• Home
  • 4 Things about Rwanda 1994
  • Data on Violence
  • Data Animations
  • Troop movements
  • BBC Documentary
  • Subsidiary Rwanda Data
  • Post-Violence Transitional (In)Justice
  • Writings
  • Videos
  • Photos
  • Presentations
  • Project Staff
  • Rwanda?!
  • Links
  • Readings
  • GenoBlog
GenoDynamics

Ranges, Reasons & Rwandan Casualty Estimation

10/28/2014

3 Comments

 
In a recent blog Prof. Marijke Verpoorten at the University of Antwerp (which also houses her colleague Filip Reyntjens) raised some interesting questions regarding the lower range of GenoDynamics' Tutsi casualty estimation, which was approximately 200,000. To begin, Verpoorten does not disagree with our higher or median values - just the lower one.  Indeed, as I will discuss further below, she actually uses our estimations quite prominently in her research (2012).  


Verpoorten's contribution to the discussion is interesting and, indeed, useful because it highlights some important factors regarding casualty estimation. It also identifies some of the weaknesses. Verpoorten's piece is useful for it identifies something that is essential for all efforts at casualty estimation:
  • all estimation must make numerous assumptions.
  • good casualty estimation will discuss these assumptions, why they were made, run alternative scenarios, discuss which values are most reasonable and make all data behind these estimations available (if this is not done, then don't bother reading further).
  • all casualty estimation must put their trust in some source (invariably all data come from somewhere and to continue on the topic, one will have to trust that a source did something appropriately).



Many of these themes were addressed in my book Media Bias, Perspective and State Repression (2010).


With these ideas in mind, Verpoorten raised concerns about the lower range of our estimation.  Essentially, to generate this figure, we: 


  • established a baseline for the Rwandan population divided by ethnic groups, which was undertaken by the colonial powers at the time along with the Tutsi-dominated government that administered the colony (This was from the census of 1958 which was believed to be the least politicized of Rwanda's censi); 
  • we selected a reasonable growth rate (from the UN); and, 
  • we subtracted the number of refugees (from UNHCR).  

We thus trusted that the government of Belgium to conduct a census in Rwanda - the place where governed for a while and the one where they assisted in solidifying the differences between ethnic groups in the first place. Given the precarious nature of the Tutsi-led government, who governed for the Belgians and were in the numerical minority, it is clear that the Belgians had a vested interest in identifying everyone by ethnicity in order to get a better understanding of what their situation was.  These actually end up overlapping with population estimates that use 1978 and 1991.  In addition to this, we trusted the UN and we trust UNHCR.  In part, this is because of the second and third reasons above (i.e., discussions of methodology/transparency and this is one of the tasks that they have undertaken for decades).


Before moving forward, it must be noted that there are some factual errors in Verpoorten's contribution regarding our work.  For example, the census we used was from 1958 not 1952; and we have a negative growth rate following 1990/1 not a positive one, which is standard within conflict situations (i.e., interstate war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front who were invading from Uganda and the then Rwandan government). There are also some differences that we have regarding the number of Tutsi saved: Verpoorten tends to believe a figure of 100-150,000 saved taken from some unnamed "Aid organizations" while we believe that a figure around 300,000 is more accurate, taken from a Tutsi survivor's association (Ibuka) and the Rwandan government's survey of genocide survivors.


It is also worth noting how puzzling it is that Verpoorten would express problems with our work for in her own research and in direct correspondence with GenoDynamics she expressed nothing but respectful collegiality and appreciation for our willingness to share data as well as discuss the topic.  Indeed, in her 2012 piece ("Detecting Hidden Violence: The spatial distribution of excess mortality in Rwanda") Verpoorten relies upon our casualty estimate of all violence in order to compare against the measurement she created, which as was correctly identified was one of the only estimates produced by some rigorous and transparent method.  As a result, there is no fundamental problem that Verpooten has with our work up until the date of the recent blog and, in fact, she presents a rather straightforward account of our research when she states that

  Davenport and Stam (2009) apply a Bayesian latent variable model to the data in order to obtain   

  estimates on the number of killings taking place in 164 administrative communes during AprileJune 
  1994. The sum of victims in communes under the jurisdiction of the FAR is estimated at 
  approximately 890,000, which adds to the evidence of a high death toll under the jurisdiction of the 
  genocidal regime. Davenport & Stam (2009) use the same approach to estimate the number of 
  killings that took place in 1994 within the zones under RPF controland the zones contested by the 
  RPF and FAR.. They arrive at estimates of respectively 80,000 and 90,000, which confirm previously 
  made allegations of 1994 human rights violations, in particular reprisal killings, at the address of the 
  RPF (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1998, the Gersony report).

