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GenoDynamics

Each one, teach one, then run - Tales of Rwanda, Part 6

4/26/2024

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Note: Between 1999-2004 I traveled around Rwanda during research. Many things happened on my trips and it is only now that I start to share them.

As part of my deal for going to Rwanda, I was supposed to teach some students at the National University of Rwanda at Butare about research methods. It was not exactly clear what I was supposed to do – like everything else.  That was cool though – I was getting a trip to Africa and I would be the first in the family to go there.  

Now, I have a love-hate relationship with teaching.  I love the engagement, the pursuit, watching young minds come alive – preparing to struggle, challenge, overthrow and prosper.  I hate the machine that education has become however: most of my colleagues lectured and did not interact much in the classroom, students want an A and most acquired them (the essence of my teaching method was Socratic with a healthy line of Dewey), most didn’t want to read and most couldn’t write – I’ll just stop there.

The situation had started to slowly kill me.  Every now and then I would come across a jewel of a student: engaged but reflective, hardworking but carefree, troubled but helpful, young but old.  These had become fewer and far between.

In response, I had started to pull back – moving to the dark side: research (or, was it the other way around?).  Regardless, I felt it creep in: fewer written assignments (a pain to grade), fewer books assigned (a pain to pull out of them), fewer questions (more talking to as opposed to talking with for the students weren’t interested).  

Being asked to teach in Rwanda was thus a mixed blessing.  I figured I would give it a shot.

Once in the classroom, it was a different story.  The classroom existed in what looked like a military bunker made of brick and wire fences.  There was a basketball court in front of the Rector’s office (the American equivalent of the University President), a field for “experimentation,” dormitories and other classrooms – all surrounded by jungle and barbed wire.  

The students ranged from ages 18 to 40.  They had very different backgrounds: some had fought in the civil war (not a handbag in sight), some had been abroad the whole time and had just returned and some had been in Rwanda hiding.  Some spoke English, most spoke French and all spoke Kinyarwandan. All the students were neatly dressed and were respectful to a fault.  All had cell phones and grumbled when they were asked to turn them off.  This was somewhat similar to the states until I realized that cell phones here were a life-line in the literal sense.  How could you ask a student to stay off their cell in Rwanda when the next revolution could be coming over the airwaves?  The immediacy simply trumped the courtesy.  We settled on them applying a higher criteria for accepting a call: it had to be “important.”  Over time, they got the point.

All the students were surprised to find out that their instructor was an African American.  They had never seen one and thus whenever they had a chance, they would ask questions about my life and my take on America.  This came later though. At first, they just sat there quizzically.

Socrates did not come to Rwanda with me nor did he already reside there for me to run across.  The Rwandese were used to lecturing.  They were used to being told what to do and how to do it.  Unlike the deferent to authority machines discussed in the Western media, however, once the students were given a chance, prompted and made to feel comfortable, they were full of questions and challenges.  

Interestingly, there was a certain degree of skepticism about statistics and numerical representation –the “you can say anything with numbers” variety. Walking by a chart plotting nose size against ethnic identity that I saw on a wall in a nearby library (provided by the Belgians but replicated elsewhere), I understood how they could come to be this way.  Nevertheless, we pushed on.

What struck me most about the students was that the “children are the future” stuff we always hear in the states is a genuine reality in Rwanda.  These kids literally are the future and much of the present.  These kids are not going to be the farmers who made up the majority of society.  They were going to be the lawyers, entrepeneurs, generals and Rectors who ran it.  They know it and you can see it in their faces, which leads to a certain degree of snootiness.  Now, it is not like interacting with kids from the uppercrust American institutions (Yale, Harvard, Stanford, etc.) but it is in the same ballpark; or, neighborhood of the ballpark.  

These kids had to get it right and so did everyone around them.  Some of this was interest driven but some of it was external.  They were handpicked the way athletes had been in the former Soviet Union, given everything to become the very best that they could be so that they could later serve the state who would continue to allow them to be the very best. Kinda like “Be all that you Can be – or else.”

But, this was not necessarily good for education and knowledge building.  Could you learn something which you thought was used to hold you back?  Could you take it in but not be taken over?  The students evaluated everything that came out of my mouth by some metric of state and nation-building.  Will this help Rwanda?  How?  Can we extract something that is useful from this America?  And, so it went for weeks.

The student’s intensity, the little state and nation-building exercise, the weight of their expectations were energizing.  It was not like interacting with the kids back home at the University of Maryland (where I taught at the time) who were only excited when class was over, moving on to the next mediocre experience.  These kids were hungry.  It was not like interacting with the kids from Ivy League schools either, who now walked around Rwanda as consultants, humanitarian aid workers, bankers and cultural attaches with a combination of derision, awe and compassion on a stick.  Rwanda was off.  Rwanda was raw.  The students followed suit.  Some eye of the tiger like stuff.  

But, if they were the tiger, then who was I: the meat, the zoo keeper, the visitor getting too close to the cage or was I just another animal in the cage daydreaming while someone slipped a needle under my fur to keep me calm and unpredatory?  The students seem to have the same quizzical look directed at me as well, trying to figure me out.  Who was I to them (cue the music
)?  Was I the oppressor in a new package?  Was I some ally who recently found his way to their school in the jungle?  Was I one of the thousands of individuals who came to Rwanda after the violence to pay pennance, soon to leave after I felt my soul had been cleansed?  Or, would I return to keep putting up my strange words and equations on the blackboard, year after year?  On opposite sides of the cage, we looked at each other, wondering who was on which side.      ​

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Archives of the 1994 violence

4/21/2024

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Quite frequently we hear the violence of 1994 as being described in a simple manner where one ethnic group (Hutu) targeted another (the Tutsi).  Indeed, this is now referred to as the "Genocide of the Tutsi" which recently had its 30th anniversary.  For those of us that have been studying this topic, however, this simplistic characterization is far from the truth.  I will share some of this research material here and as you will see the violence was very complex with Hutu being mistaken for Tutsi, with Hutu being lumped in with Tutsi and sometimes with there not being any Tutsi present at all.  

