobility, and global capital accumulation.

- Pre-genocide Rwanda, influence of international financial policies on the civil war/genocide
- Qualitative study based on literature and legal documents


*No electronic access through umich!*


The evolution of Rwanda's language policies since 1996 has played and continues to play a critical role in social reconstruction following war and genocide. Rwanda's new English language policy aims to drop French and install English as the only language of instruction. The policy-makers frame the change as a major factor in the success of social and education reforms aimed at promoting reconciliation and peace and increasing Rwanda's participation in global economic development. However, in Rwanda, the language one speaks is construed as an indicator of group affiliations and identity. Furthermore, Rwanda has the potential to develop a multilingual educational policy that employs its national language, Kinyarwanda (Ikinyarwanda, Rwanda), to promote mass literacy and a literate,
multilingual populace. Rwanda’s situation can serve as a case study for the ongoing roles that language policy plays in the politics of power.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, language policy of the RPF regime (drop French, install English)
- Qualitative study, based on interview data from interviews at secondary schools amongst other sources


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This literature review analyses current academic literature examining the reporting of the Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi in 1994 in the American and European media. It shows how the genocide was mischaracterised as a ‘tribal war’ and an act of spontaneous violence and primordial hatred, rather than being accurately reported as a meticulously planned and implemented political project of ethnic extermination. It examines the range of reasons for this failure to report the news accurately presented in the current literature, finding a combination of factors: racism, lack of media interest in reporting on Rwanda and Africa, a shortage of images of the genocide, an uncritical approach to government statements downplaying genocide, and the drive to report stories that gratify Western viewers' perception of the West as being morally idealistic, just, and civilised. When the truth contradicted these imperatives and prejudices academic literature shows that the media sacrificed the truth for the economic bottom line to produce media that sells.

- 1994, literature review about the reporting of the genocide in European and American media


This article analyzes how the current framework of retributive justice pursued by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda fails to respect the human rights and to enable the well-being of Rwandan genocide survivors. Rwandan genocide survivors currently suffer from widespread poverty, lack of access to health care and housing, inadequate educational opportunity, and food insecurity and malnutrition. It calls for the application of restorative justice as an extension of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect for genocide survivors to be included in the remit of the Tribunal and UN humanitarian and development programs in Rwanda. It examines current and past restorative justice programs in various countries around the world to provide tangible examples of ways in which restorative justice can be
implemented. It critically questions the moral logic of exclusive reliance on retributive justice that ignores the consequences of genocide by punishing the guilty without simultaneously assisting the victims. Finally, it urges that the Declaration of Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Human Rights Violations and Article 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court be applied to the work of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice, discussion of restorative and retributive justice
- Qualitative study


Looking beyond obvious development achievements under Kagame’s rule, this article attempts to reveal the political motives behind the government’s large-scale campaign to rewrite the country’s history and to reshape society. In order to do so, the political practices of the current regime are analysed from a critical approach based on the writings of Foucault and Agamben. The article examines how the survival of the current regime is securitised and what role censorship along with propaganda play in strengthening the current government. Moreover, it exposes what political motives are at the bottom of collective mourning ceremonies and how one part of the population is victimised while the other part is criminalised. In Rwanda, ‘peace’ equals ‘security’ which is imposed by an all-powerful state through tight control over all aspects of life - including the production of knowledge and the definition of ‘truth’. In such an environment, the renewed politicisation of ethnicity or any other cleavage in society might easily erupt in another wave of violence.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, analysis of the RPF regime’s governance, creating of a new historical narrative
- Qualitative study


This paper argues that the Rwandan government’s reconciliation strategy will need to be accompanied by a process of democratisation if it is to achieve its objective of fostering long-term peace. If the discourse of national unity is not reflected in an effective sharing of political power and economic resources, it is likely to be perceived with suspicion or even rejection by the country’s largely Hutu population, and could contribute to aggravating ethnic tensions. Last time Rwanda—under pressure from the international community—undertook a democratisation process, however, this contributed to exacerbating the ethnic tensions that led to the genocide. Today Rwanda and its international donors thus face a stark trade-off between short-term stability and long-term peace: the longer the country puts off necessary democratic reform for fear of upsetting stability, the greater the risk of a rejection of government policies by the population and of a renewed manipulation of ethnicity in the future.
- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, reconciliation strategy of the regime, lack of democratization
- Qualitative study


- Book review of Marie Beatrice Umutesi’s autobiographic book “Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaïre” (Umutesi is a Hutu refugee and claims that the killings of refugees in the DRC by Rwandan troops/rebels constitutes another genocide), see also the review by de Lame exclude?