That was all she said about it.  There was no fatal flaw to our operationalization of total casualty figures. There were differences but nothing that would result in casting the measure aside.  


As for the particular comments made in the recent blog, it appears that Verpoorten's problem lies with the lower range of our estimation regarding how many Tutsi were killed in the territory under the control of the FAR. For the record, this includes genocide but it also includes other forms of violence as well - something Verpoorten's (2012) article explicitly investigates. The higher range is fine and indeed overlaps with the estimates that she provides (i.e., our estimation ranges overlap).

Central to Verpoorten's critique is the issue of the 1991 census that was conducted by the Rwandan government.  Why do we keep discussing this census?  Well, partly this is because we cannot go forward. Citing fears of divisionism, ethnicity (accept for explicit discussion of the "genocide of the Tutsi") all references to ethnicity have been banned (including the census). We also keep going back to this source because to date there has been no list produced regarding victims of the mass killing and without a list with all the potential victims it is hard to understand what took place as well as why.  Genocide, for example, requires ethnic targeting and the census identifies ethnicity thus making it a natural location to look.  Lists were read over the hate radio stations but the sheer number of names read did not come close to the number commonly believed to be killed.  Lists were believed to be handed out to perpetrators but none have been recovered. The census or something like it thus proves crucial to those of us trying to understand what took place in Rwanda during 1994.  For example, with a good census and the identification of everyone by ethnicity, then this information would be used to find and kill everyone.  If the census was good though, then the casualty count for Tutsi would be low according to Verpoorten, relative to the number she believes to be present. But, if the census was bad and it did not identify everyone by ethnicity properly, then the high casualty count based on ethnicity identification is problematic.  That is, unless there was another source that was used.  

Verpoorten's (2005) work on one geographic location (GIkongoro) is the source she trusts to make her case.  This was a population estimate provided by local authorities whom she trusts were more accurate in identifying individuals ethnicities than authorities from the national government office.  If this information is good, then this would account for a larger number of Tutsi deaths.  If the information is bad, however, then this suggests that the killing was unclear.  Some interesting assumptions exist here.  

First, it is presumed that the list created by the local administrators regarding who should be targeted was the one that was used when people were being killed.  No one has provided evidence to this effect and there are numerous reports of people coming from the outside a community to kill people. What list would they have used?  Were lists discarded and people in the community pointed out those to be targeted?  To answer these questions, we need detailed information about who did what to whom in each locale, not simply population figures taken before and after overt violence.  


Second, the approach Verpoorten uses assumes that the situation in Gikongoro applies to ALL of Rwanda or at least parts of it.  Indeed, she explicitly states that this is problematic when she remarks that "Admittedly, there is no good reason to assume that the under-reporting occurred on exactly the same scale in all prefectures" (2005: 341).  

Third, the approach Verpoorten uses (in 2005 and in her blog) assumes that individuals were killed where they came from.  But, as Verpoorten acknowledges in her 2012 piece

  The refugee crisis was nationwide, but more intense at the borders with RD Congo and Tanzania, 
  two neighboring countries that hosted an estimated 1,200,000 and 580,000 refugees, respectively. 
  Burundi also hosted a considerable number of refugees (270,000) while Uganda hosted no more 
  than 10,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2000, chap. 10). Both the proximity to a refugee camp and its size 
  are likely to affect excess mortality (51: fn 3).  

In addition to this, there is the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) which might have reached another 2 million, if not more.  This means that somewhere between a half or more of the population was on the move during the violence of 1994.

Movement is an especially problematic issue in the calculation of casualty estimation for it raises some questions that are rarely asked in Rwanda. For example,
  • when did people move - exactly?
  • how many moved and who moved (Tutsi alone, Hutu alone or Tutsi as well as Hutu)?
  • how is ethnicity identified as people move around outside of their home communities?
  • what does movement of the population mean for static pre/post evaluations?

As a community of people interested in Rwanda and the violence of 1994, we have very little systematic answers to these questions but they are crucial for movement tends to undermine and invalidate many of the discussions that take place (something also noted in Verpoorten's 2012 study as she attempts to figure out how many died in the different forms of killing that occurred: civil war, genocide, (counter)insurgency and the refugee crisis.  

