Research featured in BBC documentary - "Rwanda's Untold Story"
Rwanda's Untold Story - BBC Documentary
From BBC
Wednesday 1 October
Today, Rwanda is one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, a model state loved by western leaders. Rwanda’s economic miracle and apparent ethnic harmony has led to the country being one of the biggest recipients of aid from the UK. But Rwanda is a country still dominated by its dark history, and the senseless barbarity of the Rwandan genocide still shocks the world.
Twenty years on, Rwanda’s Untold Story reveals evidence that challenges the accepted story of one of the most horrifying events of the late 20th Century and questions the role that Paul Kagame played in it.
The current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, has long been portrayed as the man who brought an end to the killing and rescued his country from oblivion. Now there are increasing questions about the role of Kagame’s RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) forces in the dark days of 1994 and in the 20 years since. The film investigates allegations surrounding Kagame’s involvement in the shooting down of the presidential plane which sparked the killings in 1994, and questions his claims to have ended the genocide.
Part of the award-winning strand This World, the film also examines claims of war crimes committed by Kagame’s forces and their allies in the wars in DR Congo, and allegations of human rights abuses in today’s Rwanda. It includes interviews with former close associates from within Kagame’s inner circle and government, as they speak out - presenting a very different portrait of the man.
Wednesday 1 October
Today, Rwanda is one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, a model state loved by western leaders. Rwanda’s economic miracle and apparent ethnic harmony has led to the country being one of the biggest recipients of aid from the UK. But Rwanda is a country still dominated by its dark history, and the senseless barbarity of the Rwandan genocide still shocks the world.
Twenty years on, Rwanda’s Untold Story reveals evidence that challenges the accepted story of one of the most horrifying events of the late 20th Century and questions the role that Paul Kagame played in it.
The current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, has long been portrayed as the man who brought an end to the killing and rescued his country from oblivion. Now there are increasing questions about the role of Kagame’s RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) forces in the dark days of 1994 and in the 20 years since. The film investigates allegations surrounding Kagame’s involvement in the shooting down of the presidential plane which sparked the killings in 1994, and questions his claims to have ended the genocide.
Part of the award-winning strand This World, the film also examines claims of war crimes committed by Kagame’s forces and their allies in the wars in DR Congo, and allegations of human rights abuses in today’s Rwanda. It includes interviews with former close associates from within Kagame’s inner circle and government, as they speak out - presenting a very different portrait of the man.
GenoDynamics research featured in the film:
Finally completing some of the work that we have been doing for approximately 14 years, we decided to take an opportunity to discuss some of our research with the BBC. We preferred this format for it gave us a little more time to discuss what was involved and what we were concluding. Of course, we did not have that much time. In fact, most of the hour long interview does not appear on screen (understandably) and we are attempting to obtain that full/complete footage now for it was a generally good discussion. Within the larger interview we were each asked and answered several questions (slightly modified for each of us - Christian Davenport was interviewed first and then Allan Stam). These are paraphrased below for Davenport's interview:
- How did you come to do your work on Rwanda?
- What lead you to your work on Rwanda?
- How did you start this work?
- What type of information did you have before you went to Rwanda?
- What did you as an individual think in basic terms about what had happened?
- What was your basic idea of what the Rwandan story was when you first went to the country?
- So, is it fair to say that when you went to Rwanda you had the same opinion that the rest of the world had?
- In general terms, what was your general understanding of the situation? Was it clear that the Hutu had initiated violence and that the Tutsi were victims?
- When you got there what kind of field work did you do... In general terms not in scientific terms?
- What kind of country is it (how would you describe it)?
- And, what did you get to find out when you got into the countryside?
- So, in a nutshell what is the thesis that began to develop?
- Basically, what picture began to emerge?
- I understand it's complex... but you suggest that a picture began to emerge from your findings. What was that picture? Explain that and say how it was different from the image that you had before you started your research.
- So, it was a very confused atmosphere and people were killed because of perhaps where they were and not who they were?
- So, you were finding things that were very different from what people had written and talked about for many years?
- Regarding the ICTR, what did you do for/with them, how did they react to what you did?
- Were you surprised that the ICTR was initially enthusiastic and then that changed?
- When you started to put the maps together what did you discover with regard to the front lines and back lines - again, in general/non-academic terms?
- What was the pattern that emerged about who was killing whom - in simple terms?
- So what was the significance of what you found as this relates back to the established narrative up to this point?
- And what does this all mean for Paul Kagame who has established himself as the savior of the Tutsis?
- So, your work shows that the RPF actually contributed to the violence as they pushed forward into the country?
- What happened to you after you presented your work?
- How did you feel about the response to your work - as a scholar and as an African American? How did you feel when you were called a "denier" and all the other things you were called?
Photos from the filming taken by Christian Davenport (except for the last one)
Media Coverage of the documentary
- Rwanda: British Legislator Vows to Call Probe Into BBC Documentary
- Rwanda sets up commission to probe BBC’s role in inciting hate (Star Africa)
- The Kagame-Power Lobby's Dishonest Attack on the BBC 2's Documentary on Rwanda (Monthly Review)
- IFJ Calls for Lifting Ban On BBC Broadcasts in Rwanda (All Africa)
- Will US policymakers review ‘Rwanda; The Untold Story’ before sending in the Marines? (San Francisco Bay Review)
- Controversy Over BBC's 'Rwanda: The Untold Story' (Huffington Post)
- Rwanda MPs condemn BBC Untold Story programme on genocide (BBC)
- Rwandan government angry at BBC over documentary (Associated Press)
- BBC: we had a ‘duty’ to make Rwandan genocide documentary (The Guardian)
- Rwanda bans BBC broadcasts over genocide documentary (The Guardian)
- Measuring, “Denying” & “Trivializing” Deaths in the Case of Rwanda (Political Violence at a Glance)
- Rwanda calls for BBC to be banned over controversial documentary (The Guardian)
- Kagame Criticizes BBC’s Film ‘Rwanda’s Untold Story’ Over Genocide Denial (UGO News)
- Rwanda MPs condemn BBC Untold Story programme on genocide (The BBC)
- Ambassador Jean-Marie Ndagijimana congratulates the BBC for its impartiality and the professionalism in the documentary "Rwanda's untold story" (Tribune Franco-Rwandaise)
- Why is the Truth About Rwanda so Elusive? (Global Research)
- Rwanda: Genocide Denial Should Be Made an International Crime (The New Times)
- Rwanda: A Tale of Two Genocides - and the Poor Attempt At Revisionism (All Africa)
- IBUKA genocide survivors call on BBC to stop broadcasting Rwanda’s Untold Story (Jambonews)
- Rwandans infuriated by BBC's genocide revisionism (Politics Web)
- Rwandan president accuses BBC of 'genocide denial' (Yahoo News)
- Dr. Theogene Rudasingwa (RNC) coordinator thanks BBC for the documentary Rwanda's Untold Story (The Rwandan)
- The BBC Must Be Congratulated For Launching Scrutiny With "Rwanda's Untold Story" (Blackstar News)
- BBC asks ‘What really happened in Rwanda?’ (San Francisco Bayview)
- BBC accused of promoting genocide denial in Rwanda documentary (The Independent)
- The BBC and the Rwandan Genocide (TeleSUR)
- Protests over BBC's 'revisionist approach' to Rwandan genocide (The Independent)
- "Rwanda's Untold Story - BBC Documentary Offers Compelling Case of Kagame as War Criminal" (Blackstar News)
- "This World: Rwanda's Untold Story, BBC Two, review – 'intense'" (The Telegraph)
- "BBC Documentary : Rwanda’s Untold Story – Rwandan community in UK reacts with gratefulness" (Global Campaign for Rwandan's Human Rights)
- "Unearthing falsehoods in the BBC documentary on 1994 Genocide" (The New Times)
- "“Rwanda: The Untold Story”: questions for the BBC" (The New Times)
- "Survivors outraged by BBC Genocide denial film" (The New Times)
Letter of Complaint to BBC
Mr. Tony Hall, Director-General of the BBC, Broadcasting House, Portland Place,
London. W1A 1AA
October 12, 2014.