**Stanton, Gregory.** 2004. "Could the Rwandan Genocide have been Prevented?" *Journal of Genocide Research* 6 (2):211.

Stanton argues that genocide consists of eight stages with distinctive warning signs and that at each stage strategies are available to prevent or stop the genocide. He outlines the eight stages in the case of Rwanda and describes how, despite sufficient information about the developments in Rwanda, the US and the UN ignored the warning signs and failed to intervene. He discusses the various reasons for the international community’s inaction and concludes that a stronger UNAMIR could have prevented the genocide. JG

- Pre-genocide Rwanda and 1994, discussion of the question if the genocide could have been prevented by third party intervention
- Historical analysis


This article explores psychological avenues to reconciliation between groups. It describes the psychological changes in survivors, perpetrators, and passive bystanders in the course of the evolution of increasing violence and points to healing from the psychological wounds created as an essential component of reconciliation. It also explores the role of understanding the roots of genocide, and of violence between groups in general, in contributing to healing, to the creation of a shared history in place of the usually contradictory histories held by groups that have been in violent conflict, and to reconciliation in general. The role of processes that have been emphasized in the literature on reconciliation, such as truth, justice, and contact between groups are discussed. Bottom up approaches focusing on the population and top down approaches involving leaders and the media, and the importance of changes in institutions and structures are discussed. The article exemplifies many of the issues and processes by a discussion of the genocide in Rwanda, and by the description of interventions, ranging from work with small groups, including leaders and the media, to radio programs that aimed to further reconciliation, as well as research evaluating an intervention.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, essay describing seminars for psychological recovery in Rwanda that were developed by the authors


Estimates of the number of Rwandans who participated in the genocide vary between millions and tens of thousands. The author argues that a precise estimate has important implications for both, the understanding of the genocide, as well as for the post-genocide environment in Rwanda. He therefore attempts to provide an empirically based and systematically calculated estimate of the number of perpetrators.

- 1994, estimate of the number of perpetrators in genocide
- Empirical study


The article presents a comparative analysis of genocide in Rwanda and Darfur. The first half of the article examines the patterns and origins of violence in both cases and uses the comparison to generate some theoretical inferences about the causes of genocide. The analysis finds that both cases demonstrate a similar character of violence but that in Rwanda the violence was more intense, more exterminatory, and more participatory than in Darfur. Both episodes took place in the midst of civil war, in periods of political transition, in countries with histories of ethnic nationalism, and in areas where the conflicting ethnic populations lived in relative proximity. However, in Rwanda the state is more compact, centralized, and effective, which may explain the variation in intensity. The second half of the article focuses on the international response to genocide in both cases. After Rwanda, observers emphasized the importance of using the label "genocide" and creating domestic constituencies. Darfur showed that both strategies are insufficient. In response to Darfur, US officials declared "genocide" to be occurring, and there emerged a politically diverse civil-society coalition to lobby the administration. Yet the net outcome for both cases, in terms of the absence of an effective policy to halt genocide, was the same. The article argues that focusing too intently on a "genocide" determination may be counterproductive, that international politics matter yet mobilization on Darfur outside of North America was weak, and that protocols for the use of force to prevent genocide should be clarified.

- 1994, comparative case study of the genocide in Rwanda and Darfur
- Qualitative, comparative case study
The importance of hate radio pervades commentary on the Rwandan genocide, and Rwanda has become a paradigmatic case of media sparking extreme violence. However, there exists little social scientific analysis of radio's impact on the onset of genocide and the mobilization of genocide participants. Through an analysis of exposure, timing, and content as well as interviews with perpetrators, the article refutes the conventional wisdom that broadcasts from the notorious radio station RTLM were a primary determinant of genocide. Instead, the article finds evidence of conditional media effects, which take on significance only when situated in a broader context of violence.