Related to this, movement is problematic because it makes one think a bit harder about how people were killed and this is a level of depth that most do not wish to engage in (for obvious reasons).  When one does this, however, it is clear that most assume that killers are traveling around with lists of people to kill most likely derived from the census or local administration.  But, this requires a high degree of coordination, literacy and copying machines - all of which are in short supply, especially as the existing government were getting destroyed on the battlefield and the Rwandan population was fleeing.  What good is a list if people are running and hiding?

All of this discussion places a tremendous amount of confidence in Rwandan abilities to identify ethnic others. But, this is not clear.  Indeed, this might explain why people had id cards. If ethnicity was so obvious, then these would be unnecessary.  But, if you were not sure who somebody was, then you would need some id.  Historical researchers note the significant amount of intermarriage that took place between Tutsi and Hutu.  What was the child of a Hutu man and Tutsi female?  What was the child of a Tutsi man and Hutu female?  Were all Hutus identified as Hutus?  Were all Tutsis identified as Tutsis?  Do answers to these questions vary across time and place?  Were mistakes made and under what circumstances? These issues clearly complicate the identification and targeting of ethnic victims as the violence takes on an air of variability across individuals and contexts.  This complexity appears to be evident in eyewitness testimony from the ICTR regarding what took place in 1994: 1 and 2 (these are two examples from around 7000 that were compiled by the ICTR).


The Rwandan government has not helped with assisting individuals in identifying which specific groups were killed.  Indeed, the research conducted by the government on the topic reveals the difficult in obtaining an actual count of casualties by ethnicity.  According to the Ministry of Local Governments own survey of genocide victims, the complexity identified above is quite clear.  As they state in their report: "genocide victims are all persons which have been killed in the period between 10/1/1990 and 12/31/1994 
  • because they are Tutsi;
  • or they can be associated by lineage with a Tutsi;
  • or they are  friends with a Tutsi; 
  • or have a particular affinity with (a Tutsi); 
  • or they exhibit political thoughts and/or belong to a political party contrary to the ideology of the divisionist politics before 1994".

This is a rather broad conception of victims and one that likely pushes beyond the traditional definition of genocide.  Indeed, Article II of the  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the relevant political violence as any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
  • Killing members of the group;
  • Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  • Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
  • Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
  • Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Clearly, the categories of genocide victim used by the Rwandan Ministry above only partially fits the definition for genocide identified.  Being a "friend" or having an "affinity with" someone from a group is not the same thing as being from the group. Actually, being a "friend" or having an "affinity with" likely represents Hutus for if they were Tutsi then they would have been classified as ethnic Tutsi, which is the first category. Having a "lineage with a Tutsi" presumes that this is the reason why someone would be targeted and that the perpetrators know this. It is possible that someone might see themselves and be perceived by others around them as Hutu but through lineage they would later be counted as Tutsi.  Finally, there are those that because of their belief against divisionism, hatred and violent policies would be placed in the category of genocide victim. As this concerns political beliefs, this clearly moves past the strict categorization of the term genocide.  Again, this also includes Hutus.

All of this raises questions regarding the identification of Tutsi victims. It may be that the research from GenoDynamics is capturing 200,000 ethnic Tutsis that are clearly and consistently identified as such and that the other victims we are identifying are those fitting into the other categories highlighted by the Rwandan government which includes both Tutsi as well as Hutu victims.  Rather than compel a reduced conversation, therefore, our estimation and the issues identified above compel a deeper, wider and more thorough conversation about who died, why and who was responsible that allow us to differentiate between the categories of victims identified above.
3 Comments

Evidenced-Based Discussion of Rwandan Repression and Civil Liberties

10/26/2014

0 Comments

 
In the quest to understand Rwanda 1994, we often forget that that conversation is situated in a particular context. Unfortunately, we never quite get to a discussion of that context because of the highly politicized nature of Rwanda in general.  While many have focused on the economic situation within the country as of late, I wished to provide some data compiled by the V-DEM project to illustrate what Rwanda has looked like over time with regard to personal integrity violations (e.g., state torture and killing) and civil liberties restrictions (e.g., limitations on speech and association).  Below, please find a brief discussion of how the data was coded and then find figures that look at all Rwanda history since the early 1900s to 2012 and then focused attention on the period from 1980 to 2012.  Here is a link to the project's methodology.