The records that I will share in these posts were given to me by members of the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda back when I worked for them in the early 2000s.  After the violence, there were different efforts put forward to acquire eyewitness statements about what had taken place.  These efforts were undertaken between 1994-2000.  The interest of the ICTR Prosecution was initially contextualizing the caseload that they had and trying to assess what they were dealing with.  Eventually, the Prosecution lost interest in this approach and they were no longer interested in my analyses.  The ICTR Defense did have an interest in continuing these investigations, however, and at the courts request we analyzed what they had and it compared it to what we were developing.  The material that they had was impressive.  They had nearly 15,000 eyewitness reports available in English, French and Kinyarwandan.

I told them that I would release these reports when the court cases were finalized so that the world could better understand what happened.  
These reveal the complexities of 1994.  They will shift what you think you know.  They reveal horrific violence and occasionally amazing acts of humanity.  
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Giving til it Hurts - Tales of Rwanda, Part 5 (Repost from 4/29/2013)

4/21/2024

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Note: Between 1999-2004 I traveled around Rwanda during research. Many things happened on my trips and it is only now that I start to share them.

As one leaves an establishment in Rwanda (a restaurant or a hotel) one must invariably prepare themselves for the onslaught of thin, hungry, dirty, scantily dressed but completely adorable children who ask for food or a few francs.  The culture at that time was still essentially Francophone – this would change quickly as the RPF presence increased.  There is little variation however: there are no fat children, none who look healthy, none who appear clean and none of them is fully dressed.  Now, being from New York, I have been approached a million different ways by people in the street: “hey buddy, got a quarter,” “got a light,” “got busfare,” “got my rent in yo pocket,” or “blow for a meal”?  You hear everything.  I have even been approached by kids who just pull your heart strings.  Literally.  They just open you up, pull out veins and start playing.

The situation here is compounded by the sheer volume of the issue.  There is no isolated child like in New York but rather there is a veritable sea of youth.  The onslaught is held back by armed guards, making the place safe for foreigners and those with resources, but once you leave the safety of the establishment – unless you have guards with you or manage to sneak to your vehicle – you have to deal with the kids.

After a while, I could take it, which I was both grateful for and troubled by.  After the umteenth child solicitation, a certain degree of callousness overcomes you in Rwanda.  I really could not function in any other way because there were simply too many children.  The problem was too daunting to contemplate.  My colleague Candace could not take it either but she decided that she was going to cave in completely – albeit reacting to only one at a time.  

Something that became obvious upon closer observation was that there was a system to the solicitation.  While you were approached by a barrage of individuals, if you interacted with one or gave something to one of the children, you were thereafter “owned” by them.  If after marking, another kid interacted with the marked outsider, then it appeared that you could be sanctioned by some regulator with a stone, stick or some harsh words.

Candace was marked by a spry little kid with eyes like midnight, a smile like sunlight and a face like the sky (vast, full of potential and haunting).  He was named Innocent like many people in Rwanda.  You could not help but want to help him.

It was absolutely amazing to see.  Upon coming out of any store on the Butare strip, Candace’s Innocent would find her.  “Madaam…  Madaam…”  He would start, tilt his head to the side and smile – hand out.  Initially, Candace would give him a franc or two but then she came up with a mini-development strategy.  First, she would work on his nutrition: a sandwich instead of a franc, a power bar or a vitamin or two.  Second, she would take him for a visit to a doctor – after the buy-in purchased with a meal.  Then she would talk about school, over a bottle of water or coke.  

Candace was all into his life and he lapped it up.  How could he not?   They both seemed to need each other and you were warmed by the connection. Amidst all the horrible things one saw in Rwanda, if just one life could be improved, things would be just a little more tolerable.  That was the idea at least.  The reality was more complex.  

You see, the children were also marked.  They did not run amok as we thought.  Over a few weeks, I managed to sneak in the back of the Made Niggaz Hair Salon and sat in the front with some people I had met before.  This allowed me to watch where the kids were hanging out as well as where Candace was coming from. 

Watching the street, I could see that there were clics/groups of youth – a gaggle of little capitalistic entrepreneurs.  There were older kids as well – between 15 and 20 who seemed to run the pack.  The leader would gather the youth at the beginning of the day and pass out assignments.  Innocent’s job was seemingly Candace.  He would trail her everywhere – walking, running, hiding, waiting – always placing himself where he could be seen (which after you have been marked becomes easy somehow – it’s like there are no longer a hundred kids in a crowd, just yours).  

At the end of the day, the kids met again to hand over their goodies to their handlers, from the days catch.  There is no joyful enjoyment of the goodies.  There is no gracious handover of the piece of bread to grandma back at the old house in the bush.  Rather, grandma is dead and there is no house but there is a somber handover and reallocation.  After Candace’s giving, all Innocent does is cross the street, turn the corner into an alley and hand over everything he got.  On the way back to the street, he might take a nibble but not too much or else he might get caught.

Why give up the goodies?  Protection.  Fear.  Survival.  Numbers are the only thing that seem to keep you alive on the streets of Rwanda.  You give up to get set up and you get set up to live (not die).  

Seeing this whole process once, by mistake, Candace later mentioned to me that “oh, that’s so cute.  He’s sharing.”  I just looked at her.  She missed his submissive demeanor (it looked like someone waiting to get punished), the look on the older kid’s face of anticipation (it looked like some drug addicted fiend waiting for their fix), the eight or so kids that stood around waiting their turn (reminiscent of the first).  She even missed Innocent’s look on his face after he gave over this prize (like his lunch money was taken that day, like everyone before it – this was actually pretty accurate but the money was not just for lunch).  

At that moment, I realized that we were and were not from the same place.  Later, I realized that she needed to see Innocent share.  To see anything else would be too hard.  I, on the other hand, didn’t need anything but to see what was in front of me.  Both of us were likely wrong.  I needed more of a filter for all this stuff lest I be overcome by it and Candace needed less of one lest she be underwhelmed. 