- 1994, influence of the broadcasts of radio RTLM on the onset of genocide
- Quantitative and qualitative methods


Much has been written about the special design of Rwanda's judiciary in order to handle the aftermath of the genocide in 1994. By contrast, other institutional elements of the 2003 constitution have rarely been addressed in research. The second (partial) parliamentary elections in September 2008 revealed some of the implications which the carefully designed electoral system has for Rwanda's political development. As a starting point, the paper emphasises the need to link the debate about institutional design in divided societies with the debate about elections in authoritarian regimes. Under different regime types, "institutional engineers" may pursue different goals. The paper argues that proportional representation (PR) can foster undemocratic outcomes: PR impedes the local accountability of politicians in a political environment in which the government is not held in check by a democratic opposition. Thus, the current PR system facilitates the maintenance of authoritarian power in Rwanda whereas small constituencies would establish closer links between the local populations and their representatives.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, analysis of the Rwanda’s PR election system and its consequences
- Qualitative study


- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, concept of state in Rwanda over the course of history
- Theoretical/historical essay


> "While it has been well established that ethnic Hutu attempted to exterminate ethnic Tutsi during the genocide in Rwanda, the experience of ethnic Twa in 1994 remains largely unknown and dismissed. The Batwa exist as invisible members of Rwandan society. As the world once again focuses on Rwanda on the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide, the Batwa continue to remain forgotten people in a remembered land. They merely elicit a footnote in scholarship about the genocide, generally formulated in terms of Hutus killing Tutsis and their Hutu sympathizers. Perhaps the deaths of over 10,000 Twa appear insignificant when compared with the slaughter of more than 500,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu. Indeed, readers might be forgiven for thinking that there are only two ethnic groups in Rwanda, because the experiences of Twa are just as peripheral in post-genocide literature as they seem to be in Rwandan social and economic life, both before and after the genocide. Drawing on seven months of ethnographic research and life history interviews with ethnic Twa living in southern Rwanda in 2006, my essay examines the ways that the post-genocide policy of national unity and reconciliation serves to further marginalize an already disadvantaged people."

- Post-genocide Rwanda, marginalization of the Twa
- Ethnographic research and interviews


In this article, I argue that the praise of legal and political analysts who perceive Rwanda's gacaca courts as a model of locally grounded and culturally relevant transitional justice is unfounded without consideration of the broader power dynamics in which justice is delivered. Drawing on life history interviews with 37 Rwandan peasants resident in the south-west of the country, I argue that the claims of the Rwandan government that its gacaca courts are promoting peace and reconciliation must also assess the impact of local justice mechanisms on those subject to its demands, namely ordinary people. In the case of Rwanda's gacaca courts, local-level analysis illuminates a darker and largely unexamined aspect of transitional justice - the playing out of local power dynamics and the social and political inequalities masked by the pursuit of justice and reconciliation. My study cautions against a wholesale endorsement of the gacaca courts as an effective and legitimate form of transitional justice. Instead, it is a mechanism of state power that works to reinforce the political power of the ruling RPF and to ply international audiences with the idea that Rwanda is 'a nation rehabilitated' from 'the scourge of genocide'.
The government in post-genocide Rwanda stakes its moral claim to legitimacy on a policy of national unity and reconciliation, claiming to create a ‘Rwanda for all Rwandans’. This article investigates peasant resistance to this policy. Focusing on everyday acts of resistance among the rural poor, it demonstrates that despite the appearance of widespread popular support, many peasant Rwandans consider the various mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation to be unjust and illegitimate.

Obedience to the dictates of the policy of national unity is frequently tactical, rather than sincere, as peasants employ various strategies to avoid participation. Through a focus on everyday acts of resistance, the article reveals how the post-genocide state through the policy of national unity and reconciliation seeks to depoliticize peasant people by orchestrating public performances and by closing off the possibility for individuals to join together to organize politically.