The takeaway: the Rwandan government was generally less likely to repress (e.g., engage in diverse personal integrity violations like torture and kill) and engage in civil liberties restrictions (e.g., less likely to restrict speech and association) within the pre-1994 period. After the ascension to power of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), repression and civil liberties worsen.  Interesting after the RPF invade from Uganda some characteristics worsen (e.g., domestic movement) but some improve (e.g., discussion and association).  After the genocide, interstate war, reprisal killings and random violence conclude, however, and the RPF took control of the government, almost uniformly repression and civil liberties restrictions became and continued to be worse than the period preceding the violence taking place during 1994. Note: this does not include anything about what was taking place in the DRC, which I we likely address next week.


Question:
Is there freedom from torture?

Choices :

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.

2 : Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.


Question: Do men and women enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all adults are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal and extremely low freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Question: Are men and women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which adults are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal and extremely low rights to freedom of discussion.

 
Question: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Choices :

0 : No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

1 : Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin’s Russia.

2 : Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3 : Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 1 and 2 above below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

4 : Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.


Question: Is there freedom from political killings? Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

Choices :

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.

2 : Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.


Diverse Personal Integrity Violations in Rwanda, 1900-2012

Picture

Diverse Personal Integrity Violations in Rwanda, 1980-2012

Picture
Below, we consider some other characteristics:

Question: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

Choices:

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.


1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2 : Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.


Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Question: Are men and women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which adults are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal and extremely low rights to freedom of discussion.


Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Choices :

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular {social groups"A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant."}. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2 : Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular {social groups"A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant."} is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4 : Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

 
Question: To what extent does government respect press & media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Question: Is there freedom of religion? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Choices:

0 : Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1 : Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2 : Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3 : Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4 : Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.


Diverse Civil Liberties Restrictions in Rwanda, 1900-2012

Picture

Diverse Civil Liberties Restrictions in Rwanda, 1980-2012

Picture
0 Comments

Rwandan Weekend Reading: 

10/24/2014

0 Comments

 
Amnesty International — Rwanda: Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda’s Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and ‘Sectarianism’ (2010)

From the Report:

Following six years of extensive reforms to the conventional justice system, the Rwandan government announced a review of the “genocide ideology” law in April 2010. Amnesty International welcomes this government initiative. This report identifies Amnesty International’s concerns about the current legislation and its application in light of the Rwandan government’s review process.

Prohibiting hate speech is a legitimate aim, but the Rwandan government’s approach violates international human rights law. Rwanda’s vague and sweeping laws against “genocide ideology” and “divisionism” under “sectarianism” laws criminalize speech protected by international conventions and contravene Rwanda’s regional and international human rights obligations and commitments to freedom of expression. The vague wording of the laws is deliberately exploited to violate human rights.

Prosecutions for “genocide ideology” and so-called “genocide ideology-related” offences were brought even before the law defining this offence was promulgated. People continue to be prosecuted for “divisionism”, under “sectarianism” laws, even though “divisionism” is not defined in law. Rwandans, including judges, lawyers and human rights defenders, expressed confusion about what behaviour these laws criminalize.

These broad and ill-defined laws have created a vague legal framework which is misused to criminalize criticism of the government and legitimate dissent. This has included suppressing calls for the prosecution of war crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In the run-up to the 2010 elections, legitimate political dissent was conflated with “genocide ideology”, compromising the freedom of expression and association of opposition politicians, human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government. 
0 Comments

GenoDynamic's Response to Rwandan Government's Response to BBC Documentary

10/23/2014

0 Comments

 
In a news report from today, the Rwandan parliament "has condemned the BBC for broadcasting a documentary which questioned official accounts of the 1994 genocide in the country. It approved a resolution calling on the government to ban the BBC in Rwanda and to charge the documentary-makers with genocide denial." The news report also indicates that "The BBC programme Rwanda, The Untold Story, includes interviews with US-based researchers (Prof. Christian Davenport and Prof. Allan Stam) who say most of those killed may have been Hutus, killed by members of the then-rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which has been in power since 1994."  

While the first part of the response is correct - our research does question official accounts of the violence of 1994 in terms of the number of individuals killed - at no point does the research suggest that a genocide did not occur.  This claim is part of the name of our project (GenoDynamics), it has been stated in every single page associated with the research effort (virtual and otherwise) and it has been part of every presentation about our research on the topic.  What is at issue is how many individuals from different ethnic groups were killed.  Our 14-year exploration into the topic (employing diverse sources from the current Rwandan government, Rwandan NGOs as well as international human rights organizations - Human Rights Watch and African Rights) has resulted in a range of deaths for both Tutsi as well as Hutu and it is the range of estimates that we have put forward for discussion as well as additional exploration. The "official account" noted in the BBC news article has never been made public (i.e., the raw, disaggregated data behind official statements) and without this transparency it is not quite clear what the account is based upon. The approach adopted by GenoDynamics is based on a statistical model that the more information that has been provided, the better the estimation (including the reduction in error). With the government's data, the estimation could probably be improved.  