Dear Sir,
We the undersigned, scholars, scientists, researchers, journalists and historians are writing to you today to express our grave concern at the content of the documentary Rwanda’s Untold Story (This World, BBC 2 Wednesday October 1), specifically its coverage of the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi.
We accept and support that it is legitimate to investigate, with due diligence and respect for factual evidence, any crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and to reflect on the contemporary political situation in Rwanda. However, attempts to examine these issues should not distort the reality of the 1994 genocide. It is not legitimate to use current events to either negate or to diminish the genocide. Nor is it legitimate to promote genocide denial.
The parts of the film which concern the 1994 genocide, far from providing viewers with an ‘Untold Story’ as the title promises, are old claims. For years similar material using similar language has been distributed far and wide as part of an on-going ‘Hutu Power’ campaign of genocide denial. At the heart of this campaign are convicted génocidaires, some of their defence lawyers from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and their supporters and collaborators. These deniers continually question the status of the genocide and try to prove – like the programme – that what it calls the ‘official narrative’ of the 1994 genocide is wrong. The BBC programme Rwanda’s Untold Story recycles their arguments and provides them with another platform to create doubt and confusion about what really happened.
Three of the untenable claims made in the programme are of the utmost concern: the first is a lie about the true nature of the Hutu Power militia. The second is an attempt to minimize the number of Tutsi murdered in the genocide, and the third is an effort to place the blame for shooting down President Habyarimana’s plane on April 6, 1994 on the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
First, the programme allows a witness to claim that ‘only ten percent of the Interahamwe (militia) were killers’. In fact, the majority of Hutu Power militia forces – estimated to have been 30,000 strong – were trained specifically to kill Tutsi at speed, and indoctrinated in a racist ideology, part of genocide planning. There is eyewitness testimony by several militia leaders who cooperated with the ICTR.
Second, the programme attempts to minimise the number of Tutsi murdered, a typical tactic of genocide deniers. The false figures cited are provided by two US academics who worked for a team of lawyers defending the génocidaires at the ICTR. They even claim that in 1994 more Hutu than Tutsi were murdered – an absurd suggestion and contrary to all the widely available research reported by Amnesty International, UNICEF, the UN Human Rights Commission, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, Africa Rights, a UN Security Council mandated Commission of Experts and evidence submitted to the ICTR and other European courts who have successfully put on trial several perpetrators.
Third, the film argues that the shooting down of the plane on April 6, 1994 was perpetrated by the RPF. This same story was promoted by Hutu Power extremists within a few hours of the president’s assassination and promoted ever since by génocidaires and a few ICTR defence lawyers.
The film pays no heed to a detailed expert report published in January 2012 by a French magistrate Judge Marc Trévidic. This contains evidence from French experts, including crash investigators, who proved scientifically that the missiles that shot down the plane came from the confines of the government-run barracks in Kanombe on the airport’s perimeter – one of the most fortified places in the country, and where it would have been impossible for the RPF, armed with a missile, to penetrate.
Within hours of the president’s assassination, in this carefully planned genocide, roadblocks went up all over Kigali and the Presidential Guard started to target every member of Rwanda’s political opposition. These momentous events are barely mentioned. The members of the Hutu and Tutsi pro-democracy movements were hunted down and killed, including Rwanda’s Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and ten UN peacekeepers from Belgium who were protecting her. These opposition politicians separately threatened the Habyarimana regime for advocating power-sharing and paid for their courage with their lives. Ignored in this film are the Hutu Power attempts to divide the internal political opposition along ethnic lines. Political violence in the film is seen only in the context of a ‘civil war’ between the RPF and the Habyarimana government, a smoke screen, used then and now, to hide the systematic killing of Tutsi carried out by the Hutu Power Interim Government and its militia.
The film-maker, Jane Corbin, who presented the programme, even tries to raise doubts about whether or not the RPF stopped the genocide. The authority on this subject is Lt.-General Roméo Dallaire, the Force commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and present in Rwanda throughout the genocide. Dallaire is categorical. ‘The genocide was stopped because the RPF won and stopped it’, he says. Corbin ignores the testimonies of direct witnesses to what happened in 1994: Dallaire and his volunteer UN peacekeepers, Philippe Gaillard and the medics at the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Dr. James Orbinski of Médecins Sans Frontières. Years of research and writing by academics and other experts along with hours of films by journalists who work for the BBC – all of this eyewitness testimony is dismissed as if fraudulent.
In broadcasting this documentary the BBC has been recklessly irresponsible. The programme has fuelled genocide denial. It has further emboldened the génocidaires, all their supporters and those who collaborate with them. It has provided them the legitimacy of the BBC. Denial of genocide causes the gravest offence to survivors. For them, the genocide is not a distant event from 20 years ago but a reality with which they live every day.
The denial of genocide is now widely recognised as the final stage of the crime. One of the world’s preeminent genocide scholars, the US Professor Greg H. Stanton, describes ten stages in genocide: classification of the population; symbolization of those classifications; discrimination against a targeted group; dehumanisation of the pariah group; organisation of the killers; polarisation of the population; preparation by the killers; persecution of the victims; extermination of the victims; and denial that the killing was genocide.
Denial, the final stage, ensures the crime continues. It incites new killing. It denies the dignity of the deceased and mocks those who survived. Denial of genocide is taken so seriously that in some European countries it is criminalized. In 2008 the Council of the European Union called upon states to criminalize genocide denial.
The 1994 genocide of the Tutsi should be treated by all concerned with the utmost intellectual honesty and rigour. We would be willing – indeed see it as our duty – to meet with journalists and to debate in a follow up programme the serious inaccuracies in Rwanda’s Untold Story.
We hope that the BBC management will quickly realise the gravity of the genocide denial in Rwanda’s Untold Story. We call upon the BBC to explain how the programme came to be made and the editorial decision-making which allowed it to be broadcast. In the course of any internal BBC enquiry we hope all relevant documents from the This World archive and from senior editors involved in approving the programme will be released for study.
Rwanda’s Untold Story tarnishes the BBC’s well-deserved reputation for objective and balanced journalism. We urge the BBC to apologise for the offence this programme has caused for all victims and survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
Signed
Professor Linda Melvern
Author, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide; Conspiracy to Murder
Senator Roméo Dallaire
Force Commander, UNAMIR
Professor Gregory H. Stanton
President, Genocide Watch
Mehdi Ba
Journalist and Author
Bishop Ken Barham
Dr. Margaret Brearley
Independent Scholar
Dr. Gerald Caplan
Author, The Preventable Genocide
Professor Frank Chalk
Professor of History/Director, Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia University, Co-author, ‘Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership to Prevent Mass Atrocities’ (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010)
Dr.Phil Clark
Reader in Comparative and International Politics, SOAS, University of London
Boubacar Boris Diop, Sénégal.
Author, Murambi, the book of bones
Jean-Francois Dupaquier
Author and Expert
Hélène Dumas,
Diplômée de l’IEP d’Aix-en-Provence (2003), Docteur en histoire de l’EHESS (2013)
Professor Margee Ensign
President, American University of Nigeria
Tim Gallimore
Independent genocide researcher
Peter Greaves
Former UNICEF staff member
Fred Grünfeld.
Emeritus professor in International Relations, Human Rights and the Causes of Gross Human Rights Violations, Universities of Maastricht and Utrecht, Netherlands. Author, The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders, 2007
Dr. Helen Hintjens
Assistant Professor in Development and Social Justice, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) The Hague
Dr. Georgina Holmes
Lecturer International Relations,
University of Portsmouth/Royal Holloway, University of London
Richard Johnson
Author, The Travesty of Human Rights Watch on Rwanda
Eric Joyce MP
Ambassador Karel Kovanda (ret).
Czech Representative on the UN Security Council, 1994-95
Françoise Lemagnen
Chief Executive, Survivors Fund (SURF)
Ambassador Stephen Lewis.
Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN.