The epicentre of post-genocide Rwandan society and politics has been the need for reconciliation to assuage ethnic tensions and end a culture of impunity. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has yet to meet its goal of reconciliation in Rwanda: The failure of the tribunal goes beyond its institutional shortcomings and can be attributed the norms of international criminal law that render it an inappropriate response to criminalizing mass violence. The Gacaca courts were resurrected in Rwanda as an indigenous form of restorative justice. The principles and process of these courts hope to mitigate the failures of “Arusha Justice” at the tribunal and seeks to punish or reintegrate over one hundred thousands genocide suspects. Its restorative foundations require that suspects will be tried and judged by neighbours in their community. However, the revelation that Gacaca is a reconciliatory justice does not preclude its potential for inciting ethnic tension if purports to serve as an instrument of Tutsi power. The state-imposed approach of command justice has politicised the identity of the participants in Gacaca -- perpetrators remain Hutus and victims and survivors remain Tutsis. Additionally, the refusal of the Kagame government to allow for the prosecution of RPF crimes to be tried in Gacaca courts empowers the notion that Tutsi survival is preconditioned by Tutsi power and impunity. If Gacaca fails to end the perceptions of impunity in post-genocide Rwanda, it will come at a much higher cost for reconciliation than the failure of the ICTR. The relevance of justice after genocide speaks to the appropriateness of retributive and restorative models of justice in a
post-genocide society such as Rwanda. Additionally, the model of justice must be reconciled to the nature of a political regime that imposes unity under an ethnocratic minority.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, critical evaluation of the gacaca courts in view of the ethnocratic policies of the RPF regime
- Qualitative study


The author analyzes the faulty setup of the UNAMIR mission and its (moral) failure to protect people other than expatriates and fellow soldiers. The article focuses particularly on the massacre at the Ecole Tecnique Officielle Don Bosco, which has been abandoned by the Belgian troops on April 11, sending 2000 Tutsi to certain death. (JG)

- 1994, failure of UNAMIR
- Qualitative study


“In this article we analyze the local politics and perceptions of postgenocide justice in Rwanda and the relationship of justice to peace, democracy, and reconciliation. There are currently three types of efforts to deal with the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda, and all receive significant international support: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the formal domestic justice system, and gacaca. We present the aims of the international community for each type and juxtapose these with the internal politics within Rwanda. We argue that the first two Western inspired systems of justice have proven incapable of addressing the needs of Rwanda. The third system, gacaca, offers a promising alternative to achieve not only justice, but reconciliation and grassroots empowerment as well. This promise, however, also poses risks.”

- Post-genocide Rwanda, transitional justice
- Qualitative analysis


The death toll of the Rwandan genocide remains highly debatable. The frequently quoted estimate of 500,000 Tutsi killed is based on the population census of 1991. However, two unanswered questions make this estimate unreliable. First, how many Tutsi lived in Rwanda prior to the genocide? Second, how many Tutsi survived? With respect to the first question, critics say that the proportion of Tutsi was under-reported in the 1991 census. By comparing
the census data with population data of the local administration of Gikongoro Prefecture, we provide evidence for this allegation and study how the under-reporting may affect the estimate of the genocide death toll. We also use local population data for 117 administrative sectors within Gikongoro Prefecture to make a detailed analysis of the spatial pattern of killings in Gikongoro. We find that Tutsi in Gikongoro had, on average, a 25% chance of surviving the genocide. The survival rate for women was only slightly higher than for men: 29% versus 21%. The location of huge massacres and the way violence spread across sectors were more decisive for the Tutsi survival rate than whether or not local authorities opposed the genocide.