The second claim is simply completely incorrect: at no point does the research suggest that the RPF killed large numbers of individuals. Our research focuses on the territorial zones under which different actors were found during 1994 and attributes deaths to these zones.  The findings are instructive. The zone under the jurisdiction of the FAR/Extremist Government is responsible for the majority of the deaths within our research (which is consistent with the definition of genocide but also crimes against humanity, human rights violations, war crimes and random violence - information about intent is required to make this judgement for every death incurred). The zone where the FAR and Rwandan Patriotic Front (the invading rebels or RPF) meet is associated with deaths. These are likely classified as deaths attributed to the military exchanges between the combatants but it is possible that these deaths are associated with other reasons. Finally, the zone under the jurisdiction of the RPF is also associated with deaths. These are likely classified as reprisal killings but could also include crimes against humanity, human rights violations, war crimes and random violence).  


The RPF troops were significant in our work not because of what took place under their jurisdiction but in a different way: movements of the RPF forward into Rwanda were associated with increasing the number of deaths under the jurisdiction of the FAR/Extremist government.  Such a concern is revealed by declassified documents from the US government: 1, 2.

The second misrepresentation of our work is important for it raises the question: why would the FAR/Extremist government kill both Tutsi and Hutus?  This is the question that we believe should be addressed in order to better understand what took place.  Additionally, further reference should be made to the fact that before 1990, the amount of overt political violence (i.e., violent deaths at the hands of the existing Rwandan government) were limited.


To facilitate improved understanding of what took place - specifically, who did what to whom, when and where, GenoDynamics calls upon all source to provide information and for this information to be made publicly available for the systematic analysis and re-analysis of what took place.  
0 Comments

GenoDynamic's Response to the letter sent to the BBC

10/18/2014

1 Comment

 
 The BBC documentary ("Rwand's Untold Story) where our research was featured is accused of three things in an open letter signed by numerous individuals from diverse professions and locales:

-       playing down the number of tutsi victims

-       accusing the RPF of shooting down the plane

-       playing down the crimes of the Hutu militia

As we make no claims about the shooting down of the plane, we will ignore this comment.  The other two, however, merit a response as it is addressed by our work – at least, partially in the film.  Before beginning, however, it is useful to note that the letter of complaint identifies us as working for the Defense at the ICTR. Actually, the exact wording in their letter is: “two US academics who worked for a team of lawyers defending the génocidaires at the ICTR.” Several things merit attention about this comment.  

First, we were already working on doing a detailed study of the violence undertaken in Rwanda during 1994 paid for by the National Science Foundation.  This involved conducting interviews with genocidaires as well as survivors, conducting focus groups among those who lived in Rwanda during 1994 (Tutsi as well as Hutu), conducting a survey in Butare of experiences during 1994 as well as compiling diverse databases from different Rwandan ministries and human rights organization (both inside and outside Rwanda) as well as compiling information from all media coverage of Rwanda between 1985 and 1999.  The ICTR interaction was a small part of the larger research project.  

Second, the letter of complaint incorrectly represents the nature of our relationship with the ICTR.  For example, our services were requested by the Prosecution of the ICTR and this was our first contact with the organization. Specifically, they wanted:

  • Complete coding of witness statements which they had in their possession but they did not have the resources to enter and code (a “master chronology” from the ICTR Prosecution);
  • Conduct a comparative analysis of the chronology generated using their witness statements vs. other sources in our possession, noting zones of correspondence and disagreement;
  • Create an animation of killings on a day-by-day basis for country (lowest level will be determined by census data they can provide);
  • Create detailed maps of killings through out country, as well as maps of weapons types used and changing nature of violence over time;
  • Provide a GIS regression analysis to establish if killing patterns were non-random or systematic.

We were told that they wanted this so that they could “contextualize” their cases and have a broader understanding of what had happened during 1994. To meet these needs we requested the following:

  • Individual level records for 1991 census data (in order to calculate %Tutsi population) – source: Rwandan Ministry of Census;
  • 2001 cell level census data – source: Rwandan Ministry of Local Affairs;
  • Physical locations of party HQ or locations of individuals claimed to be associated with execution of genocide plan;
  • 1:50,000 topographic maps of Rwanda from Canadian defense forces (we were willing to provide the funds for this ourselves; they simply needed to make request on our behalf);
  • Complete set of interview records as well as existing database based on witness interviews so that we could code this information and conduct the comparisons noted above (the coding would be paid for by our NSF grant); and,
  • Unrestricted access to prisoners already convicted by the ICTR to ask them questions about what they did, what they saw and who was where in the country and when.