W. Alan McClue
Visiting Fellow, Bournemouth University/Cranfield University
Roland Moerland
Ph.D. Researcher and Lecturer in Supranational and Organizational Criminology, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology Maastricht University, The Netherlands
George Monbiot
Author and Journalist
Jacques Morel
Author, La France au coeur du génocide des Tutsi (2010)
Barbara Mulvaney
International Law Consultant; Former Senior Trial Attorney - Bagosora et al., United Nations International Tribunal for Rwanda
Dr. Jude Murison
School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh
Peter Raymont
President, White Pine Pictures, Toronto, Canada
Professor Josias Semujanga
Professeur titulaire, Département des littératures de langue française, Université de Montréal, Quebec
Jonathan Salt
Managing Director of Ojemba Education
Keith Somerville
Senior Research fellow, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London; Lecturer in Communications and Humanitarianism, Centre for Journalism, University of Kent
Patrick de Saint-Exupéry
Author and journalist
Dr James M. Smith
CBE CEO, Aegis Trust
Rafiki Ubaldo
Journalist
Andrew Wallis
Author, Silent Accomplice: The untold Story of the Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide, I.B.Tauris, 2014
Lillian Wong, O.B.E.
British Chargé d’Affairs in Rwanda 1994-1995
London. W1A 1AA
October 12, 2014.
Dear Sir,
We the undersigned, scholars, scientists, researchers, journalists and historians are writing to you today to express our grave concern at the content of the documentary Rwanda’s Untold Story (This World, BBC 2 Wednesday October 1), specifically its coverage of the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi.
We accept and support that it is legitimate to investigate, with due diligence and respect for factual evidence, any crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and to reflect on the contemporary political situation in Rwanda. However, attempts to examine these issues should not distort the reality of the 1994 genocide. It is not legitimate to use current events to either negate or to diminish the genocide. Nor is it legitimate to promote genocide denial.
The parts of the film which concern the 1994 genocide, far from providing viewers with an ‘Untold Story’ as the title promises, are old claims. For years similar material using similar language has been distributed far and wide as part of an on-going ‘Hutu Power’ campaign of genocide denial. At the heart of this campaign are convicted génocidaires, some of their defence lawyers from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and their supporters and collaborators. These deniers continually question the status of the genocide and try to prove – like the programme – that what it calls the ‘official narrative’ of the 1994 genocide is wrong. The BBC programme Rwanda’s Untold Story recycles their arguments and provides them with another platform to create doubt and confusion about what really happened.
Three of the untenable claims made in the programme are of the utmost concern: the first is a lie about the true nature of the Hutu Power militia. The second is an attempt to minimize the number of Tutsi murdered in the genocide, and the third is an effort to place the blame for shooting down President Habyarimana’s plane on April 6, 1994 on the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
First, the programme allows a witness to claim that ‘only ten percent of the Interahamwe (militia) were killers’. In fact, the majority of Hutu Power militia forces – estimated to have been 30,000 strong – were trained specifically to kill Tutsi at speed, and indoctrinated in a racist ideology, part of genocide planning. There is eyewitness testimony by several militia leaders who cooperated with the ICTR.
Second, the programme attempts to minimise the number of Tutsi murdered, a typical tactic of genocide deniers. The false figures cited are provided by two US academics who worked for a team of lawyers defending the génocidaires at the ICTR. They even claim that in 1994 more Hutu than Tutsi were murdered – an absurd suggestion and contrary to all the widely available research reported by Amnesty International, UNICEF, the UN Human Rights Commission, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, Africa Rights, a UN Security Council mandated Commission of Experts and evidence submitted to the ICTR and other European courts who have successfully put on trial several perpetrators.
Third, the film argues that the shooting down of the plane on April 6, 1994 was perpetrated by the RPF. This same story was promoted by Hutu Power extremists within a few hours of the president’s assassination and promoted ever since by génocidaires and a few ICTR defence lawyers.
The film pays no heed to a detailed expert report published in January 2012 by a French magistrate Judge Marc Trévidic. This contains evidence from French experts, including crash investigators, who proved scientifically that the missiles that shot down the plane came from the confines of the government-run barracks in Kanombe on the airport’s perimeter – one of the most fortified places in the country, and where it would have been impossible for the RPF, armed with a missile, to penetrate.
Within hours of the president’s assassination, in this carefully planned genocide, roadblocks went up all over Kigali and the Presidential Guard started to target every member of Rwanda’s political opposition. These momentous events are barely mentioned. The members of the Hutu and Tutsi pro-democracy movements were hunted down and killed, including Rwanda’s Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and ten UN peacekeepers from Belgium who were protecting her. These opposition politicians separately threatened the Habyarimana regime for advocating power-sharing and paid for their courage with their lives. Ignored in this film are the Hutu Power attempts to divide the internal political opposition along ethnic lines. Political violence in the film is seen only in the context of a ‘civil war’ between the RPF and the Habyarimana government, a smoke screen, used then and now, to hide the systematic killing of Tutsi carried out by the Hutu Power Interim Government and its militia.
The film-maker, Jane Corbin, who presented the programme, even tries to raise doubts about whether or not the RPF stopped the genocide. The authority on this subject is Lt.-General Roméo Dallaire, the Force commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and present in Rwanda throughout the genocide. Dallaire is categorical. ‘The genocide was stopped because the RPF won and stopped it’, he says. Corbin ignores the testimonies of direct witnesses to what happened in 1994: Dallaire and his volunteer UN peacekeepers, Philippe Gaillard and the medics at the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Dr. James Orbinski of Médecins Sans Frontières. Years of research and writing by academics and other experts along with hours of films by journalists who work for the BBC – all of this eyewitness testimony is dismissed as if fraudulent.
In broadcasting this documentary the BBC has been recklessly irresponsible. The programme has fuelled genocide denial. It has further emboldened the génocidaires, all their supporters and those who collaborate with them. It has provided them the legitimacy of the BBC. Denial of genocide causes the gravest offence to survivors. For them, the genocide is not a distant event from 20 years ago but a reality with which they live every day.
The denial of genocide is now widely recognised as the final stage of the crime. One of the world’s preeminent genocide scholars, the US Professor Greg H. Stanton, describes ten stages in genocide: classification of the population; symbolization of those classifications; discrimination against a targeted group; dehumanisation of the pariah group; organisation of the killers; polarisation of the population; preparation by the killers; persecution of the victims; extermination of the victims; and denial that the killing was genocide.
Denial, the final stage, ensures the crime continues. It incites new killing. It denies the dignity of the deceased and mocks those who survived. Denial of genocide is taken so seriously that in some European countries it is criminalized. In 2008 the Council of the European Union called upon states to criminalize genocide denial.
The 1994 genocide of the Tutsi should be treated by all concerned with the utmost intellectual honesty and rigour. We would be willing – indeed see it as our duty – to meet with journalists and to debate in a follow up programme the serious inaccuracies in Rwanda’s Untold Story.
We hope that the BBC management will quickly realise the gravity of the genocide denial in Rwanda’s Untold Story. We call upon the BBC to explain how the programme came to be made and the editorial decision-making which allowed it to be broadcast. In the course of any internal BBC enquiry we hope all relevant documents from the This World archive and from senior editors involved in approving the programme will be released for study.
Rwanda’s Untold Story tarnishes the BBC’s well-deserved reputation for objective and balanced journalism. We urge the BBC to apologise for the offence this programme has caused for all victims and survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
Signed
Professor Linda Melvern
Author, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide; Conspiracy to Murder
Senator Roméo Dallaire
Force Commander, UNAMIR
Professor Gregory H. Stanton
President, Genocide Watch
Mehdi Ba
Journalist and Author
Bishop Ken Barham
Dr. Margaret Brearley
Independent Scholar
Dr. Gerald Caplan
Author, The Preventable Genocide
Professor Frank Chalk
Professor of History/Director, Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia University, Co-author, ‘Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership to Prevent Mass Atrocities’ (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010)
Dr.Phil Clark
Reader in Comparative and International Politics, SOAS, University of London
Boubacar Boris Diop, Sénégal.
Author, Murambi, the book of bones
Jean-Francois Dupaquier
Author and Expert
Hélène Dumas,
Diplômée de l’IEP d’Aix-en-Provence (2003), Docteur en histoire de l’EHESS (2013)
Professor Margee Ensign
President, American University of Nigeria
Tim Gallimore
Independent genocide researcher
Peter Greaves
Former UNICEF staff member
Fred Grünfeld.