- Same article also published in French
- 1994, attempt to estimate the death toll in the Gikongoro prefecture – evidence for the underreporting of Tutsi in 91 census and geographical analysis of killing patterns
- Quantitative analysis


The economic literature has given due attention to household coping strategies in peacetime. In contrast, little is known about such strategies in wartime. This paper studies the use of cattle as a buffer stock by Rwandan households during 1991–2001, a period characterized by civil war and genocide. It is found that the probability of selling cattle increases upon the occurrence of both peacetime and wartime covariant adverse income shocks. The peacetime cattle sales are largely explained by shifts in the household asset portfolio. In contrast, in 1994, the year of the genocide, almost half of the cattle sales were motivated by the need to buy food. However, we argue that the effectiveness of this coping strategy was severely reduced due to the wartime conditions. First, during the year of ethnic violence, cattle prices plummeted to less than half of their pre-genocide value. Second, we find that households most targeted in the violence did not sell cattle. We discuss several explanations for this latter finding.

- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda (91-2001), use of cattle as buffer stock in households during peace- and war
- Quantitative economic analysis


Existing sub-national studies on the geography of armed conflict mainly focus on observed battle events. Other dimensions of the conflict cycle, including battle events that remain undetected in news reports, one-sided violence against civilians and the indirect death toll, have gone largely unstudied due to lack of systematic data. This article demonstrates how these different dimensions of a conflict cycle can be detected and how their relative
importance can be assessed. The basic tools include population census data, principal component analysis and spatial analysis. When applied to the Rwandan case, the method reveals high excess mortality from the civil war, genocide, (counter)insurgency and the refugee crisis. Hidden violence is detected by presenting the first quantitative evidence to date of high excess mortality in Gisenyi, the northwestern province which was the location of (counter)insurgency and served as a corridor for more than a million refugees. The spatial regression analysis indicates that both the refugee crisis and (counter)insurgency contributed to a high death toll in Gisenyi. This latter finding is important because it provides empirical weight in support of contentious qualitative reports by various human rights groups.

- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda (the whole conflict cycle of the 90s), spatial distribution of the different “kinds” of violence during the civil war, genocide, (counter)insurgency, and refugee crisis
- Quantitative, principal component and spatial analysis


More than 200 years after its first publication, the Malthusian thesis is still much debated, albeit in a modified form. Rather than predicting a global catastrophe, most neo-Malthusians stress the local character of the relationship between population pressure, natural resource scarcity, and conflict as well as its dependency on the socio-political and economic context. This softened version of Malthus’s thesis has received little empirical support in cross-country studies. In contrast, a number of subnational analyses have provided some evidence for local conditional Malthusian catastrophes, although ‘catastrophe’ is a big word since these studies have largely focused on low-intensity violence. This article adds to the small body of subnational studies, but focuses on a high-intensity conflict – the Rwandan genocide. In particular, it provides a meso-level analysis of the relation between population pressure and the intensity of violence measured by the death toll among the Tutsi across 1,294 small administrative units. The results indicate that the death toll was significantly higher in localities with both high population density and little opportunity for young men to acquire land. This finding can be interpreted as support for the neo-Malthusian thesis. On the other hand, it is possible that another mechanism operated – in densely populated areas, it may have been relatively easy for the elite to mobilize the population, because of dependency relations through the land and labor market. Alternatively, in densely populated areas, there may have been more lootable assets, and the violence may have been opportunistic rather than driven by need or by fear.

- 1994, explanation of violence, test of the (neo-)Malthusian thesis (relation between population pressure and intensity of violence)
- Quantitative analysis

This article illustrates how fine continuous and categorical measures of genocide intensity can be derived from the records of the Rwandan transitional justice system. The data, which include the number of genocide suspects and genocide survivors across 1484 administrative sectors, are highly skewed and contain a non-negligible number of outlying observations. A number of genocide proxies are subjected to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to obtain a genocide index, and the effect of survival bias on this index is reduced by augmenting the set of genocide proxies subjected to PCA with the distance from an administrative sector to the nearest mass grave. Finally, the administrative sectors are divided into distinct categories of low, moderate and high genocide intensity by means of Local Indicators of Spatial Auto-Correlation (LISA) that allow identifying significant high-high and low-low clusters of genocide intensity.