We asked for no consulting fee or anything besides what was requested above as well as the right to publicly distribute all information after the project was completed.  This was agreed to but we were told that everything would take a little time.  

Before we began this work, however, we were told that the Prosecution was no longer interested in a broader understanding of what happened and they were going to concentrate on the specific cases that they had on their docket.

Somewhat after this point, we were contacted by the Defense and asked if we would be willing to provide exactly what the Prosecution has earlier requested.  After we were informed that we would not be explicitly associated with the Defense (which was a concern for us) but rather that we would be providing information for the court (the Judges, Prosecution, Defense and official archive to be compiled as well as later made available to the public), we then repeated our list above about what was needed. After much negotiation, approximately 7000 readable witness statements were provided, a detailed topographic map of Rwanda on April 6th (this is before the revelations of available US satellite imagery that might be day to day) and access to some former members of the RPF and FAR to corroborate geographic locales.

The characterization of our relationship with the Defense and the nature of our research endeavor in the letter of complaint was thus incorrect.  But this is just the beginning/background.  Now, we move to the specific points themselves. 

1) It is suggested that we minimize the crimes of the Hutu militia. This is simply false. If anyone had seen the documentary and/or seen/read our discussion of what we found, then they would clearly see that we attribute the majority of the killing in 1994 to territorial zones under the jurisdiction of the FAR (the Rwandan government at the time) and those associated with them (including the various organizations referred to uniformly as the “Hutu militia” but which represented a conglomeration of distinct institutions).  We are not precise on the identification of the perpetrators of these crimes (e.g., presidential guard vs. different militias vs. gendarme vs ordinary citizens or combinations) because the evidence on this is unclear.  In some locations, individuals have been able to identify some of those responsible for killing.  In other locations, either no one was left alive to identify those responsible for killing or the survivors were not able to identify who was responsible – something that is quite understandable under the circumstances as well as something that is quite common in instances of mass killing.  Lacking this type of precise information, which no one in the public domain has with any degree of accuracy, we opted for an evaluation of killing designated by territorial control.  This is something that is more reasonable to estimate with available information.  Now, the differences between what specific perpetrators were involved in specific activities at a particular time (hour/day) and place (e.g., village) do not matter, if one is simply interested in whether or not someone died. If one is trying to affix blame, hold individuals accountable or understand what motivated individuals to engage in the different killing, however, then such information is crucial.

Was some of the violence that took place within the area of control of the FAR what would be legally classified as genocide?  Yes, without a doubt.  We have said this repeatedly.  Some of violence was clear as there were representatives of the state present, there were utterances that spoke to the issue of their intent in a specific time and place and there was violence. Unfortunately, however, we cannot be clear on how much of the violence (i.e., what proportion of all acts considered were legally classified as genocide) and that is because making such a judgment requires extremely detailed information about the victims, the perpetrators and the latter’s motives – the last characteristic being the hardest to understand as they reside within an individuals mind.  Our approach has been to adopt an approach based on detailed evaluations of political violence and assessing responsibility through a consideration of territorial control throughout Rwanda during 1994. Where possible we corroborate such information with ICTR eyewitness testimony and comments made in books written about Rwanda. Only through the comparison of the different sources can we begin to approach a reasonable answer.  Again, all the information used for these calculations are provided on the GenoDynamics webpage so that individuals can make their own investigations/evaluations.

Part of what is at issue is a belief that large numbers of casualties equals genocide, but this is not the case as it is a very specific legal phrase.  Large numbers of casualties are horrific, crimes against humanity and human rights violations, which have different criteria for identification, but they are not by definition genocide.  The ICTR here is instructive:

ICTR Statute 2010 

A. Genocide

Article 2: Genocide

1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

  1. Killing members of the group;
  2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
  4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
  5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

3. The following acts shall be punishable:

  1. Genocide;
  2. Conspiracy to commit genocide;
  3. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
  4. Attempt to commit genocide;
  5. Complicity in genocide.

B. Crimes against Humanity

Article 3: Crimes against Humanity

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:

  1. Murder;
  2. Extermination;
  3. Enslavement;
  4. Deportation;
  5. Imprisonment;
  6. Torture;
  7. Rape;
  8. Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
  9. Other inhumane acts.

C. Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II

Article 4: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:

  1. Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
  2. Collective punishments;
  3. Taking of hostages;
  4. Acts of terrorism;
  5. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
  6. Pillage;
  7. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilised peoples;
  8. Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

D. Individual Criminal Responsibility 

Article 6: Individual Criminal Responsibility

  1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.
  2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
  3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
  4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires.

Further information

HRW ICTR Case Law Digest

 “ICTR jurisprudence correctly recognizes the mental element of genocide in Article 2(2) above as its distinguishing feature, namely the requirement of a specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. This mental element applies to all material acts of genocide enumerated under Article 2(a)-(e) of the Statute. Since the underlying acts - such as killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm - are not international crimes as such, '[i]t is this specific intent that distinguishes the crime of genocide from the ordinary crime of murder.'' Thus, in addition to defining genocide, the requisite mental element also delineates the normative sphere of international criminal law from that of domestic law” (Akhavam 2005: 992).

There is also a conflict/overlap between Art. 2(3)(e) “complicity in genocide” and Art. 6(1) “or otherwise aided and abetted planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4”. There are, according to Akhavam, different interpretations of the ICTR regarding the dolus specialis/dolus generalis requirement for liability.

A side note on Data and our sources

Related to the criticism noted above, it is suggested in the letter that we provide "false figures". This is problematic because all of "our figures" (i.e., statistical estimates) come from the existing Rwandan government (i.e., the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport and the Ministry of Local Affairs) as well as three reputable human rights organizations (e.g., Human Rights Watch, African Rights and The Tutsi Survivor organization Ibuka).  All we have done is take the information from all of these different sources (in addition to ICTR eyewitness records, a survey in Butare, about a dozen focus groups and dozens of interviews), in order to generate estimates of the number killed as well as utilizing census records and demographic projections regarding the probable number of each ethnic group killed.  The project has been extremely detailed about every step of this process.  Indeed, unlike those that have criticized us, we not only make the original documents available for each source utilized (so that one can see what was done in each case) but we have provided our coding of that material (noting the precise page numbers from which it is taken), detailed descriptions of how we generated our estimates as well as the raw data that was generated.  We note very clearly that our estimates are improved with the inclusion of additional data and this is why we have continued to collect as much information as possible (to this day).  The imprecise nature of casualty estimates demands both the pursuit of additional sources and transparency.  If our figures are believed to be false, therefore, then that is a claim delivered against the current Rwandan government, one of the most prominent human rights organizations in the world and an organization that has been identified as the leading institution representing the Tutsi survivors.

 
2) It is suggested that we play down/trivialize the number of Tutsi victims.  To begin, there are no deaths that are trivial.  All human suffering is unacceptable and we (as a community of human beings) should work toward no one suffering from political violence – from any actor.  As for our estimation, again, if anyone had seen/read our discussion of what we found, then they would clearly see that we believe that there are a range of estimates on the number of total casualties as well as the number of casualties by the different ethnic groups involved.  There is no single number.  In fact, there is no way to discuss casualties figures without such ranges given the highly imprecise manner in which such figures are identified in conflict situations.  

Some objections that could be raised concern our use of the census taken in 1991 by the then Rwandan government.  For example, some wish to argue that the census of 1991 (a common starting point for an inquiry into how many Tutsi and Hutu died) is correct and that this is how the Rwandan government identified those that it wanted to kill.  Some wish to argue that the census of 1991 was not correct, however, and that it underestimated the number of Tutsi on purpose given the situation prompted by the interstate war but that the government still knew the actual number and used this to enact it’s killing. With this one could subtract the number believed killed from this number to derive at some understanding of how many of each group died (i.e., how many tutsi and how many hutu had been killed). If one did not trust the 1991 census, however, then they could go back to earlier censi (1978, the one undertaken in the 1950s or colonial records) – as we and others have done – and project forward with a specific population/ethnic group growth rate. 

The problem with the position that the census was off but the government still knew who was who is that no one has produced the document that was used by the government agents.  There is no “kill list” of 500,000 or 1,000,000 individuals that were located at different locations throughout the country that has been found – at least nothing that has been publicly distributed. Even partial lists (e.g., the names that were read over the radio) were small in comparison to the number of individuals commonly believed to be killed. The population is largely illiterate and thus even if such a list existed, exactly who would use it would be limited.