Emeritus professor in International Relations, Human Rights and the Causes of Gross Human Rights Violations, Universities of Maastricht and Utrecht, Netherlands. Author, The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders, 2007
Dr. Helen Hintjens
Assistant Professor in Development and Social Justice, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) The Hague
Dr. Georgina Holmes
Lecturer International Relations,
University of Portsmouth/Royal Holloway, University of London
Richard Johnson
Author, The Travesty of Human Rights Watch on Rwanda
Eric Joyce MP
Ambassador Karel Kovanda (ret).
Czech Representative on the UN Security Council, 1994-95
Françoise Lemagnen
Chief Executive, Survivors Fund (SURF)
Ambassador Stephen Lewis.
Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN.
W. Alan McClue
Visiting Fellow, Bournemouth University/Cranfield University
Roland Moerland
Ph.D. Researcher and Lecturer in Supranational and Organizational Criminology, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology Maastricht University, The Netherlands
George Monbiot
Author and Journalist
Jacques Morel
Author, La France au coeur du génocide des Tutsi (2010)
Barbara Mulvaney
International Law Consultant; Former Senior Trial Attorney - Bagosora et al., United Nations International Tribunal for Rwanda
Dr. Jude Murison
School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh
Peter Raymont
President, White Pine Pictures, Toronto, Canada
Professor Josias Semujanga
Professeur titulaire, Département des littératures de langue française, Université de Montréal, Quebec
Jonathan Salt
Managing Director of Ojemba Education
Keith Somerville
Senior Research fellow, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London; Lecturer in Communications and Humanitarianism, Centre for Journalism, University of Kent
Patrick de Saint-Exupéry
Author and journalist
Dr James M. Smith
CBE CEO, Aegis Trust
Rafiki Ubaldo
Journalist
Andrew Wallis
Author, Silent Accomplice: The untold Story of the Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide, I.B.Tauris, 2014
Lillian Wong, O.B.E.
British Chargé d’Affairs in Rwanda 1994-1995
Our response to the BBC letter of complaint
To whom it may concern:
The BBC documentary where our research was featured is accused of three things:
- playing down the number of Tutsi victims
- accusing the RPF of shooting down the plane
- playing down the crimes of the Hutu militia
As we make no claims about the shooting down of the plane, we will ignore this comment. The other two, however, merit a response as it is addressed by our work – at least, partially in the film. Before beginning, however, it is useful to note that the letter of complaint identifies us as working for the Defense at the ICTR. Actually, the exact wording in their letter is: “two US academics who worked for a team of lawyers defending the génocidaires at the ICTR.” Several things merit attention about this comment.
First, we were already working on doing a detailed study of the violence in Rwanda during 1994 paid for by the National Science Foundation. This involved conducting interviews with genocidaires as well as survivors, conducting focus groups among those who lived in Rwanda during 1994 (Tutsi and Hutu), conducting a survey in Butare of experiences during 1994, compiling diverse databases from different Rwandan ministries and human rights organization (both inside and outside Rwanda), as well as compiling information from all media coverage of Rwanda between 1985 and 1999. The ICTR interaction was a small part of the larger research project.
Second, the letter of complaint incorrectly represents the nature of our relationship with the ICTR. For example, our services were requested by the Prosecution of the ICTR and this was our first contact with the organization. Specifically, they wanted:
We asked for no consulting fee or anything besides what was requested above, as well as the right to publicly distribute all information after the project was completed. This was agreed to but we were told that obtaining all the we requested would take a little time.
Before we began this work, however, we were told that the Prosecution was no longer interested in a broader understanding of what happened and they were going to concentrate on the specific cases that they had on their docket.
Several months later we were contacted by the Defense and asked if we would be willing to provide exactly what the Prosecution has earlier requested. After we were informed that we would not be explicitly associated with the Defense (which was a concern for us) but rather that we would be providing information for "the court" (i.e., the Judges, Prosecution, Defense and official archive to be compiled as well as later made available to the public), we then repeated our list above about what was needed. After much negotiation, approximately 7000 readable witness statements were provided, a detailed topographic map of Rwanda on April 6th (this is before the revelations of available US satellite imagery that might be day to day) and access to some former members of the RPF and FAR to corroborate geographic locales.
The characterization of our relationship with the Defense and the nature of our research endeavor in the letter of complaint was thus incorrect.
Now, we move to the specific points themselves.
1) It is suggested that we minimize the crimes of the Hutu militia. This is simply false. If anyone had seen the documentary and/or seen/read our discussion of what we found, then they would clearly see that we attribute the majority of the killing in 1994 to territorial zones under the jurisdiction of the FAR (the Rwandan government at the time) and those associated with them (including the various organizations referred to uniformly as the “Hutu militia” but which represented a conglomeration of distinct groups). We are not precise on the identification of the perpetrators of these crimes (e.g., presidential guard vs. different militias vs. gendarme vs. ordinary citizens or combinations) because the evidence on this is unclear. In some locations, individuals have been able to identify some of those responsible for killing. In other locations, either no one was left alive to identify those responsible for killing, or the survivors were not able to identify who was responsible – something that is quite understandable under the circumstances as well as something that is quite common in instances of mass killing. Lacking this type of precise information, which no one in the public domain has with any degree of accuracy, we opted for an evaluation of killing designated by territorial control. That is, we decided to try and understand who was responsible by identifying which military units seemed to have control over the relevant area. If some military organization was the only one present in a location, then it was assumed that they or those affiliated with them must be responsible for the violence. This is something that is more reasonable to estimate with available information. Now, the differences between what specific perpetrators were involved in specific activities at a particular time (hour/day) and place (e.g., village) do not matter, if one is simply interested in whether or not someone died. If one is trying to affix blame, hold individuals accountable or understand what motivated individuals to engage in the different killing, however, then such information is crucial.
Should some of the violence that took place within the area of control of the FAR be legally classified as genocide? Yes, without a doubt. This we can say because there were representatives of the state present, there were utterances that spoke to the issue of their intent in a specific time and place and there was violence. Unfortunately, however, we cannot be clear on how much of the violence (i.e., what proportion of all acts considered were legally classified as genocide) and that is because making such a judgment requires extremely detailed information about the victims, the perpetrators and their motives – and motives naturally being the hardest to document as they reside within an individual's mind. Large numbers of casualties does not in itself equal genocide, which is a very specific legal phrase. Large numbers of casualties are horrific, crimes against humanity and human rights violations, which have different criteria for identification, but they are not necessarily within the definition of genocide. The ICTR here is instructive:
ICTR Statute 2010
A. Genocide
Article 2: Genocide
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this Article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
B. Crimes against Humanity
Article 3: Crimes against Humanity
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
C. Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II
Article 4: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:
D. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Article 6: Individual Criminal Responsibility
Further information
HRW ICTR Case Law Digest
“ICTR jurisprudence correctly recognizes the mental element of genocide in Article 2(2) above as its distinguishing feature, namely the requirement of a specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. This mental element applies to all material acts of genocide enumerated under Article 2(a)-(e) of the Statute. Since the underlying acts - such as killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm - are not international crimes as such, '[i]t is this specific intent that distinguishes the crime of genocide from the ordinary crime of murder.'' Thus, in addition to defining genocide, the requisite mental element also delineates the normative sphere of international criminal law from that of domestic law” (Akhavam 2005: 992).
There is also a conflict/overlap between Art. 2(3)(e) “complicity in genocide” and Art. 6(1) “or otherwise aided and abetted planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4”. There are, according to Akhavam, different interpretations of the ICTR regarding the dolus specialis/dolus generalis requirement for liability.