- 1994, micro-level analysis of genocide intensity based on data derived from the gacaca courts (released in 2007 on the webpage of the gacaca courts – couldn’t access the page anymore…)
- Quantitative study


We study welfare gains and losses in a sample of 188 rural households in two Rwandan provinces over the time span 1990–2002. Our sample is unique because it covers a period of extreme and widespread violence. Using an economic mobility analysis, we seek to identify the impact of the shocks of the war, the genocide and their aftermath on long-term household welfare. To measure economic mobility between 1990 and 2002, we use both net income per adult equivalent and an asset index. We find that households experiencing the murder or imprisonment of one of their members moved considerably downwards in the income distribution. However, households affected by other war-related shocks such as the number of months taken refuge and the loss of physical capital were not worse off in 2002 compared with other households.

- Pre- and post-genocide Rwanda, effects of war and genocide on household incomes and assets from 1990-2002
- Economic mobility analysis


The paper presents a political economy analysis of the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda. The analysis shows how, through the producer price of coffee, the dictator buys political loyalty from the peasant population, and how, in periods of economic growth, the dictator increases his level of personal consumption as well as power over the population. The analysis of Habyarimana's policy decisions leads to the conclusion that he was a totalitarian type of dictator. When, at the end of the 1980s, the international price of coffee fell dramatically, the regime switched to severe forms of repression to maintain its hold onto power. Genocide
emerges as an outcome of Wintrobe's loyalty-repression model, while foreign aid sustained
the dictator's hold onto power.

- Pre-genocide Rwanda and 1994, the exploitation of the producer price of coffee by
  the Habyarimana regime
- Political economic analysis


Based on household-level data, Verwimp tests the demographic impact of genocide and civil
war in the three prefectures Gitarama, Gikongoro and Kibuye. The results show that the
killing pattern among the Hutu and Tutsi population was clearly different and that the
absolute number of Hutus killed in the sample was half of the number of killed Tutsis. He
therefore argues that in the three above mentioned prefectures the "double-genocide"-thesis
is not tenable and that the killings committed by the RPF should not be labeled as genocide.
JG

- 1994, influence of violence on demographics > testing the double-genocide thesis

- quantitative analysis

(2):233.

This paper reports a quantitative study of the genocide in the prefecture of Kibuye in western
Rwanda in 1994. It uses a database produced from a house-to-house survey of victims by
the organization of genocide survivors, Ibuka. For a total of 59,050 victims of the genocide,
data were collected on age, sex, occupation, commune of residence before the genocide,
and place and date of death. An analysis conducted for one commune (Mabanza), showed
that the chance of surviving the genocide was higher in those sectors of the commune where
the Tutsi population did not congregate at a football stadium in Kibuye. Those who went to a
mountainous area and defended themselves were almost the only Tutsi still alive in the
prefecture after the month of April 1994. Other determinants of survival included age, sex,
and occupation. The number of deaths each day while the killing lasted is estimated for the
whole of the prefecture.

- 1994, analysis of survival chances in Kibuye
- Quantitative study, based on a dataset by Ibuka

———. 2004b. "Games in Multiple Arenas, Foreign Intervention and Institutional Design on the
Eve of the Rwandan Genocide." Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 10

This paper studies the strategic behavior of four parties in the crucial years preceding the
Rwandan genocide, namely 1990-1994. For that purpose a nested game is developed in
which the autocratic regime plays a transition game with the domestic opposition in the principal arena and at the same time that regime is involved in a civil war game with a rebel movement. The change of preference orderings is studied when the civil war is introduced as a shock in the transition game. The fourth player, the international community interferes in the nested game as a provider of military and financial aid to the autocratic regime. The Nash equilibria of different games are studied with and without the interference of the international community and with and without human rights conditionality of donor aid to the autocratic regime. When players realize that the rules of the game prevent them from reaching their preferred outcome, they may redesign these rules. The elimination of the moderate Hutu opposition is studied as an example of institutional design. This elimination cleared the way for an even more innovating strategy, the genocide of the Tutsi minority.