Essentially, research on the topic of Rwandan casualties has relied upon eye-witness testimony via survey, census and interviews. While insightful in many ways, none have released the original/raw data collected during efforts for external validation accept for isolated cases and/or a relative small number of individual’s stories. Generally, individuals have used compilations of these eye-witness testimonies, which while not as good in terms of quality as the raw data does allow one some evidenced-based investigation that can be evaluated in a rigorous manner. We encourage that all conversations about casualty counts should be based on evidence that is available to individuals so that the estimates can be validated as well as replicated. 

One reason for not releasing such information is to protect the memories of those that have been lost. This said, other large-scale mass killings (e.g., the Holocaust, the killing fields in Cambodia and even the Stalinist purges and Mao’s Cultural Revolution) have released data and/or had data discovered that has been evaluated by a variety of different scholars.  The public availability of the raw material has assured not only continued, rigorous interest – yielding important and new insights (as different researchers have continually found new things), but it has also assured quality control as the diverse scholars can look over each other’s work and make sure that nothing was done incorrectly. This is how the scientific enterprise works best.  This meets the highest standards of social science research and this is the standard that the topic of mass killing deserves. Alternatively, one could anonymize the records to protect individuals but still allow the remaining material to assist individuals with analyzing what happened, where and why.  Toward this end, we have several thousand eye-witness accounts from the ICTR and will be making these publicly available after we have finished the redaction of said documents in order to protect named individuals. 

A different response to the claim regarding our estimation of Tutsi victims is that almost all individuals acknowledge (implicitly and sometimes explicitly) that everyone “knew” what ethnicity everyone was but this is clearly a local phenomenon.  You know who your neighbors were but not those from several villages over.  This last point is important because there is another (often unstated) presumption that everyone was killed where they were from but given the large number of internally displaced persons (potentially several million), refugees (potentially several million) and repeated discussions of running as well as hiding, this is unlikely.  This also misses the problematic assumption that individuals can identify ethnic others while on the run for their lives, which current research suggests is very difficult to do.  

With these concerns in mind, we took information from before the questionable census of 1991 and projected forward diverse population growth rates (which is standard practice in demography) and found figures that were comparable to what was discussed in 1991 therefore allowing us to use it in our estimations. We also employed survivor figures from the Tutsi survivor association Ibuka as well as the census of genocide survivors.   We used this information to generate different estimates and then discussed what we believed to be the most reasonable among them given the information that was available. Within this work, there was no point estimate with a single figure – nor should there be. Our research identifies ranges (estimations with +/- error) and typically when the media covers our work they report single figures eliminating nuance, accuracy as well as uncertainty. Across most of our estimations, we generally do not find results that suggest that the Tutsi death toll was higher than the Hutu death toll because of the initial population totals as well as the varied ability to identify ethnicity within a largely fleeing population. All of this information (including the raw source material utilized in these calculations) is publicly available on our genodynamics webpage – a practice that has not been matched by any of those that have questioned our findings.

Evidence to counter our estimation would involve a more definitive population count of Tutsi and Hutu for 1994 (which has not yet been presented), a compilation of id cards distributed among the victims at genocide sites (which was never reported) and a systematic collection as well as evaluation of the witness statements by a neutral investigatory body of all victims and perpetrators both in and outside of Rwanda that could then be evaluated by scholars from around the world to assure competency and quality. To be more definitive on this issue, what is needed in order to provide an accurate assessment of the death toll (by ethnicity) is information on every single killing in Rwanda. This information would identify the perpetrator (by name, ethnicity and organization), victim (by name and ethnicity), space/place (e.g., village) and time (e.g., hour, day and week). With this information, we can more definitively provide an estimate for there will always be error in such calculations as not all of the information noted above would be available.  Without this information, however, then the type of estimation that we provide follows the best practices currently available in the social sciences.  Counter arguments should at a minimum make their raw material available so any concerned party can work through what was done in a reasonable manner.  This would facilitate discussion as well as understanding.  If someone has the will but not the resources to share such information, GenoDynamics will provide assistance in scanning, uploading, shipping or programming toward this end.  

Sincerely

GenoDynamics

Christian Davenport – University of Michigan
Allan Stam – University of Virginia
1 Comment

    Author

    Prof. Christian Davenport (University of Michigan), Prof. Allan Stam (University of Virginia) and guests will provide information about Rwandan political violence and mass political violence more generally.

    Archives

    October 2014

    Categories

    All
    Civil Liberties
    Data
    Evidence
    Political Violence
    Rwanda

    RSS Feed


Picture