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Victorians in the Jungle - Tales of Rwanda, Part 4 (Reposting from 4/21/2013)

4/18/2024

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Note: Between 1999-2004 I traveled around Rwanda during research. Many things happened on my trips and it is only now that I start to share them.

“I had a farm in Africa...”   I swear this is how Rosamond Carr began her story.  We had traveled to one of the farthest points in Rwanda to see a genocide site, and we were told that if we were going to be over there, we should stop in and see Ms. Carr who ran an orphanage.  She was well known for she was the oldest consistently present white person in the country (even Pres. Bill Clinton buzzed through on his visit).  Over her 30+ years spent there, she had lived through a great deal: regime change, revolution, civil war, genocide, poverty, regime change, revolution, regime change and civil war. Recently, her plantation/farm had been taken from her during one of these events.  She currently lived in a house provided by Anheiser Busch – the beer people. I have no idea why.

We actually had a hard time getting to Ms. Carr, having been directed to another old white woman in the region.  This was pretty embarrassing - actually.  As we rolled up and were introduced to the roar of several hundred kids penned up behind a fence and playing soccer (for their protection or ours), we knew from Ms. Carr’s picture on the cover of her book that we had the wrong white lady.  She seemed to realize this immediately; with a shrug she said that Ms. Carr was up the road – pointing dismissively.  So as not to offend her, we asked if we could visit with her anyway.  Surprised, she gestured to her man Godfree (not his real name) and we had some tea.

Evidently, she too had been there for quite some time (not as long as Ms. Carr but for a while).  Her orphanage was larger than Ms. Carr’s.  But, lacking a best-selling book and the attending cache, her facility was less well-funded (Ms. Carr received large sums of money).  Interestingly, she was not bitter.  

After touring the facility, we pushed on, laughing about the fact that to Rwandans one ol’ white woman might be the same as another.  

Meeting Ms. Carr was a different matter entirely.  She was from a different era.  She came to Rwanda from a high-profile socialite family on the East coast of the United States with her husband.  He later left her.  Stubborn and not yet ready to leave the country, she decided to stay.  I swear this sounds like Out of Africa, the more I think about it.  There didn’t appear to be any more passion between her and her husband than between Meryl Streep and Robert Redford who were both a bit too stiff for my taste but I digress.  

As for the meeting, Ms. Carr had it all down to a tee.  You came in, met by her man Godfree (not his real name either) – a polite gentleman with white gloves, a white coat, black pants and no shoes (I kid you not).  We introduced ourselves and then were invited to sit.  Godfree brought tea and Belgian chocolates.  By that time, we had been in Rwanda a while and needed a shot of sugar, so we politely wolfed them down.

The drill was simple.  Ms. Carr literally turned to each of us and said “tell me your story” – we evidently were supposed to skip the boring parts.  Each of us complied and she delicately sat there, sipped her tea and actually appeared to listen.  

It was all pretty routine for her until someone in our group talked about where he was from – New Hampshire.  At that moment, the whole interaction changed.  It was as if there was a secret door that had been opened and only Ms. Carr and our colleague went through as the rest of us watched outside the metal gate.  It was classic: he dropped a name or mentioned a store (secret handshake noted), which caused her to glow referencing someone/someplace and they provided additional information about how it changed or stayed the same.  Never before had I seen the Northeastern uppercrust recognition dance/ritual revealed.  Ms. Carr seemed overjoyed that she could once again touch the shores of home with “her” people – she had not been back in quite some time.

Hearing it all, her stay in Rwanda had been quite something.  She talked of the troubles she had lived through and she would occasionally let something slip about how “they” (the Rwandans) needed “our” (Western/civilized) assistance or how “they” tended to have difficulties with one another.  Every now and then, Godfree would check on us.

Godfree invariably brought me back from Ms. Carr’s romantic meanderings.  Indeed, I sat there somewhat overtaken by the whole affair.  Part of me wanted to slap this ol’ racist woman; part of me wanted to listen to her tales of violence and survival; and, part of me wanted to have another piece of chocolate.  I took the latter two options. As I mentioned, I had been in the country for a while by then and needed a lil’ something sweet, a fix; my sense of righteousness was thus depleted.  Hard to fight “the man,” or “the woman” in this case, while hungry, hot and tired.

Truth be told, I was also caught by Ms. Carr’s charm. She seemed vivacious despite her age and it was infectious because she appeared to transport all of us back to her time – well, not completely for I realized that if we went back too far I would end up with Godfree in the kitchen looking at da company as well as da chocolate from a crack in the door.  

When she was done with us, Ms. Carr rose, Godfree appeared from thin air, and we signed our names in her book.  We requested photos, which she granted, posing demurely, gracefully and professionally as though she did this everyday (which, of course, she did).  Mine is provided above.  

Walking out the door, you realized that while she was in Africa, she was very much out of it.  In many ways, the world she had known changed.  Now, the weapons were bigger, migration on a larger scale, desires for rebuilding after the violence more grandiose.  At the same time, it was clear that the world she occupied had not changed at all.  Godfree had probably been serving her for years and she had a beautiful home in the middle of an amazing valley – on lease from a multi-national corporation.

She had a farm in Africa; now the farm seemed to have her. 

Come to think of it, we never did see those damn kids.  Makes you wonder.


Note 1: I am sure there were kids and an orphanage.
Note 2: Ms. Carr passed in 2006.

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Oh Those Crazy Mizungus - Tales of Rwanda, Part 3

4/14/2024

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Note: Between 1999-2004 I traveled around Rwanda during research. Many things happened on my trips and it is only now that I start to share them.  Originally blogged on 4/14/2013

I never thought I was a white man or that people could ever see me in this way.  Well, there was that one conversation with my friend Wycuie at age 14 when I stupidly said that “my people” were French – Huguenots to be precise.  This was the only family history that had been passed to me and not knowing any better, I just mentioned this to him in the heat of some conversation.  To this, Wycuie just looked at me, said nothing about my not being French and left it alone, kinda (Wycuie had a quiet scream that he could wield against you).  I was lost then and he figured that he would let me find my way.  