- Pre-genocide Rwanda, analysis of the strategic behavior of the four parties (regime, domestic opposition, rebels, international community) from 1990 – 1994.
- Nested game approach


This paper presents the results of a research project in which we have traced 350 Rwandan households who were part of a rural household survey before the Rwandan genocide (1994). Economic, demographic and agricultural data from an extensive 1989–1992 survey can be linked with the condition of the household at the time of the Genocide Transition Survey (2000). This allows us to study the fate of the household members during the genocide. Our results show that age, sex, the sex of the head of the household, the size of rented land, off-farm income, gross household income and farm-level anti-erosion investment significantly determine the probability of a household member to become a perpetrator of genocide. These results are interpreted in the political economy of Rwanda.

- 1994, analysis of peasant participation in the Rwandan genocide
- Quantitative study based on household level data (households from a pre-genocide survey were traced in 2000)


This article is a quantitative study of the use of machetes and firearms during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Kibuye Prefecture. The machete is an agricultural tool owned by most Rwandan households and is believed to have been the prime instrument of killing during the genocide. The article addresses the question to what extent individual characteristics of victims (gender, age, occupation) and aspects of the Rwandan genocide (location of atrocities, point in time during the genocide) determined the perpetrators' use of modern rather than traditional weapons to kill individual victims. An original database developed by the organization of the survivors of the genocide (IBUKA) is used. The data were collected from 1996 to 1999 and contain information on the deaths of 59,050 victims. Logistical regression analysis is performed to explain the use of either a traditional weapon or a
firearm to kill the victims. The analysis shows that the probability of being killed with a firearm depended on the location where the victim was killed (more particularly, on whether or not the victim was killed in a large-scale massacre); on the commune of residence and the age of the victim; on the number of days after 6 April the victim was killed; and on interaction effects between the latter two variables and the gender of the victim. The importance of individual characteristics, location of atrocities and timing for the use of different kinds of weapons adds to our understanding of the organized nature of the Rwandan genocide.

- 1994, factors (characteristic of victims or location and time of massacre) determining the use of firearms, rather than machetes
- Quantitative study


Until now, two main sets of arguments have dominated the debate on the nature of the massacres that were perpetrated in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. The first one maintains that they constituted a response to prior attacks by the RPF, implying that they should be regarded as military operations, rather than as acts of ethnic cleansing. The second common line of argument is that these massacres served as pilot runs for the subsequent genocide, implying that they were part of a plan that was not to see its full implementation until 1994. This paper puts forth a third, alternative interpretation of these massacres. The first of the aforementioned arguments, it is contended, does not take into account the detailed evidence that is available on the killings: the fact that they took place in the context of the civil war accounts for the timing of the massacres, but not for their genocidal character. In turn, the second interpretation fails to situate these massacres against the agro-pastoral and ideological background of the regime that committed them. By contrast, this paper shows that the massacres took place in areas characterized by a specific history of spatial and social engineering. They are best understood against the background of the processes of land colonization, resettlement, depredation and dispossession of cattle and land that were under way in the areas where the land was most scarce, and where the peasant society was being subject to rationalization and remodelling from above. The paper concludes that pastoralism was sentenced to disappear from Rwanda and that the massacres should be considered instances of ethnic cleansing.

- Pre-genocide Rwanda, interpretation of the massacres between 1990-1992
- Qualitative study


Western donors are heavily engaged in Rwanda's Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme for former combatants. This engagement reflects the commitment of the donors to implement a new post-conflict agenda in a very difficult situation. When this agenda goes beyond mere economic development, we argue that donors should not drift too far away.
from their first task: combating poverty. More often than not, development and security are two sides of one coin. Addressing one side without considering the other is bad practice. Demobilisation is really a topic that has both a developmental as well as a security aspect. Donors, as well as the Rwandan government, focus too narrowly on the security or military aspect of demobilisation. This reflects the status of the Rwandan government. It is very focussed on its own security to the detriment of other elements. We argue that these other elements, access to jobs and education, equity and broad based development should be dealt with as a matter of priority. If not, they will once more undermine security. Given the enormous amount of money invested in the demobilisation programme, donors should do much more to use their monitoring capacities to their full potential.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, critical analysis of Rwanda’s demobilisation and reintegration efforts and the involvement of Western donors in the program
- Qualitative study based on interview data


This paper studies the demographic consequences of the Rwandan genocide and how the excess mortality due to the conflict was distributed in the population. Data collected by the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey indicate that although there were more deaths across the entire population, adult males were the most likely to die. Using the characteristics of the survey respondent as a proxy for the socio-economic status of the victims’ family, the results also show that individuals with an urban or more educated background were more likely to die. The country’s loss of human capital is a long-term cost of the genocide that compounds the human tragedies.