A side note on Data and our sources
Related to the criticism noted above, it is suggested in the letter that we provide "false figures". This is problematic because all of "ourfigures" (i.e., statistical estimates) come from the existing Rwandan government (i.e., the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport and the Ministry of Local Affairs) as well as three reputable human rights organizations (e.g., Human Rights Watch, African Rights and The Tutsi Survivor organization Ibuka). All we have done is take the information from all of these different sources (in addition to ICTR eyewitness records, a survey in Butare, about a dozen focus groups and dozens of interviews), in order to generate estimates of the number killed as well as utilizing census records and demographic projections regarding the probable number of each ethnic group killed. The project has been extremely detailed about every step of this process. Indeed, unlike those that have criticized us, we not only make the original documents available for each source utilized (so that one can see what was done in each case) but we have provided our coding of that material (noting the precise page numbers from which it is taken), detailed descriptions of how we generated our estimates as well as the raw data that was generated. We note very clearly that our estimates are improved with the inclusion of additional data and this is why we have continued to collect as much information as possible (to this day). The imprecise nature of casualty estimates demands both the pursuit of additional sources and transparency. If our figures are believed to be false, therefore, then that is a claim delivered against the current Rwandan government, one of the most prominent human rights organizations in the world and an organization that has been identified as the leading institution representing the Tutsi survivors.
2) It is suggested that we play down/trivialize the number of Tutsi victims. To begin, there are no deaths that are trivial. All human suffering is unacceptable and we (as a community of human beings) should work toward no one suffering from political violence – from any actor. As for our estimation, again, if anyone had seen/read our discussion of what we found, then they would clearly see that we believe that there are a range of estimates on the number of total casualties. We also have a range of estimates of the number of casualties by the different ethnic groups involved. There is no single number that can be verified. In fact, there is no way to discuss casualties figures without such ranges given the highly imprecise manner in which such figures are identified in conflict situations.
Some objections that could be raised concern our use of the census taken in 1991 by the then Rwandan government. For example, some wish to argue that the census of 1991 (a common starting point for an inquiry into how many Tutsi and Hutu died) is correct and that this is how the Rwandan government identified those that it wanted to kill. Some wish to argue that the census of 1991 was not correct, however, and that it underestimated the number of Tutsi on purpose given the situation prompted by the interstate war but that the government still knew the actual number and used this to enact its killing. With this number one could subtract the number believed killed to derive at some understanding of how many of each group died (i.e., how many Tutsi and how many Hutu had been killed). If one did not trust the 1991 census, however, then they could go back to earlier censi (1978, the one undertaken in the 1950s or colonial records) – as we and others have done – and project forward with a specific population/ethnic group growth rate.
The problem with the position that the census was off but that the government still knew who was who, is that no one has produced the document that was used by the government agents. There is no “kill list” of 500,000 or 1,000,000 individuals that has been found – at least nothing that has been publicly distributed. Even partial lists (e.g., the names that were read over the radio) were small in comparison to the number of individuals commonly believed to having been killed. The population was largely illiterate and thus even if such a list existed, the number of users would be limited.
Essentially, research on the topic of Rwandan casualties has relied upon eye-witness testimony via survey, census and interviews. While insightful in many ways, none have released the original/raw data collected during efforts for external validation accept for isolated cases and/or a relative small number of individual’s stories. Generally, individuals have used compilations of these eye-witness testimonies which while not as good in terms of quality as the raw data, does allow one some evidenced-based investigation that can be evaluated in a rigorous manner. We encourage that all conversations about casualty counts should be based on evidence that is made freely available to researchers, so that the estimates can be validated and replicated.
One reason for not releasing such information is to protect the memories of those that have been lost. This said, other large-scale mass killings (e.g., the Holocaust, the killing fields in Cambodia and even the Stalinist purges and Mao’s Cultural Revolution) have released data and/or had data discovered that has been evaluated by a variety of different scholars. The public availability of the raw material has assured continued, rigorous interest – yielding important and new insights (as different researchers have continually found new things). Importantly, however, it has also assured quality control, as the diverse scholars can look over each other’s work and make sure that nothing was done incorrectly. This is how the scientific enterprise works best. This meets the highest standards of social science research and this is the standard that the topic of mass killing deserves. Alternatively, one could anonymize the records to protect individuals but still allow the remaining material to assist researchers with analyzing what happened, where and why. Toward this end, we have several thousand eye-witness accounts from the ICTR and will be making these publicly available after we have finished the redaction of said documents in order to protect named individuals.
A different response to the claim regarding our estimation of Tutsi victims is that almost all individuals acknowledge (implicitly and sometimes explicitly) that everyone “knew” what ethnicity everyone was - but this is clearly local knowledge. You know who your neighbors were, but not those from several villages over. This last point is important because there is another (often unstated) presumption that everyone was killed where they were from. But given the large number of internally displaced persons (potentially several million), refugees (potentially several million), and many accounts of people running and hiding, this assumption that people were killed were they were from is unlikely. Another problematic assumption that is relevant here is that individuals can identify ethnic others while on the run for their lives, which current research suggests is very difficult to do.
With these concerns in mind, we took information from before the questionable census of 1991 and projected forward diverse population growth rates (which is standard practice in demography) and found figures that were comparable to what was discussed in 1991 therefore allowing us to use it in our estimations. We also employed survivor figures from the Tutsi survivor association Ibuka as well as the census of genocide survivors. We used this information to generate different estimates and then discussed what we believed to be the most reasonable among them, given the information that was available. Within the different sources available, there was no point estimate with a single figure – nor should there be. Our research identifies ranges (estimations with +/- error). However, when the media covers our work they typically report single figures, eliminating nuance, accuracy and levels of uncertainty. Across most of our estimations, we generally do not find results that suggest that the Tutsi death toll was higher than the Hutu death toll because of the initial population totals as well as the limited ability to identify ethnicity within a largely fleeing population. All of this information (including the raw source material utilized in these calculations) is publicly available on our genodynamics webpage – a practice of openness that has not been matched by any of those that have questioned our findings.
Evidence to counter our estimation would involve a more definitive population count of Tutsi and Hutu for 1994 (which has not yet been presented), a compilation of id cards distributed among the victims at genocide sites (which was never reported) and a systematic collection and evaluation of the witness statements by a neutral investigatory body of all victims and perpetrators both in and outside of Rwanda that could then be evaluated by scholars from around the world to assure competency and quality. To be more definitive on this issue, what is needed in order to provide an accurate assessment of the death toll (by ethnicity) is information on every single killing in Rwanda. This information would identify the perpetrator (by name, ethnicity and organization), victim (by name and ethnicity), space/place (e.g., village) and time (e.g., hour, day and week). With such information, we could have more definitively provided an estimate. However, as not all of the information noted above would probably be available, there will always be error in such calculations. Without this information then, the type of estimation that we provide follows the best practices currently available in the social sciences. Counter arguments should at a minimum make any raw material they might have available, so that any concerned party can assess the basis of their counter-argument in a reasonable manner. This would facilitate discussion and understanding. If someone has the will but not the resources to share such information, GenoDynamics will provide assistance in scanning, uploading, shipping or programming toward this end.
Sincerely
GenoDynamics
Christian Davenport – University of Michigan
Allan Stam – University of Virginia
The BBC documentary where our research was featured is accused of three things:
- playing down the number of Tutsi victims
- accusing the RPF of shooting down the plane
- playing down the crimes of the Hutu militia
As we make no claims about the shooting down of the plane, we will ignore this comment. The other two, however, merit a response as it is addressed by our work – at least, partially in the film. Before beginning, however, it is useful to note that the letter of complaint identifies us as working for the Defense at the ICTR. Actually, the exact wording in their letter is: “two US academics who worked for a team of lawyers defending the génocidaires at the ICTR.” Several things merit attention about this comment.
First, we were already working on doing a detailed study of the violence in Rwanda during 1994 paid for by the National Science Foundation. This involved conducting interviews with genocidaires as well as survivors, conducting focus groups among those who lived in Rwanda during 1994 (Tutsi and Hutu), conducting a survey in Butare of experiences during 1994, compiling diverse databases from different Rwandan ministries and human rights organization (both inside and outside Rwanda), as well as compiling information from all media coverage of Rwanda between 1985 and 1999. The ICTR interaction was a small part of the larger research project.
Second, the letter of complaint incorrectly represents the nature of our relationship with the ICTR. For example, our services were requested by the Prosecution of the ICTR and this was our first contact with the organization. Specifically, they wanted:
- Complete coding of witness statements which they had in their possession but they did not have the resources to enter and code (a “master chronology” from the ICTR Prosecution);
- Conduct a comparative analysis of the chronology generated using their witness statements vs. other sources in our possession, noting zones of correspondence and disagreement;
- Create an animation of killings on a day-by-day basis for country (lowest level will be determined by census data they can provide);
- Create detailed maps of killings through out the country, as well as maps of weapons types used and changing nature of violence over time;
- Provide a GIS regression analysis to establish if killing patterns were non-random or systematic.