I was and am an African-American..... well, mostly.  My great grandfather on my father’s side was a Choctaw or Cherokee Indian and my great grandfather on my mother’s side was white (victimizing his servant in the tradition of Strom Thurmond and Thomas Jefferson).  All of the other folks were black and thus, after my Wycuie intervention, I normally stuck with the majority.  So did all the people I interacted with throughout all aspects of my life.

This changed when I went to Rwanda.  There I was Mizungu (Me-sun-goo) – alternatively meaning: a white person, a foreigner, an outsider, money, a mark.  Now this was news to me.  I did not know I was a Mizungu until we pulled up to an orphanage in a remote part of the country.  As we got out of the car, children in the hundreds ran up from where they were playing, screaming “Mizungu, Mizungu!”  

The name/label/insult did not seem threatening.  Somehow I knew it wasn’t “hi” or “nigger,” but I did not know what it was and my interpreters were not telling me.  This was not like the time I was called “Shvartze” by Adam at Junior High School 104 in New York City and all my Jewish “friends” wouldn’t tell me what it meant as they giggled, but it was pretty damn close.

Following that experience, I picked out the word quite frequently from the babble of language that surrounded me – muttered underneath the sound of cars passing by or stepping into a market or café.  

I finally got it one day, however, when we were trying to figure out where we would have lunch.  One of my hosts started to suggest one location, but they quickly withdrew the idea, saying that I would probably not want to go there because it was Rwandan.  I responded that I was in Rwanda and why would I not want to try their food.  They said that some other Mizungu didn’t like it.  I said, “who was that person and what the hell is a Mizungu?”  They then went on to tell me that a Mizungu was someone not from Rwanda.  The other definitions came over the next few minutes.

Now, I was offended because the other person they were comparing me to was a white man from Toronto.  I went off at that point, likely overreacting because of exhaustion, mind-altering medicine and recovering from 400 years of slavery.  I was like, “do you have any idea how insulting that is to an African-American.  I may not have come to Africa to find myself but I sure didn’t come here to get lost.”  [note: I have no problems with either white people or Toronto]

We then had a long conversation about race relations in the West.  Although white Canadians are generally better than American whites on many dimensions when it comes to racism and discrimination, it is still offensive to tell an African American that they are like some anglo-canuck.  “I mean damn,” I continued, “you all are going to have one hell of a time incorporating into the global market if you lump together black people from Manhattan with white people from Toronto.”

Accepting the point (after several days of returning to the issue), my hosts and I went through different ways of qualifying Mizungu to allow for some nuance (otherness with adjectives, as it were).  The top contenders were: NeoMizungu, Blazungu (my favorite) and CocoaMizungu.   Acknowledging that Kinyarwanda is a bit more resistant to innovation than English, we laughed and they said they would try to accommodate my request.

Later on the trip, we were at a museum of Rwandan history and art.  After greeting the attendant, the host paid and walked through the little gate.  After greeting the attendant in the proper Rwandan manner, I pulled out some money and then asked my host some question about someone that we were supposed to meet later.  Upon hearing me speak English, the attendant looked kind of pale and asked my host if I was Mizungu.  He smiled and said yes, afterwhich my fee was tripled - literally, in my face.  Immediately I was pissed, talking about how that wasn’t fair.  Evidently, I greeted the attendant so well and they were used to people coming back to Rwanda from all over the world, I was briefly able to pass.  When I realized that for a second I was an African, I corrected my tone, gladly paid the high fee and went in to see some ancient huts, the Tutsi lineage as well as some assorted historical artifacts from the region.  

Although we both kind of left the topic alone, the Mizungu thing stayed with me; how could it not?  I heard it daily.  As is my way, I started to ponder the idea and make jokes about it.  Actually, after a while and observing stupid little things that foreigners did in Rwanda, I thought that a good comic strip in the locale paper could be called “Oh, Those Crazy Mizungus.”  The show would be set in a school or a bar, hotel, around a travel guide or interpreter who would interact with a wide variety of Mizungus.  As they interacted with them, they would invariably do something inappropriate and when that happened, the whole cast would stop and say “Oh, Those Crazy Mizungus.”  It couldn’t lose.  Several episodes came to mind: working through lunch, coming to places on time, tanning by the pool or misunderstanding the logic behind effective bargaining for a mask. The sheer number of episodes was a source of constant amusement. The thought of this almost made me forget that for a while they thought I was a white man... almost. 
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Rwanda @ 30: A Revisitation of Rwandan violence, politics and economics 30 years after the genocide and internationalized civil war

4/4/2024

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Three decades ago, a great many people believed that President Paul Kagame and those affiliated with the current regime in Rwanda were the key to political and economic development for the country that was devastated by genocide, internationalized civil war, reprisal killings, human rights violations and random violence.  In certain ways, it looks as though the promises have been kept.  Rwanda is generally viewed as a “peaceful" nation where individuals are quite safe to walk the streets (especially in urban centers like Kigali) and the idea of overt collective violence is generally viewed as highly unlikely. In line with most conceptions of political democracy, the political system has engaged in periodic elections with mass participation, there has been extensive inclusion of a group that was previously under-represented in government (i.e., women) and there was discussion of as well as extensive action taken towards reconciliation through the process known as “Gacaca” – this system evaluated and dealt rulings on a million plus individuals. In addition to this, there has been extensive discussion as well as action taken regarding the importance of law.  Domestic issues are not the only place where Rwanda appears to have excelled.  Internationally, the government of Rwanda has offered itself up to assist other nations either by sending peace keepers (i.e., throughout Africa) or housing those seeking asylum (i.e., from the United Kingdom).  Finally, Rwanda has been heralded by some as nothing less than an “economic miracle” providing a shining example of what is possible.  
 
This is the view that one gets when they take a quick look.  The situation becomes much more complicated and less positive when one takes a closer look.  Indeed, 
several of us had a conversation about the last thirty years in an interesting discussion placed online: https://www.mivideo.it.umich.edu/channel/channelid/339658312.  The takeaways for me were quite remarkable and unsettling.   
 