- 1994 distribution and long-term demographic consequences of the excess mortality
- Quantitative study


This article examines the tensions between the Rwandan government’s discourse on reconciliation and its fight against negationism. It shows how the government's campaign against negationism has taken shape—from the law against “divisionism” in 2001 to recent accusations of “genocide ideology.” The article also explores the treatment of Hutu rescuers at the national level. It raises concerns that the broad definition and application of genocide ideology may have a negative impact on reconciliation in Rwanda.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, discrepancies between the regime’s reconciliation narrative and its fight against negationism (campaign against genocide ideology)
- Qualitative analysis

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This article argues that particular assumptions about biology, ethnicity, genetics, and gender create a permissive environment for policies of sexual violence during war. It further asserts that the children born as a consequence of these policies become a prism for identity politics. The arguments regarding identity and war and the consequences on policies of sexual violence during wartime are illustrated through analyses of the Serbian militia’s rape campaigns in Bosnia in the early 1990s and the mass rape and killing of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994.

- 1994, evaluation of the polices of sexual violence during the civil war in Rwanda and Bosnia
- Qualitative analysis


This article aims to critically examine Rwanda's security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ssr–ddr) process through a theoretical framework outlining four different models of peace processes in order to identify the sort of peace that can emerge from Rwanda's ssr–ddr approach. The author analyses how the Rwandan government has managed to keep the process ‘locally’ owned, while largely financed by external actors, despite strong criticism of its apparent lack of democratisation. The ‘genocide credit’, the Rwandan government's preference for national, rather than international solutions and its recent troop contribution to peacebuilding operations in the region are identified as the main reasons for this development. The paper argues that the peace emanating from the ssr–ddr process may be considered a hybrid form of state formation and state building, because of the local agency's preference for security and stability while simultaneously enjoying financial and technocratic support for its 'liberal' peacebuilding actions in the region.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, critical evaluation of the SSR and DDR process
- Qualitative study


No access through umich.
The word “reconciliation” is a key political slogan of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) government, and is widely used by donors, media, and Rwandans themselves. Despite ubiquity, the meaning of “reconciliation” remains unclear. Drawing on fieldwork in two communities in southern Rwanda, this paper examines how respondents understand and articulate the term. For respondents, reconciliation: (i) requires punitive justice informed by a hierarchy of responsibility for crimes; (ii) does not necessarily involve forgiveness; and (iii) is repeatedly referred to as returning to “the way things were before.” The paper then contrasts these understandings and expectations with the official government discourse on reconciliation, the “RPF Healing Truth,” a narrative which, among other things, stresses that the “haute responsables” (high leadership) of the previous regime is primarily responsible for the genocide even though a large segment of the population participated, and the need to “improve,” meaning chiefly educate and emancipate, Rwandans. The comparison of the “public” and “hidden” transcripts on reconciliation reveals areas of both agreement and disagreement. For example, the notion of a hierarchy of responsibility for the genocide spanning from the “haute responsables” to the “bas peuple” (low people) is found in both discourses. Grassroots respondents, however, also attribute some responsibility for the genocide to the RPF who are themselves part of the “haute responsables.” The article concludes by highlighting signs of an internal contradiction between RPF reconciliation policy and practice: as the RPF calls for Rwandan emancipation, education and critical thinking on the one hand, it attempts to “institutionalize” and control people’s behaviour on the other, as is seen in the example of “state-bestowed” forgiveness.

- Post-genocide Rwanda, reconciliation and transitional justice, difference between the respondents’ understanding of reconciliation and the official RPF narrative
- Qualitative research based on interview data