- Individual level records for 1991 census data (in order to calculate %Tutsi population) – source: Rwandan Ministry of Census;
- 2001 cell level census data – source: Rwandan Ministry of Local Affairs;
- Physical locations of party HQ or locations of individuals claimed to be associated with execution of genocide plan;
- 1:50,000 topographic maps of Rwanda from Canadian defense forces (we were willing to provide the funds for this ourselves; they simply needed to make request on our behalf);
- Complete set of interview records as well as existing database based on witness interviews so that we could code this information and conduct the comparisons noted above (the coding would be paid for by our NSF grant); and,
- Unrestricted access to prisoners already convicted by the ICTR to ask them questions about what they did, what they saw and who was where in the country and when.
We asked for no consulting fee or anything besides what was requested above, as well as the right to publicly distribute all information after the project was completed. This was agreed to but we were told that obtaining all the we requested would take a little time.
Before we began this work, however, we were told that the Prosecution was no longer interested in a broader understanding of what happened and they were going to concentrate on the specific cases that they had on their docket.
Several months later we were contacted by the Defense and asked if we would be willing to provide exactly what the Prosecution has earlier requested. After we were informed that we would not be explicitly associated with the Defense (which was a concern for us) but rather that we would be providing information for "the court" (i.e., the Judges, Prosecution, Defense and official archive to be compiled as well as later made available to the public), we then repeated our list above about what was needed. After much negotiation, approximately 7000 readable witness statements were provided, a detailed topographic map of Rwanda on April 6th (this is before the revelations of available US satellite imagery that might be day to day) and access to some former members of the RPF and FAR to corroborate geographic locales.
The characterization of our relationship with the Defense and the nature of our research endeavor in the letter of complaint was thus incorrect.
Now, we move to the specific points themselves.
1) It is suggested that we minimize the crimes of the Hutu militia. This is simply false. If anyone had seen the documentary and/or seen/read our discussion of what we found, then they would clearly see that we attribute the majority of the killing in 1994 to territorial zones under the jurisdiction of the FAR (the Rwandan government at the time) and those associated with them (including the various organizations referred to uniformly as the “Hutu militia” but which represented a conglomeration of distinct groups). We are not precise on the identification of the perpetrators of these crimes (e.g., presidential guard vs. different militias vs. gendarme vs. ordinary citizens or combinations) because the evidence on this is unclear. In some locations, individuals have been able to identify some of those responsible for killing. In other locations, either no one was left alive to identify those responsible for killing, or the survivors were not able to identify who was responsible – something that is quite understandable under the circumstances as well as something that is quite common in instances of mass killing. Lacking this type of precise information, which no one in the public domain has with any degree of accuracy, we opted for an evaluation of killing designated by territorial control. That is, we decided to try and understand who was responsible by identifying which military units seemed to have control over the relevant area. If some military organization was the only one present in a location, then it was assumed that they or those affiliated with them must be responsible for the violence. This is something that is more reasonable to estimate with available information. Now, the differences between what specific perpetrators were involved in specific activities at a particular time (hour/day) and place (e.g., village) do not matter, if one is simply interested in whether or not someone died. If one is trying to affix blame, hold individuals accountable or understand what motivated individuals to engage in the different killing, however, then such information is crucial.
Should some of the violence that took place within the area of control of the FAR be legally classified as genocide? Yes, without a doubt. This we can say because there were representatives of the state present, there were utterances that spoke to the issue of their intent in a specific time and place and there was violence. Unfortunately, however, we cannot be clear on how much of the violence (i.e., what proportion of all acts considered were legally classified as genocide) and that is because making such a judgment requires extremely detailed information about the victims, the perpetrators and their motives – and motives naturally being the hardest to document as they reside within an individual's mind. Large numbers of casualties does not in itself equal genocide, which is a very specific legal phrase. Large numbers of casualties are horrific, crimes against humanity and human rights violations, which have different criteria for identification, but they are not necessarily within the definition of genocide. The ICTR here is instructive:
ICTR Statute 2010
A. Genocide
Article 2: Genocide
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this Article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
- Killing members of the group;
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
- The following acts shall be punishable:
- Genocide;
- Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- Attempt to commit genocide;
- Complicity in genocide.
B. Crimes against Humanity
Article 3: Crimes against Humanity
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
- Murder;
- Extermination;
- Enslavement;
- Deportation;
- Imprisonment;
- Torture;
- Rape;
- Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
- Other inhumane acts.
C. Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II
Article 4: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:
- Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
- Collective punishments;
- Taking of hostages;
- Acts of terrorism;
- Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
- Pillage;
- The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilised peoples;
- Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
D. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Article 6: Individual Criminal Responsibility
- A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.
- The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
- The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
- The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires.
Further information
HRW ICTR Case Law Digest
“ICTR jurisprudence correctly recognizes the mental element of genocide in Article 2(2) above as its distinguishing feature, namely the requirement of a specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. This mental element applies to all material acts of genocide enumerated under Article 2(a)-(e) of the Statute. Since the underlying acts - such as killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm - are not international crimes as such, '[i]t is this specific intent that distinguishes the crime of genocide from the ordinary crime of murder.'' Thus, in addition to defining genocide, the requisite mental element also delineates the normative sphere of international criminal law from that of domestic law” (Akhavam 2005: 992).
There is also a conflict/overlap between Art. 2(3)(e) “complicity in genocide” and Art. 6(1) “or otherwise aided and abetted planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4”. There are, according to Akhavam, different interpretations of the ICTR regarding the dolus specialis/dolus generalis requirement for liability.
A side note on Data and our sources
Related to the criticism noted above, it is suggested in the letter that we provide "false figures". This is problematic because all of "ourfigures" (i.e., statistical estimates) come from the existing Rwandan government (i.e., the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport and the Ministry of Local Affairs) as well as three reputable human rights organizations (e.g., Human Rights Watch, African Rights and The Tutsi Survivor organization Ibuka). All we have done is take the information from all of these different sources (in addition to ICTR eyewitness records, a survey in Butare, about a dozen focus groups and dozens of interviews), in order to generate estimates of the number killed as well as utilizing census records and demographic projections regarding the probable number of each ethnic group killed. The project has been extremely detailed about every step of this process. Indeed, unlike those that have criticized us, we not only make the original documents available for each source utilized (so that one can see what was done in each case) but we have provided our coding of that material (noting the precise page numbers from which it is taken), detailed descriptions of how we generated our estimates as well as the raw data that was generated. We note very clearly that our estimates are improved with the inclusion of additional data and this is why we have continued to collect as much information as possible (to this day). The imprecise nature of casualty estimates demands both the pursuit of additional sources and transparency. If our figures are believed to be false, therefore, then that is a claim delivered against the current Rwandan government, one of the most prominent human rights organizations in the world and an organization that has been identified as the leading institution representing the Tutsi survivors.
2) It is suggested that we play down/trivialize the number of Tutsi victims. To begin, there are no deaths that are trivial. All human suffering is unacceptable and we (as a community of human beings) should work toward no one suffering from political violence – from any actor. As for our estimation, again, if anyone had seen/read our discussion of what we found, then they would clearly see that we believe that there are a range of estimates on the number of total casualties. We also have a range of estimates of the number of casualties by the different ethnic groups involved. There is no single number that can be verified. In fact, there is no way to discuss casualties figures without such ranges given the highly imprecise manner in which such figures are identified in conflict situations.
Some objections that could be raised concern our use of the census taken in 1991 by the then Rwandan government. For example, some wish to argue that the census of 1991 (a common starting point for an inquiry into how many Tutsi and Hutu died) is correct and that this is how the Rwandan government identified those that it wanted to kill. Some wish to argue that the census of 1991 was not correct, however, and that it underestimated the number of Tutsi on purpose given the situation prompted by the interstate war but that the government still knew the actual number and used this to enact its killing. With this number one could subtract the number believed killed to derive at some understanding of how many of each group died (i.e., how many Tutsi and how many Hutu had been killed). If one did not trust the 1991 census, however, then they could go back to earlier censi (1978, the one undertaken in the 1950s or colonial records) – as we and others have done – and project forward with a specific population/ethnic group growth rate.