In terms of political violence used domestically (by all actors including the government) it is clear that all forms of overt violence within the borders of Rwanda have declined. The price of this decline, however, is the veritable decimation of civil society and individual freedom.  Across diverse databases (e.g., the Political Terror Scale, the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Dataset and the Varieties of Democracy Project), it is clear that Rwanda experienced very high levels of human rights violation and civil liberties restriction over that last 30 years just declining in the last 5 to 10.  In addition to this, political power (i.e., the ability to create as well as implement policy across domains) has increasingly become concentrated in a single individual with no other political party or individual attempting to challenge Kagame being able to avoid persecution, harassment, exile or elimination. One can only speculate that the restrictions and intimidation of the ethnic majority Hutu has led to extensive resentment which could lead to another outbreak of resistance and collective violence if the government were to show any weakness – this actually justifies the continuation of extensive domestic repression. As a consequence, while some manifestations of violence are now unlikely (e.g., civil war or revolution), other manifestations of violence were involved in getting there (e.g., crimes against humanity, genocide, atrocities as well as human rights violation) and still other manifestations of contention have been rendered more likely (e.g., sabotage, terrorism, flight or internal withdrawal until the opportunity for change emerges [perhaps best signified by the high levels of unhappiness reported by the population]). Externally, there are numerous episodes of violent behavior that have been associated with the current government. There have been repeated direct incursions from the existing Rwandan government into the Congo under the guise of responding to the looming threat presented by former genocidaires but this situation is complicated by accusations of the Rwandans also being in country to extract resources. There has been indirect incursion from the existing Rwandan government as well through their support for M-23 rebels. There has been consistent effort to return political opponents from around the world back to Rwanda on the basis of government accusation regarding participation in genocide alone.  Recently revealed through the Paul Rusesabagina and Pegasus case, there has also been a global network of covert repressive activityidentified which seeks to identify, constrain or eliminate political threats.  This is added to the efforts to discredit all of those who challenge the regime through extensive use of marketing as well as political/legal leverage.  
 
The political system is, at best, now consistently characterized as autocratic in nature if not fully personalist in the nomenclature of more recent work or, invoking an older conception, “totalitarian” with increasingly negative evaluations coming back regarding election fraud and limited rule of law (again placed on global display during the Rusesabagina trial).  Most human rights groups who monitor political institutions now clearly place Rwanda in a non-democratic category.  Perusing the hundreds of characteristics found in the Varieties of Democracy project or Polity Project or Freedom House, one is struck by the increasing consistency of this position.  Most prominently, the shift has occurred over three elections which left Kagame the leader of the country but amidst serious questions about even the possibility of political competition in the evolving Rwandan landscape and serious concerns regarding the magnitude of each victory with 99% of the vote in the last election of 2017.  The future suggests more of the same. Kagame has already declared that he will run for a fourth term which he is officially allowed to do since he successfully altered term limits.  This would leave him in power to at least 2034, if not longer. In many respects, the myth of Rwanda political system as something to emulate has been tarnished.  They are less the darling of the foundation world.  Even American Universities, once a place where Kagame would consistently find a willing audience, has begun to step away from him.
 
And finally, once believed to be a developmental model, over the last 30 years Rwanda has revealed itself to be something of a developmental failure. Indeed, the economic system has been identified as one of the poorest 25 on the planet.  Not only has there been no economic miracle but the Rwandan economy has been exposed to be largely propped up by foreign aid.  What is intriguing is that this is nothing new. Rather, it has been found that the level of aid to Rwanda was more or less comparable to what other “poor”, “indebted” and “fragile” nations received. This makes the miracle more of an artifact than a reality.  Data has emerged to reveal that key individuals manipulated information to make it look as if development had taken place.  Moreover some scholars have noted that one could view “amazing growth” in the Rwandan economy as something largely derived from the exceptionally low starting point it began from in 1994.
 
And thus we arrive at the thirtieth anniversary of Rwanda’s emergence from political violence with many more questions.  How much leeway and freedom to act should political leader’s be given in their efforts to recover from massive human tragedy? How could Kagame get away with the failures across violence, politics and economics noted above?  While individuals in the Times like Anjan Sundaram have highlighted Kagame’s ability to use shame and guilt to hinder scrutiny from the West, there is an alternative explanation.  It is the principle of “commitment escalation” – once humans have committed to something (like backing an individual or institution to remedy a problem) rather than open themselves up to updating and new information, they double down on the earlier decision, they close themselves off to new insights as well as updating and they even will attack those challenging their earlier judgement.  I was once told regarding my research Rwanda (trying to understand what took place during 1994) that I would be hated for what I was doing.  Not because I was wrong mind you but because the horror and evil of Rwandan political violence and the desire to have Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front deal with the problem was so clear in the popular imagination that it would not easily let go of it.  Clearly some have moved in this direction. The revelations across the themes identified above have revealed massive shifts over time.  Clearly thirty years later, there are still some minds yet to be changed.  There are still some invitations, aid decisions and humanitarian efforts yet to be reconsidered.  Hopefully it will not take another thirty years to shift these as well.

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Ranges, Reasons & Rwandan Casualty Estimation

10/28/2014

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In a recent blog Prof. Marijke Verpoorten at the University of Antwerp (which also houses her colleague Filip Reyntjens) raised some interesting questions regarding the lower range of GenoDynamics' Tutsi casualty estimation, which was approximately 200,000. To begin, Verpoorten does not disagree with our higher or median values - just the lower one.  Indeed, as I will discuss further below, she actually uses our estimations quite prominently in her research (2012).  


Verpoorten's contribution to the discussion is interesting and, indeed, useful because it highlights some important factors regarding casualty estimation. It also identifies some of the weaknesses. Verpoorten's piece is useful for it identifies something that is essential for all efforts at casualty estimation:
  • all estimation must make numerous assumptions.
  • good casualty estimation will discuss these assumptions, why they were made, run alternative scenarios, discuss which values are most reasonable and make all data behind these estimations available (if this is not done, then don't bother reading further).
  • all casualty estimation must put their trust in some source (invariably all data come from somewhere and to continue on the topic, one will have to trust that a source did something appropriately).