The problem with the position that the census was off but that the government still knew who was who, is that no one has produced the document that was used by the government agents. There is no “kill list” of 500,000 or 1,000,000 individuals that has been found – at least nothing that has been publicly distributed. Even partial lists (e.g., the names that were read over the radio) were small in comparison to the number of individuals commonly believed to having been killed. The population was largely illiterate and thus even if such a list existed, the number of users would be limited.
Essentially, research on the topic of Rwandan casualties has relied upon eye-witness testimony via survey, census and interviews. While insightful in many ways, none have released the original/raw data collected during efforts for external validation accept for isolated cases and/or a relative small number of individual’s stories. Generally, individuals have used compilations of these eye-witness testimonies which while not as good in terms of quality as the raw data, does allow one some evidenced-based investigation that can be evaluated in a rigorous manner. We encourage that all conversations about casualty counts should be based on evidence that is made freely available to researchers, so that the estimates can be validated and replicated.
One reason for not releasing such information is to protect the memories of those that have been lost. This said, other large-scale mass killings (e.g., the Holocaust, the killing fields in Cambodia and even the Stalinist purges and Mao’s Cultural Revolution) have released data and/or had data discovered that has been evaluated by a variety of different scholars. The public availability of the raw material has assured continued, rigorous interest – yielding important and new insights (as different researchers have continually found new things). Importantly, however, it has also assured quality control, as the diverse scholars can look over each other’s work and make sure that nothing was done incorrectly. This is how the scientific enterprise works best. This meets the highest standards of social science research and this is the standard that the topic of mass killing deserves. Alternatively, one could anonymize the records to protect individuals but still allow the remaining material to assist researchers with analyzing what happened, where and why. Toward this end, we have several thousand eye-witness accounts from the ICTR and will be making these publicly available after we have finished the redaction of said documents in order to protect named individuals.
A different response to the claim regarding our estimation of Tutsi victims is that almost all individuals acknowledge (implicitly and sometimes explicitly) that everyone “knew” what ethnicity everyone was - but this is clearly local knowledge. You know who your neighbors were, but not those from several villages over. This last point is important because there is another (often unstated) presumption that everyone was killed where they were from. But given the large number of internally displaced persons (potentially several million), refugees (potentially several million), and many accounts of people running and hiding, this assumption that people were killed were they were from is unlikely. Another problematic assumption that is relevant here is that individuals can identify ethnic others while on the run for their lives, which current research suggests is very difficult to do.
With these concerns in mind, we took information from before the questionable census of 1991 and projected forward diverse population growth rates (which is standard practice in demography) and found figures that were comparable to what was discussed in 1991 therefore allowing us to use it in our estimations. We also employed survivor figures from the Tutsi survivor association Ibuka as well as the census of genocide survivors. We used this information to generate different estimates and then discussed what we believed to be the most reasonable among them, given the information that was available. Within the different sources available, there was no point estimate with a single figure – nor should there be. Our research identifies ranges (estimations with +/- error). However, when the media covers our work they typically report single figures, eliminating nuance, accuracy and levels of uncertainty. Across most of our estimations, we generally do not find results that suggest that the Tutsi death toll was higher than the Hutu death toll because of the initial population totals as well as the limited ability to identify ethnicity within a largely fleeing population. All of this information (including the raw source material utilized in these calculations) is publicly available on our genodynamics webpage – a practice of openness that has not been matched by any of those that have questioned our findings.
Evidence to counter our estimation would involve a more definitive population count of Tutsi and Hutu for 1994 (which has not yet been presented), a compilation of id cards distributed among the victims at genocide sites (which was never reported) and a systematic collection and evaluation of the witness statements by a neutral investigatory body of all victims and perpetrators both in and outside of Rwanda that could then be evaluated by scholars from around the world to assure competency and quality. To be more definitive on this issue, what is needed in order to provide an accurate assessment of the death toll (by ethnicity) is information on every single killing in Rwanda. This information would identify the perpetrator (by name, ethnicity and organization), victim (by name and ethnicity), space/place (e.g., village) and time (e.g., hour, day and week). With such information, we could have more definitively provided an estimate. However, as not all of the information noted above would probably be available, there will always be error in such calculations. Without this information then, the type of estimation that we provide follows the best practices currently available in the social sciences. Counter arguments should at a minimum make any raw material they might have available, so that any concerned party can assess the basis of their counter-argument in a reasonable manner. This would facilitate discussion and understanding. If someone has the will but not the resources to share such information, GenoDynamics will provide assistance in scanning, uploading, shipping or programming toward this end.
Sincerely
GenoDynamics
Christian Davenport – University of Michigan
Allan Stam – University of Virginia
Prof. Filip Reyntjens response to the BBC letter of Complaint
https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/filip-reyntjens/my-website/
Filip Reyntjens Website
University of Antwerp
October 20, 2014
Rwanda's Untold Story. A reply to "38 scholars, scientists, researchers, journalists and historians"
On 12 October, 38 signatories have sent a letter to the BBC’s Director-General to protest against the contents of the documentary “Rwanda’s Untold Story” first broadcast by BBC 2 on October 1. The letter states that the BBC has been “recklessly irresponsible” in broadcasting the film which has “fuelled genocide denial” and “further emboldened the génocidaires”.
Only three of the signatories (Clark, Hintjens and Murison) are academics working on Rwanda (Linda Melvern calls herself “Professor”, but she is not; she has merely been an honorary professor at the University of Wales Aberystwyth). The others have either shown interest in Rwanda in the past or played a role there, or have a sectoral expertise, e.g. in genocide studies or international criminal law. Some are activists with a record of support for the Rwandan government.
I will limit myself to a critical examination of the four claims in the documentary called “untenable” by the signatories. Before doing so it is useful to point out that the documentary is not challenged on other important points (such as the RPF’s human rights record and democratic credentials), which allows to suppose that the signatories agree with much in the programme.
First, the signatories are shocked by the fact that a witness in the programme is allowed to state that “only ten percent of the Interahamwe (militia) were killers”. This claim was made by a woman who was among the Hutu refugees massively slaughtered by the RPF in the Congo. She was very young when going through this gruelling experience, and she certainly did not conduct a scientific study of the number of militiamen actively involved in the killing of Tutsi. Her assessment doesn’t carry much weight, and one could indeed wonder why this was included in the programme at all. In addition, the notion of “Interahamwe” changed dramatically during the genocide. Before, they were the youth wing of the former single party MRND. A limited number of them (certainly much less than the 30,000 put forward in the letter) received a paramilitary training. When the genocide started, these distinctions were no longer made, as all those manning barriers and hunting down and killing Tutsi, including those from other political parties, were referred to as “Interahamwe”. In other words, it would simply be impossible to say how many of them were killers because it is unclear which entity we are talking about. What we do know is that about 70 percent of all Hutu males who were adult at the time of the genocide were convicted by Rwandan courts.
I do not need to dwell on the second claim considered untenable by the signatories. I agree with them that the figures provided by Professors Stam and Davenport on Tutsi and Hutu killed in 1994 do not appear to be based on solid research. At least the data they have published (not in a scientific journal or book, but merely on their website http://genodynamics.weebly.com) are insufficient to support their claim which flirts with genocide minimisation or denial.
Third, the signatories wrongly state that only “Hutu Power extremists” and “génocidaires and a few ICTR defence lawyers” argue that the shooting down of the presidential plane was perpetrated by the RPF. Several others, including myself, not belonging to the above categories believe that there are serious indications of the RPF’s guilt. The signatories go on to claim that French judicial evidence shows that the RPF could not have committed the attack, as the missiles “came from the confines of the government-run barracks”. First of all, this is untrue: the report found that the missiles were fired from the limits of a military domain that is over one hundred hectares large and far away from the barracks. Second, the findings were based on the assumption that the plane followed a normal approach, something that is not certain – as the report itself acknowledges. Third, the report is one of thousands of pieces of evidence in the judicial file, and it is contradicted by other elements in the file. Had the expert report, which became public in January 2012, been as convincing as the letter wants us to believe, the judges would have dropped the charges against the Rwandan suspects ages ago. Claiming as the writers do that the RPF cannot have downed the plane is reckless.