Many of these themes were addressed in my book Media Bias, Perspective and State Repression (2010).


With these ideas in mind, Verpoorten raised concerns about the lower range of our estimation.  Essentially, to generate this figure, we: 


  • established a baseline for the Rwandan population divided by ethnic groups, which was undertaken by the colonial powers at the time along with the Tutsi-dominated government that administered the colony (This was from the census of 1958 which was believed to be the least politicized of Rwanda's censi); 
  • we selected a reasonable growth rate (from the UN); and, 
  • we subtracted the number of refugees (from UNHCR).  

We thus trusted that the government of Belgium to conduct a census in Rwanda - the place where governed for a while and the one where they assisted in solidifying the differences between ethnic groups in the first place. Given the precarious nature of the Tutsi-led government, who governed for the Belgians and were in the numerical minority, it is clear that the Belgians had a vested interest in identifying everyone by ethnicity in order to get a better understanding of what their situation was.  These actually end up overlapping with population estimates that use 1978 and 1991.  In addition to this, we trusted the UN and we trust UNHCR.  In part, this is because of the second and third reasons above (i.e., discussions of methodology/transparency and this is one of the tasks that they have undertaken for decades).


Before moving forward, it must be noted that there are some factual errors in Verpoorten's contribution regarding our work.  For example, the census we used was from 1958 not 1952; and we have a negative growth rate following 1990/1 not a positive one, which is standard within conflict situations (i.e., interstate war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front who were invading from Uganda and the then Rwandan government). There are also some differences that we have regarding the number of Tutsi saved: Verpoorten tends to believe a figure of 100-150,000 saved taken from some unnamed "Aid organizations" while we believe that a figure around 300,000 is more accurate, taken from a Tutsi survivor's association (Ibuka) and the Rwandan government's survey of genocide survivors.


It is also worth noting how puzzling it is that Verpoorten would express problems with our work for in her own research and in direct correspondence with GenoDynamics she expressed nothing but respectful collegiality and appreciation for our willingness to share data as well as discuss the topic.  Indeed, in her 2012 piece ("Detecting Hidden Violence: The spatial distribution of excess mortality in Rwanda") Verpoorten relies upon our casualty estimate of all violence in order to compare against the measurement she created, which as was correctly identified was one of the only estimates produced by some rigorous and transparent method.  As a result, there is no fundamental problem that Verpooten has with our work up until the date of the recent blog and, in fact, she presents a rather straightforward account of our research when she states that

  Davenport and Stam (2009) apply a Bayesian latent variable model to the data in order to obtain   

  estimates on the number of killings taking place in 164 administrative communes during AprileJune 
  1994. The sum of victims in communes under the jurisdiction of the FAR is estimated at 
  approximately 890,000, which adds to the evidence of a high death toll under the jurisdiction of the 
  genocidal regime. Davenport & Stam (2009) use the same approach to estimate the number of 
  killings that took place in 1994 within the zones under RPF controland the zones contested by the 
  RPF and FAR.. They arrive at estimates of respectively 80,000 and 90,000, which confirm previously 
  made allegations of 1994 human rights violations, in particular reprisal killings, at the address of the 
  RPF (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1998, the Gersony report).

That was all she said about it.  There was no fatal flaw to our operationalization of total casualty figures. There were differences but nothing that would result in casting the measure aside.  


As for the particular comments made in the recent blog, it appears that Verpoorten's problem lies with the lower range of our estimation regarding how many Tutsi were killed in the territory under the control of the FAR. For the record, this includes genocide but it also includes other forms of violence as well - something Verpoorten's (2012) article explicitly investigates. The higher range is fine and indeed overlaps with the estimates that she provides (i.e., our estimation ranges overlap).

Central to Verpoorten's critique is the issue of the 1991 census that was conducted by the Rwandan government.  Why do we keep discussing this census?  Well, partly this is because we cannot go forward. Citing fears of divisionism, ethnicity (accept for explicit discussion of the "genocide of the Tutsi") all references to ethnicity have been banned (including the census). We also keep going back to this source because to date there has been no list produced regarding victims of the mass killing and without a list with all the potential victims it is hard to understand what took place as well as why.  Genocide, for example, requires ethnic targeting and the census identifies ethnicity thus making it a natural location to look.  Lists were read over the hate radio stations but the sheer number of names read did not come close to the number commonly believed to be killed.  Lists were believed to be handed out to perpetrators but none have been recovered. The census or something like it thus proves crucial to those of us trying to understand what took place in Rwanda during 1994.  For example, with a good census and the identification of everyone by ethnicity, then this information would be used to find and kill everyone.  If the census was good though, then the casualty count for Tutsi would be low according to Verpoorten, relative to the number she believes to be present. But, if the census was bad and it did not identify everyone by ethnicity properly, then the high casualty count based on ethnicity identification is problematic.  That is, unless there was another source that was used.  

Verpoorten's (2005) work on one geographic location (GIkongoro) is the source she trusts to make her case.  This was a population estimate provided by local authorities whom she trusts were more accurate in identifying individuals ethnicities than authorities from the national government office.  If this information is good, then this would account for a larger number of Tutsi deaths.  If the information is bad, however, then this suggests that the killing was unclear.  Some interesting assumptions exist here.  

First, it is presumed that the list created by the local administrators regarding who should be targeted was the one that was used when people were being killed.  No one has provided evidence to this effect and there are numerous reports of people coming from the outside a community to kill people. What list would they have used?  Were lists discarded and people in the community pointed out those to be targeted?  To answer these questions, we need detailed information about who did what to whom in each locale, not simply population figures taken before and after overt violence.  


Second, the approach Verpoorten uses assumes that the situation in Gikongoro applies to ALL of Rwanda or at least parts of it.  Indeed, she explicitly states that this is problematic when she remarks that "Admittedly, there is no good reason to assume that the under-reporting occurred on exactly the same scale in all prefectures" (2005: 341).  

Third, the approach Verpoorten uses (in 2005 and in her blog) assumes that individuals were killed where they came from.  But, as Verpoorten acknowledges in her 2012 piece

  The refugee crisis was nationwide, but more intense at the borders with RD Congo and Tanzania, 
  two neighboring countries that hosted an estimated 1,200,000 and 580,000 refugees, respectively. 
  Burundi also hosted a considerable number of refugees (270,000) while Uganda hosted no more 
  than 10,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2000, chap. 10). Both the proximity to a refugee camp and its size 
  are likely to affect excess mortality (51: fn 3).  

In addition to this, there is the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) which might have reached another 2 million, if not more.  This means that somewhere between a half or more of the population was on the move during the violence of 1994.

Movement is an especially problematic issue in the calculation of casualty estimation for it raises some questions that are rarely asked in Rwanda. For example,
  • when did people move - exactly?
  • how many moved and who moved (Tutsi alone, Hutu alone or Tutsi as well as Hutu)?
  • how is ethnicity identified as people move around outside of their home communities?
  • what does movement of the population mean for static pre/post evaluations?

As a community of people interested in Rwanda and the violence of 1994, we have very little systematic answers to these questions but they are crucial for movement tends to undermine and invalidate many of the discussions that take place (something also noted in Verpoorten's 2012 study as she attempts to figure out how many died in the different forms of killing that occurred: civil war, genocide, (counter)insurgency and the refugee crisis.  

Related to this, movement is problematic because it makes one think a bit harder about how people were killed and this is a level of depth that most do not wish to engage in (for obvious reasons).  When one does this, however, it is clear that most assume that killers are traveling around with lists of people to kill most likely derived from the census or local administration.  But, this requires a high degree of coordination, literacy and copying machines - all of which are in short supply, especially as the existing government were getting destroyed on the battlefield and the Rwandan population was fleeing.  What good is a list if people are running and hiding?

All of this discussion places a tremendous amount of confidence in Rwandan abilities to identify ethnic others. But, this is not clear.  Indeed, this might explain why people had id cards. If ethnicity was so obvious, then these would be unnecessary.  But, if you were not sure who somebody was, then you would need some id.  Historical researchers note the significant amount of intermarriage that took place between Tutsi and Hutu.  What was the child of a Hutu man and Tutsi female?  What was the child of a Tutsi man and Hutu female?  Were all Hutus identified as Hutus?  Were all Tutsis identified as Tutsis?  Do answers to these questions vary across time and place?  Were mistakes made and under what circumstances? These issues clearly complicate the identification and targeting of ethnic victims as the violence takes on an air of variability across individuals and contexts.  This complexity appears to be evident in eyewitness testimony from the ICTR regarding what took place in 1994: 1 and 2 (these are two examples from around 7000 that were compiled by the ICTR).


The Rwandan government has not helped with assisting individuals in identifying which specific groups were killed.  Indeed, the research conducted by the government on the topic reveals the difficult in obtaining an actual count of casualties by ethnicity.  According to the Ministry of Local Governments own survey of genocide victims, the complexity identified above is quite clear.  As they state in their report: "genocide victims are all persons which have been killed in the period between 10/1/1990 and 12/31/1994 
  • because they are Tutsi;
  • or they can be associated by lineage with a Tutsi;
  • or they are  friends with a Tutsi; 
  • or have a particular affinity with (a Tutsi); 
  • or they exhibit political thoughts and/or belong to a political party contrary to the ideology of the divisionist politics before 1994".

This is a rather broad conception of victims and one that likely pushes beyond the traditional definition of genocide.  Indeed, Article II of the  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the relevant political violence as any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
  • Killing members of the group;
  • Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  • Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
  • Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
  • Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Clearly, the categories of genocide victim used by the Rwandan Ministry above only partially fits the definition for genocide identified.  Being a "friend" or having an "affinity with" someone from a group is not the same thing as being from the group. Actually, being a "friend" or having an "affinity with" likely represents Hutus for if they were Tutsi then they would have been classified as ethnic Tutsi, which is the first category. Having a "lineage with a Tutsi" presumes that this is the reason why someone would be targeted and that the perpetrators know this. It is possible that someone might see themselves and be perceived by others around them as Hutu but through lineage they would later be counted as Tutsi.  Finally, there are those that because of their belief against divisionism, hatred and violent policies would be placed in the category of genocide victim. As this concerns political beliefs, this clearly moves past the strict categorization of the term genocide.  Again, this also includes Hutus.

All of this raises questions regarding the identification of Tutsi victims. It may be that the research from GenoDynamics is capturing 200,000 ethnic Tutsis that are clearly and consistently identified as such and that the other victims we are identifying are those fitting into the other categories highlighted by the Rwandan government which includes both Tutsi as well as Hutu victims.  Rather than compel a reduced conversation, therefore, our estimation and the issues identified above compel a deeper, wider and more thorough conversation about who died, why and who was responsible that allow us to differentiate between the categories of victims identified above.
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Evidenced-Based Discussion of Rwandan Repression and Civil Liberties

10/26/2014

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In the quest to understand Rwanda 1994, we often forget that that conversation is situated in a particular context. Unfortunately, we never quite get to a discussion of that context because of the highly politicized nature of Rwanda in general.  While many have focused on the economic situation within the country as of late, I wished to provide some data compiled by the V-DEM project to illustrate what Rwanda has looked like over time with regard to personal integrity violations (e.g., state torture and killing) and civil liberties restrictions (e.g., limitations on speech and association).  Below, please find a brief discussion of how the data was coded and then find figures that look at all Rwanda history since the early 1900s to 2012 and then focused attention on the period from 1980 to 2012.  Here is a link to the project's methodology.

The takeaway: the Rwandan government was generally less likely to repress (e.g., engage in diverse personal integrity violations like torture and kill) and engage in civil liberties restrictions (e.g., less likely to restrict speech and association) within the pre-1994 period. After the ascension to power of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), repression and civil liberties worsen.  Interesting after the RPF invade from Uganda some characteristics worsen (e.g., domestic movement) but some improve (e.g., discussion and association).  After the genocide, interstate war, reprisal killings and random violence conclude, however, and the RPF took control of the government, almost uniformly repression and civil liberties restrictions became and continued to be worse than the period preceding the violence taking place during 1994. Note: this does not include anything about what was taking place in the DRC, which I we likely address next week.