The fourth issue forcefully addressed by the signatories is that the documentary “even tries to raise doubts about whether or not the RPF stopped the genocide”. Of course the genocide stopped after the RPF’s military victory, but the real question is whether putting an end to genocide was the RPF’s main objective. It is paradoxically one of the signatories, who according to the letter is “the authority on the subject”, who earlier expressed serious doubts about this, but General Dallaire’s memory now seems to fail him. I limit myself to offering some quotes from Dallaire’s memoirs (Shake hands with the devil. The failure of humanity in Rwanda, Toronto, Radom House Canada, 2003). These passages are self-explanatory and need no commentary. They show that the RPF was interested in military victory rather than in saving Tutsi. Dallaire asked Kagame “why he wasn’t going straight for the jugular in Kigali, and he ignored the implication of my question. He knew full well that every day of fighting on the periphery meant certain death for Tutsis still behind RGF lines” (p. 327). At the end of April, when hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were still alive, Kagame told Dallaire: “Those that were to die are already dead. If an intervention force is sent to Rwanda, we will fight it” (p. 342). When Dallaire raised his worries about the fate of threatened Tutsi, Kagame had this chilling reaction: “There will be many sacrifices in this war. If the (Tutsi) refugees have to be killed for the cause, they will be considered as having been part of the sacrifice” (p. 358). “Kagame wanted all of the country, not parts of it. I came to believe he didn’t want the situation to stabilize until he had won” (p. 438). Finally, Dallaire had “dire thoughts as whether the (RPF) campaign and the genocide had been orchestrated to clear the way for Rwanda’s return to the pre-1959 status quo in which Tutsis had called all the shots. Had the Hutu extremists been bigger dupes than I?” (p. 476).
I too do not agree with everything shown and said in the documentary. I too am concerned about the use that is already being made and will be made of the film by those who deny the genocide. But that is not a legitimate reason to unfairly attack the BBC and the programme’s producers. One can only hope that the debate triggered by the film will contribute to establishing a shared truth about the tragedy that has unfolded in Rwanda and the great lakes region during the last quarter of a century.
Filip Reyntjens
20 October 2014
Filip Reyntjens Website
University of Antwerp
October 20, 2014
Rwanda's Untold Story. A reply to "38 scholars, scientists, researchers, journalists and historians"
On 12 October, 38 signatories have sent a letter to the BBC’s Director-General to protest against the contents of the documentary “Rwanda’s Untold Story” first broadcast by BBC 2 on October 1. The letter states that the BBC has been “recklessly irresponsible” in broadcasting the film which has “fuelled genocide denial” and “further emboldened the génocidaires”.
Only three of the signatories (Clark, Hintjens and Murison) are academics working on Rwanda (Linda Melvern calls herself “Professor”, but she is not; she has merely been an honorary professor at the University of Wales Aberystwyth). The others have either shown interest in Rwanda in the past or played a role there, or have a sectoral expertise, e.g. in genocide studies or international criminal law. Some are activists with a record of support for the Rwandan government.
I will limit myself to a critical examination of the four claims in the documentary called “untenable” by the signatories. Before doing so it is useful to point out that the documentary is not challenged on other important points (such as the RPF’s human rights record and democratic credentials), which allows to suppose that the signatories agree with much in the programme.
First, the signatories are shocked by the fact that a witness in the programme is allowed to state that “only ten percent of the Interahamwe (militia) were killers”. This claim was made by a woman who was among the Hutu refugees massively slaughtered by the RPF in the Congo. She was very young when going through this gruelling experience, and she certainly did not conduct a scientific study of the number of militiamen actively involved in the killing of Tutsi. Her assessment doesn’t carry much weight, and one could indeed wonder why this was included in the programme at all. In addition, the notion of “Interahamwe” changed dramatically during the genocide. Before, they were the youth wing of the former single party MRND. A limited number of them (certainly much less than the 30,000 put forward in the letter) received a paramilitary training. When the genocide started, these distinctions were no longer made, as all those manning barriers and hunting down and killing Tutsi, including those from other political parties, were referred to as “Interahamwe”. In other words, it would simply be impossible to say how many of them were killers because it is unclear which entity we are talking about. What we do know is that about 70 percent of all Hutu males who were adult at the time of the genocide were convicted by Rwandan courts.
I do not need to dwell on the second claim considered untenable by the signatories. I agree with them that the figures provided by Professors Stam and Davenport on Tutsi and Hutu killed in 1994 do not appear to be based on solid research. At least the data they have published (not in a scientific journal or book, but merely on their website http://genodynamics.weebly.com) are insufficient to support their claim which flirts with genocide minimisation or denial.
Third, the signatories wrongly state that only “Hutu Power extremists” and “génocidaires and a few ICTR defence lawyers” argue that the shooting down of the presidential plane was perpetrated by the RPF. Several others, including myself, not belonging to the above categories believe that there are serious indications of the RPF’s guilt. The signatories go on to claim that French judicial evidence shows that the RPF could not have committed the attack, as the missiles “came from the confines of the government-run barracks”. First of all, this is untrue: the report found that the missiles were fired from the limits of a military domain that is over one hundred hectares large and far away from the barracks. Second, the findings were based on the assumption that the plane followed a normal approach, something that is not certain – as the report itself acknowledges. Third, the report is one of thousands of pieces of evidence in the judicial file, and it is contradicted by other elements in the file. Had the expert report, which became public in January 2012, been as convincing as the letter wants us to believe, the judges would have dropped the charges against the Rwandan suspects ages ago. Claiming as the writers do that the RPF cannot have downed the plane is reckless.
The fourth issue forcefully addressed by the signatories is that the documentary “even tries to raise doubts about whether or not the RPF stopped the genocide”. Of course the genocide stopped after the RPF’s military victory, but the real question is whether putting an end to genocide was the RPF’s main objective. It is paradoxically one of the signatories, who according to the letter is “the authority on the subject”, who earlier expressed serious doubts about this, but General Dallaire’s memory now seems to fail him. I limit myself to offering some quotes from Dallaire’s memoirs (Shake hands with the devil. The failure of humanity in Rwanda, Toronto, Radom House Canada, 2003). These passages are self-explanatory and need no commentary. They show that the RPF was interested in military victory rather than in saving Tutsi. Dallaire asked Kagame “why he wasn’t going straight for the jugular in Kigali, and he ignored the implication of my question. He knew full well that every day of fighting on the periphery meant certain death for Tutsis still behind RGF lines” (p. 327). At the end of April, when hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were still alive, Kagame told Dallaire: “Those that were to die are already dead. If an intervention force is sent to Rwanda, we will fight it” (p. 342). When Dallaire raised his worries about the fate of threatened Tutsi, Kagame had this chilling reaction: “There will be many sacrifices in this war. If the (Tutsi) refugees have to be killed for the cause, they will be considered as having been part of the sacrifice” (p. 358). “Kagame wanted all of the country, not parts of it. I came to believe he didn’t want the situation to stabilize until he had won” (p. 438). Finally, Dallaire had “dire thoughts as whether the (RPF) campaign and the genocide had been orchestrated to clear the way for Rwanda’s return to the pre-1959 status quo in which Tutsis had called all the shots. Had the Hutu extremists been bigger dupes than I?” (p. 476).
I too do not agree with everything shown and said in the documentary. I too am concerned about the use that is already being made and will be made of the film by those who deny the genocide. But that is not a legitimate reason to unfairly attack the BBC and the programme’s producers. One can only hope that the debate triggered by the film will contribute to establishing a shared truth about the tragedy that has unfolded in Rwanda and the great lakes region during the last quarter of a century.
Filip Reyntjens
20 October 2014
Our response to Prof. Reyntjens remarks regarding our work
See the following link for detailed discussion of our methodology and estimation procedure. Release the documents as well as data that you employed for your analyses (conducted I believe in 1997) so that the estimations could be replicated as well as validated.