Question:
Is there freedom from torture?

Choices :

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.

2 : Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.


Question: Do men and women enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all adults are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal and extremely low freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Question: Are men and women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which adults are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal and extremely low rights to freedom of discussion.

 
Question: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Choices :

0 : No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

1 : Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin’s Russia.

2 : Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3 : Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 1 and 2 above below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

4 : Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.


Question: Is there freedom from political killings? Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

Choices :

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.

2 : Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.


Diverse Personal Integrity Violations in Rwanda, 1900-2012

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Diverse Personal Integrity Violations in Rwanda, 1980-2012

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Below, we consider some other characteristics:

Question: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

Choices:

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.


1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2 : Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.


Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Question: Are men and women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which adults are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal and extremely low rights to freedom of discussion.


Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Choices :

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular {social groups"A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant."}. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2 : Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular {social groups"A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant."} is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4 : Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

 
Question: To what extent does government respect press & media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Question: Is there freedom of religion? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Choices:

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2 : Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.


Diverse Civil Liberties Restrictions in Rwanda, 1900-2012

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Diverse Civil Liberties Restrictions in Rwanda, 1980-2012

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Rwandan Weekend Reading: 

10/24/2014

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Amnesty International — Rwanda: Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda’s Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and ‘Sectarianism’ (2010)

From the Report:

Following six years of extensive reforms to the conventional justice system, the Rwandan government announced a review of the “genocide ideology” law in April 2010. Amnesty International welcomes this government initiative. This report identifies Amnesty International’s concerns about the current legislation and its application in light of the Rwandan government’s review process.

Prohibiting hate speech is a legitimate aim, but the Rwandan government’s approach violates international human rights law. Rwanda’s vague and sweeping laws against “genocide ideology” and “divisionism” under “sectarianism” laws criminalize speech protected by international conventions and contravene Rwanda’s regional and international human rights obligations and commitments to freedom of expression. The vague wording of the laws is deliberately exploited to violate human rights.

Prosecutions for “genocide ideology” and so-called “genocide ideology-related” offences were brought even before the law defining this offence was promulgated. People continue to be prosecuted for “divisionism”, under “sectarianism” laws, even though “divisionism” is not defined in law. Rwandans, including judges, lawyers and human rights defenders, expressed confusion about what behaviour these laws criminalize.

These broad and ill-defined laws have created a vague legal framework which is misused to criminalize criticism of the government and legitimate dissent. This has included suppressing calls for the prosecution of war crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In the run-up to the 2010 elections, legitimate political dissent was conflated with “genocide ideology”, compromising the freedom of expression and association of opposition politicians, human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government. 
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GenoDynamic's Response to Rwandan Government's Response to BBC Documentary

10/23/2014

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In a news report from today, the Rwandan parliament "has condemned the BBC for broadcasting a documentary which questioned official accounts of the 1994 genocide in the country. It approved a resolution calling on the government to ban the BBC in Rwanda and to charge the documentary-makers with genocide denial." The news report also indicates that "The BBC programme Rwanda, The Untold Story, includes interviews with US-based researchers (Prof. Christian Davenport and Prof. Allan Stam) who say most of those killed may have been Hutus, killed by members of the then-rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which has been in power since 1994."  

While the first part of the response is correct - our research does question official accounts of the violence of 1994 in terms of the number of individuals killed - at no point does the research suggest that a genocide did not occur.  This claim is part of the name of our project (GenoDynamics), it has been stated in every single page associated with the research effort (virtual and otherwise) and it has been part of every presentation about our research on the topic.  What is at issue is how many individuals from different ethnic groups were killed.  Our 14-year exploration into the topic (employing diverse sources from the current Rwandan government, Rwandan NGOs as well as international human rights organizations - Human Rights Watch and African Rights) has resulted in a range of deaths for both Tutsi as well as Hutu and it is the range of estimates that we have put forward for discussion as well as additional exploration. The "official account" noted in the BBC news article has never been made public (i.e., the raw, disaggregated data behind official statements) and without this transparency it is not quite clear what the account is based upon. The approach adopted by GenoDynamics is based on a statistical model that the more information that has been provided, the better the estimation (including the reduction in error). With the government's data, the estimation could probably be improved.  


The second claim is simply completely incorrect: at no point does the research suggest that the RPF killed large numbers of individuals. Our research focuses on the territorial zones under which different actors were found during 1994 and attributes deaths to these zones.  The findings are instructive. The zone under the jurisdiction of the FAR/Extremist Government is responsible for the majority of the deaths within our research (which is consistent with the definition of genocide but also crimes against humanity, human rights violations, war crimes and random violence - information about intent is required to make this judgement for every death incurred). The zone where the FAR and Rwandan Patriotic Front (the invading rebels or RPF) meet is associated with deaths. These are likely classified as deaths attributed to the military exchanges between the combatants but it is possible that these deaths are associated with other reasons. Finally, the zone under the jurisdiction of the RPF is also associated with deaths. These are likely classified as reprisal killings but could also include crimes against humanity, human rights violations, war crimes and random violence).  


The RPF troops were significant in our work not because of what took place under their jurisdiction but in a different way: movements of the RPF forward into Rwanda were associated with increasing the number of deaths under the jurisdiction of the FAR/Extremist government.  Such a concern is revealed by declassified documents from the US government: 1, 2.

The second misrepresentation of our work is important for it raises the question: why would the FAR/Extremist government kill both Tutsi and Hutus?  This is the question that we believe should be addressed in order to better understand what took place.  Additionally, further reference should be made to the fact that before 1990, the amount of overt political violence (i.e., violent deaths at the hands of the existing Rwandan government) were limited.


To facilitate improved understanding of what took place - specifically, who did what to whom, when and where, GenoDynamics calls upon all source to provide information and for this information to be made publicly available for the systematic analysis and re-analysis of what took place.  
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